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Annual Narrative Report

1 January — 31 December 1950



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
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Introduction

The calendar year 1950 may well be considered a year of decision in the European Command when events of the past twelve months, and decisions taken as a result of those events, are considered in comparison with the post-war years which preceded them. Prior to 1950, the final breakdown of quadripartite control of Germany and the imposition by Soviet occupation authorities of a blockade against Berlin led to initiation of certain emergency plans and programs within the command as a matter of basic security. When, in 1949, the Berlin blockade was lifted and relations between the Soviet occupation authorities and those of the Western powers seemed headed for improvement, the efforts of the command, within the limits of its resources, to prepare for any emergency which might arise were in no way lessened. The cumulative experiences of the 1945 - 49 period in American relations with the U.S.S.R. -- plus the deployment of relatively inadequate U.S. forces on the frontier between West and East where the first blows would fall -- made it imperative that security measures and intelligence activities be vigorously pursued at all times if potential disaster were to be averted.

In 1950, however, with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, a new significance was given such security measures as had already been taken in the European Command, while a sense of urgency pervaded the planning and preparation of such measures as were planned for the future. Under the increasing tension, relationships between the European Command and other United States commands and agencies in Europe were tightened and redefined; so were its relationships with the armed forces, not only of other friendly occupying powers, but of all those nations which were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In Western Germany, a new approach to relationships of the command with the German people was also accelerated by the almost parallel position in which both found themselves with respect to conditions existing in Korea at the outbreak of hostilities. The transition of U.S. Forces in Germany from an occupational (or police-type) force to a tactical one capable of taking the field upon short notice was also speeded by the flow of events.

Under these circumstances, and in order to attain the highest degree of combat readiness with the limited number of troops assigned the European Command, and under the peculiar geographical and political conditions existing in quartered Germany, the command addressed itself largely to the following major problems: (1) Reorganization of the European Command, and particularly the Army element of the Command; to meet such emergencies as might arise well in advance of the event; (2) Planning for operations in the event of an emergency, not alone with component services of the European

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Command, but with other friendly occupying powers and member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (3) Augmentation of troop strength in the command to overcome, at least in part, the serious strength deficiencies with which it faced the threatening situation existing in 1949 - 50; (4) Planning for the logistic support of augmented troop strength in Germany and for such modifications in logistic support of U.S. Forces in Germany as is dictated by the change of mission from one of occupation to tactical responsibilities; and the establishment of a line of communications across France which would be capable of supporting these forces in combat; (5) The intensification of training of troops and troop units to meet the unusual conditions existing in Germany and the deployment of U.S. troops in relation to those of other friendly powers to derive the maximum defense potential; (6) The setting up and operation of Mutual Defense Assistance Pact agencies in Europe and the training of troops of recipient nations in the care and employment of United States arms and equipment; (7) The administrative support of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) during its formative period and coordination with that headquarters in planning, and the position of the command in the overall command structure of SHAPE.

Reorganization of the European Command

The problem of implementing the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which provided that joint headquarters would be established in all oversea commands had been under constant study since 1949. The difficulty in the European Command arose largely from the fact that it was primarily and overwhelmingly an Army command. A secondary difficulty was the lack of personnel among the naval and air force components of the command for assignment to such a headquarters. The Air Force further objected to providing staff officers for EUCOM headquarters on the ground that EUCOM was basically an Army headquarters and that the effect of such assignment on the part of the Air Force and the Navy would be to provide staff officers for performance of Army staff work.

Personnel shortages did exist, preventing the separation of USAREUR headquarters from EUCOM, and since the joint Chiefs of Staff had recognized the peculiar conditions existing in this land-locked command, it was decided at the beginning of 1950 to retain the existing organizational structure until relationships and responsibilities arising from the new situation in Europe settled into position.

Outbreak of hostilities in Korea, bringing the possibility that while the United States was engaged in Asia an attack might be launched against it in Europe, made the requirement for maintaining a status of combat readiness acute. It also seemed essential that, before actual operations began, a theater organization capable of functioning during war should be brought into existence so that early, all-important tactical operations would not be hampered by a simultaneous reorganization. On 17 September, authority was requested from the Department of the Army to so reorganize the command at the earliest possible date.

The reorganization authorized by the Department of the Army on 20 November was centered largely upon the formation of the Seventh Army, a field army comprising the two major tactical units then in the command -- 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary. This field army would replace USAREUR in the command structure. On 24 November the Seventh Army was reactivated in Germany.

Planning for Possible Emergencies¹

As already indicated, planning to meet any emergencies which might arise as a result of deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations had been instituted prior to the current year. The Korean conflict served to underline planning in EUCOM and to give to such preparations a new note of urgency.

A matter of particular concern was the necessity for evacuating, in an emergency, the approximately 60,000 noncombatants in Western Germany. The necessity for evacuating such a number of civilians, including women and children, was no small problem under normal conditions. The fact that such an evacuation would occur at the same time that the U.S. forces would be attempting to parry the thrusts of forces far outnumbering them and that a large part of the energies of the small United States forces would have to be diverted to this effort was of the gravest concern. This problem was the subject of considerable staff study, and detailed, zone-wide plans for such an evacuation were worked out and rehearsed (by military personnel involved but not by civilians) during the year.

¹Because of the classification of this document, planning can be only summarily treated here. It will be discussed at length in a special study, "Planning in the European Command, 1949 - 50," (Top Secret) under preparation by the Historical Division, Headquarters, EUCOM.

Of much greater importance was planning for the concerted use of all manpower and resources in Western Europe to the maximum extent in event of emergency. In November 1949, General Handy was named senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representatives, Europe, with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, (USAFE) and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) completing the committee. Current directives to the JCS Representatives, Europe, and to the Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG) encompassed three categories of planning responsibilities:

- a. Unilateral Service Planning
- b. North Atlantic Treaty Planning
- c. United States Joint Planning

For the purposes of planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representatives, Europe, were assigned responsibility for North Atlantic Treaty regional matters as follows: Commander in Chief, USAFE, Northern Europe including the United Kingdom; CINCNELM, the Mediterranean including Northwest Africa; Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), Western Europe, including Germany.

Throughout the latter part of 1949 and the early part of 1950, this planning, together with definitive assignments of responsibility among the various interested and responsible commanders, continued. The outbreak of war in Korea, however, served to spur this effort, and arrangements were completed with other occupying powers for a deployment of troops without regard to zonal boundaries so that the greatest tactical potential could be achieved with forces and resources available to the Western Powers.

Within the European Command itself, a series of alert plans were drawn up, tested, modified as occasion demanded on a zone-wide basis; demolition plans and division of responsibility as to areas of defense among occupying powers were agreed upon; and the respective parts to be played by the High Commissioner and the Commander in Chief, European Command, in event of emergency, were the subject of an agreement almost ready for signature at the end of 1950. (See 1950 USAREUR Report, Chap. II.)

Troop Augmentation

Upon assumption of command in Germany, General Handy felt -- as his predecessors back to General McNarney had felt -- that the

troop strength of the command was not nearly in ratio to the missions and responsibilities assigned. Early in 1950, in order to begin implementation of planning which was then under way in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Department of the Army authorized an increase in strength to be effected during 1950 or in the early months of 1951.

The command was asked to return cadres to the United States for the organization of the first additional divisions. It was reported to the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, that it was the opinion of this command that in the future if large cadres were required from this theater, it would be desirable to ship replacement troops to the theater and accomplish the organization and training of the troops here. Already at a disadvantage when compared with the Soviet occupation forces, the return of large cadres to the United States for long periods of time would mean for the theater an even greater understrength of its best trained troops. It was also felt that some advantage in training in the terrain in which they would fight could thus be gained.

Outbreak of the Korean War served to delay the shipment of these divisions to the European Command and, at the end of the year, it was not known when and in what strength augmentation of troops in Germany would occur. This uncertainty was also heightened by the debate in Congress on the "troops for Europe" issue. Addition of several divisions to those United States forces already in Europe would undoubtedly play a psychological part in preparing European nations to participate in the common defense effort which would be far greater than the tactical value that an augmentation would have in comparison with the overwhelming opposing strength.

Logistical Problems

The augmentation of troops in the command, even at a distant and uncertain date, posed serious logistical problems for which planning and a certain amount of implementation of planning at an early date was essential. Because of the great time lag between requisitioning and delivery in this theater, it was necessary to anticipate a great many requirements and place requisitions far in advance. However, the two most serious logistical problems facing the command were, in order of their importance: (1) the establishment of an adequate line of communications to support combat operations of the augmented troop strength, and (2) the

provision of adequate troop housing to support this augmentation.

The policy of the United States occupation authorities was to relinquish, whenever possible, property under requisition from the Germans. In the past three years, large blocks of requisitioned property were returned to the German economy as the Army, through the Government at Bonn, moved into more and more quarters especially constructed for United States occupancy. Now, at a time when an effort was being made to win the support of the German people, it seemed that the unpopular but necessary process of re-requisitioning property would have to take place.

A certain number of casernes used in the housing of displaced persons were surveyed by the EUCOM Engineer Division, and it was learned that, except in a few instances, and by lowering the United States standards of billeting to the minimum, re-requisitioning of property could also be held to a minimum. Even this meant, however, that the West German Government would have to find or construct other quarters to house the displaced persons who presently occupy these casernes, and at an early date, to permit necessary repairs and renovation. These matters were arranged through the High Commissioner who, after EUCOM requirements were made known, carried out negotiations with the Bonn Government.

Still another problem arose as a result of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in New York during September 1950. At this conference it was agreed that, for tactical reasons, troops of the Western Powers could be stationed in West Germany without regard to occupation zone boundaries. Negotiations to obtain the necessary facilities to accommodate the troops in the new tactical locations were not complete at year's end. Agreement was expected early in 1951 which would enable new troop dispositions to be made.

However, the matter which caused the gravest concern in the command was the exposed line of communications from Bremerhaven to the U.S. Zone of Occupation. Bremerhaven, as the major port of supply for U.S. Forces in Germany, had the advantage of accessibility and, with a friendly power occupying East Germany, would be entirely satisfactory for the support of present troop strength and foreseeable augmentation.

With an unfriendly power occupying East Germany, the line of communications from Bremerhaven not only paralleled what might become the front line of battle, but was dangerously near to that line and capable of being cut both by land and by air.

Early in 1949 a study of alternate routes and ports of supply was made. As a result of that study, the French port complex of Bordeaux-La Pallice was selected as such an alternate. Upon request through the Department of the Army, negotiations were

undertaken by the State Department to effect an agreement with the French Government for use of this port area and certain rail lines, highways, depots, and storage facilities and for the establishment of signal communications essential to such a line of communications. This port area, although separated from the U.S. Zone of Germany by six hundred fifty miles, and involving large expenditures in funds and manpower for its establishment and operation, lay behind the command and was less vulnerable to severance.

At the same time, the 7966 EUCOM Detachment was organized to establish the nucleus for a wartime line of communications across France and to perform the necessary housekeeping functions attendant upon the receipt and storage of theater strategic stocks. These functions included representing the Commander in Chief in negotiations with the French authorities and construction of facilities required for storage. This agency was the successor to, and took over some of the personnel and facilities of, the AGRC-EA. Meanwhile, negotiations with the French regarding agreements on establishing a line of communications across France were finally concluded in November 1950. Current plans called for construction of facilities primarily for dead storage of strategic stocks with the line of communications becoming operational only in event of emergency.

Troop Training

The soldier serving in the European Command in 1950 was probably one of the best-trained in the U.S. Army. Realizing the overwhelming odds against which he would have to stand in event of attack, a rigid training program extending from individual, small arms training to zone-wide maneuvers of a joint and combined nature was carried out.

Individual and unit training had been intensively pursued for the past three years with a wide range of problems for small unit action covered. At Grafenwohr Training Area, every type of training except 90-mm. antiaircraft firing and 90-mm. moving tank firing had been conducted. During the year, special training programs — such as air transportability, 3.5 rocket launcher, indirect fire with medium tanks, and defense against atomic warfare — was also given.

At the beginning of 1950, the training program in the European Command was hampered by a lack of training areas and firing ranges, particularly for antiaircraft and tank firing. By arrangement with the British Occupation Forces the use of ranges for the 90-mm. antiaircraft firing and for combat tank firing was obtained. Negotiations were conducted with HICOG directed towards obtaining a division size training area with minimum impact on the German economy. As of the end of the year, no definite results had been achieved. In addition, a study was made of methods employed by the German Army in the use of land for maneuvers.

Two joint exercises involving the three component services were held during 1950. The first was a Command Post Exercise, Exercise SHAMROCK (CPX - 50), conducted in March; the second was a Command Maneuver, Exercise RAINBOW (FTX - 50), held in September. The objectives of both exercises were to develop staff officers experienced in joint operations, improve communications, test mobility, and, in general, to prepare all elements of the Command for any tactical emergency and achieve the highest level of combat readiness. Defects revealed as a result of these two maneuvers aided in determining the type of training program to be adopted in 1951.

The military school program continued to operate in 1950 to provide the necessary technical specialists. A change occurred in the training given service troops under the secondary mission program. In 1949, a varied training program to include use of crew-served weapons was given all service personnel designated as infantry replacements in case of an emergency. In 1950, as a result of experience gained, such training was confined to their training as riflemen since the small amount of time available from occupation duties for such training did not permit attainment of the degree of perfection required for operation and maintenance of crew-served weapons.

The evaluation of actual combat readiness of the command was difficult in view of the conditions prevailing. Staff officers and major commanders agreed that the command was well-trained by peacetime standards, but it was impossible to apply a single set of standards to such evaluations. On the basis of training inspections and performance in Exercise RAINBOW, it was felt that approximately three months of intensive training would be required for the Command to reach maximum operational effectiveness. (See Chap. IV, below, and 1950 USAREUR Report, Chap. III.)

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program

At the beginning of 1950, the whole MDAP program, for which the Commander in Chief, as United States Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe, was largely responsible, was still in a planning stage. The Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) were unable to enter their assigned countries, and firm supply and training programs could not be developed until an over-all strategic defense plan was approved by the President and bilateral agreements between the United States and other participating countries were signed.

On 27 January, these two conditions were fulfilled and the way cleared for establishment of MAAG's in Belgium (for Belgium and Luxembourg), Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. At an orientation meeting held in London on 11 - 13 January by the European Coordinating Committee, the problems facing the European Command in its support of the new program were considered. By this time, the lists of equipment to be shipped under the FY 1950 program were nearly firm, the tentative dollar value of the program amounting to \$891,500,000. This program was designed to bring practically all existing forces in recipient countries to operational level with enough spare parts to assure one year's maintenance (See Chap. VI, below).

Early in February, EUCOM headquarters was able to issue the first orders for movement of MAAG personnel. Between February and April, most of the MAAG's were in place and the program moved into an operational stage.

An important element of the program of re-equipping the forces of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations was the training of their troops in the operation and maintenance of this equipment to insure its maximum return. Instruction was of two general types: technical instruction, which was given at various technical schools in this command, and limited operational and maintenance training, given in training installations established by the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary. More than two thousand such personnel, to be used in their respective countries as instructors, were trained in the European Command during 1950.

A re-survey of equipment available for transfer to recipient countries from the European Command revealed, however, that the part to be played by EUCOM as a supplier would be much smaller than anticipated and that most of the equipment required would have to be sent directly from the United States.

With the exception of one position, an Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations with responsibility for top-level coordination of MDAP matters, the MDAP program did not involve increases in the EUCOM staff. However, it did involve a great many staff officers in MDAP matters in addition to their regular duties since, in each staff division concerned, one officer was assigned as a liaison officer for MDAP matters.

Responsibilities with Regard to SHAPE

The whole trend of events in 1950, including the closely interlocked planning of the other occupying powers with EUCOM and the mutual requirement to stand together in the face of the common foe, indicated the necessity for a supreme headquarters to coordinate planning and operations on a combined level. Acceptance in 1950 of this concept on a Governmental level and the selection of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe, late in 1950 gave to the North Atlantic Treaty members such a headquarters.

At the outset, the European Command became a part of General Eisenhower's command and, immediately, certain administrative missions were assigned. EUCOM was to budget for the new headquarters and administratively support it until such time as it was operational and prepared to take care of its own administrative support.

On 24 December, the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, reported to General Eisenhower by cable and placed all forces of the European Command under his command. General Eisenhower notified the Commander in Chief to continue in effect all previously existing plans, preparations and command and operational arrangements. At the end of 1950, the command structure of SHAPE had not yet been formulated and the place of the European Command in that structure was still unknown. EUCOM headquarters, however, through the 7966 EUCOM Detachment (with installations in Paris) and through personnel sent to Paris on temporary duty, was administratively supporting SHAPE and would continue to do so until relieved of that assignment.

Contents

	Page
Chapter I: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON THE EUROPEAN COMMAND.	1
I. The Korean Conflict.	1
1. General Effect of Korean War on the European Command	1
2. EUCOM Aircraft Assistance.	1
3. Lessons Learned.	3
4. Other Effects of the Korean War on EUCOM	4
II. Relations with Soviets and Satellites.	5
5. Threatened Invasion of West Berlin	5
6. Planning on Countermeasures in Case of Soviet Restrictions on East-West Commerce	6
7. Controlling Shipment of Critical Materiel to Soviets and Satellites	7
8. Soviet Missions with EUCOM	9
9. Czech Aircraft Incidents	14
III. Other International Matters Affecting the the Occupation	18
10. Augmentation of Forces in Germany.	18
11. Disregard for Zonal Boundaries	19
12. New Line of Communication Through France	22
13. Opening of EUCOM Dependents Schools in France	25
II: MISSION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES	27
I. Mission.	27
14. Evolution of EUCOM Mission	27
15. Letter of Instruction Defining EUCOM Mission.	28
16. Additional Statement of Mission.	28
17. Responsibilities of CINCEUR under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.	30
18. Mission of CINCEUR as Occupation Com- mander	30
19. EUCOM Support of SCAPE	31

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	Page
II. Organizational Matters.	31
20. Organizational Structure, 1 January 1950	31
21. Composition of Headquarters, EUCOM, at the Beginning of 1950.	32
22. General Summary of Major Organizational Changes during the Year.	34
23. Trends Affecting Organizational Changes	34
III: Build-up of Tactical Forces	36
24. Creation of a Field Army	36
25. Withdrawal of Troops from USAREUR.	43
26. Effect of Creation of the Seventh Army and Withdrawal of Troops from USAREUR Upon Organizational Structure of EUCOM	44
27. Establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe.	46
28. Authorized Expansion of Labor Service Type Units	47
IV. Program of Economy in Personnel and Operations.	48
29. European Command General Program of Economy.	48
30. Establishment of a Budget Advisory Committee.	49
31. Management Survey of EUCOM Staff Divisions.	49
32. Establishment of the EUCOM Logistic Planning Board	50
33. Other EUCOM Organizational Changes	51
V. Planning for Establishment of an Operating Unified Command	55
34. Reorganization Plans	55
35. The Air Force Position	56
36. The Army's Position.	57
37. Other Reorganizational Planning in 1950	58
38. Air Force and Navy Representation on the EUCOM Staff.	59
39. Move of COMNAVFORGER to Heidelberg	60
40. Administration of Joint Activities	60

	Page
VI. Creation of Units and Agencies to Handle U.S. Commitments in NATO and Obligations under the LOFC.	61
41. EUCOM Responsibilities for Implementation of MDAP.	61
42. Organizational Changes in the 7966 EUCOM Detachment	63
VII. Personnel Assignments in EUCOM.	64
43. Major Assignments in 1950.	64
Chapter III: MANPOWER IN THE EUROPEAN COMMAND.	68
I. Military Personnel.	68
44. Military Strength of the Command on 1 January.	68
45. Changes in Troop Basis for U.S. Army Forces	69
46. Build-up of Major U.S. Army Tactical Forces in Europe	70
47. Military Personnel Policy Trends and Changes.	71
48. Military Strength of the Command at the End of the Year.	78
II. Labor Service Personnel	78
49. Industrial Police and Labor Service Personnel Strengths on 1 January	78
50. Administration at the Beginning of the Year	79
51. Major Organizational Changes	80
52. Increased Strength Authorized for Labor Service Type Units	81
53. Status of Labor Service Personnel at the End of the Year.	82
III. Civilian Personnel.	83
54. Civilian Employee Strengths on 1 January.	83
55. Major Changes in Civilian Employee Policies	84
56. Civilian Employee Strengths on 31 December	85

	Page
Chapter IV: MILITARY TRAINING.	87
I. Scope of Problem	87
57. EUCOM Training Program for 1950	87
58. Staff Responsibility for EUCOM Training	88
59. Status of Training.	88
60. Intensification and Acceleration of Training.	89
II. Joint Maneuvers.	89
61. General	89
62. Exercise SHAMROCK (CPX-50).	90
63. Exercise RAINBOW (FTX-50)	96
III. Air Transportability Training.	104
64. Background.	104
65. Objectives.	104
66. Program	105
IV. Air Support of Army and Navy Operations.	108
67. Joint Operation Center and Ground Liaison Teams	108
V. Marksmanship	108
68. EUCOM Marksmanship Competition.	108
VI. Training Relationships with the British and the French	109
69. Nature of Relationship.	109
70. Training Areas and Ranges	110
71. Exchange of Units for Maneuvers	110
72. Other Activities.	111
V. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT	112
I. Main Developments.	112
73. International Factors	112
74. EUCOM Priority on ZI Stocks	113
75. Support of EUCOM Augmentation	114
76. Line of Communications Across France.	115

	Page
II. Logistical Support Activities	116
77. Logistical Support of Labor Service Units.	116
78. Supply and Procurement for Line of Communication (LOFC) Across France . .	118
79. Allocation of Quartermaster Stocks to USAFE.	119
80. Procurement for USNAVFORGER.	120
81. Support of SHAPE	120
82. Third Air Division	121
83. Logistical Support of Joint EUCOM Maneuvers.	121
84. Assistance to Nonmilitary Agencies and Individuals.	124
III. Supply.	125
85. Levels	125
86. Status of Line Items on Zone of the Interior Requisition	126
87. Berlin Supply.	126
IV. Procurement	127
88. Developments in Military Procurement .	127
89. Procurement of Foodstuffs in Germany .	128
90. Berlin Procurement	130
91. Procurement of Solid Fuels in Germany.	132
92. Disposal and Reacquisition of Surplus Property	133
Chapter VI: THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM	135
I. Early Planning and Organization	135
93. MDAP Responsibilities of the European Command.	135
94. Status of the Program, 1 January 1950.	135
95. Orientation Conference at London, 11 - 13 January.	136
96. Establishment of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups.	137
97. Administrative Support of the Advisory Groups	138
98. Fiscal Operations Related to MDAP. . .	139

Contents--(Continued)

	Page
II. Training Program Under MDAP	140
99. Participation in the Training Program	140
100. Instruction Provided by USAFE	142
III. Supply for Recipient Countries	143
101. Support of the End-Item Program	143
102. Supplying of MDAP Materiel by USAFE	145
IV. Communications Network	146
103. Responsibility for MDAP Signal Communications	146
104. Implementation of the Signal Plan	147
Chapter VII: RELATIONS WITH HICOG	150
I. Administration, Liaison, and Logistical Support	150
105. General Relationship	150
106. Military Personnel with HICOG	151
107. Liaison Activities	152
108. Logistical Support	155
109. Intelligence Operations	158
110. Schooling for HICOG Children	159
111. Finalizing OMGUS Liquidation	159
112. Transfer of DP Program to HICOG	160
II. Law, Order and Security	161
113. Judge Advocate Conference	161
114. New Legislation	162
115. Civilian Practice of Law	164
116. War Crimes Activities	164
117. Venereal Disease Control	166
118. Tear Gas for German Police	167
119. Sale of Dangerous Weapons	168
120. Labor Service Units	168
121. Emergency Planning	170
III. Matters Affecting the German People	171
122. German-American Relations	171
123. German Youth Activities	172

 Contents--(Continued)

	Page
124. Economic Aid to Germany.	174
125. Turn-Back of German Property . . .	175
126. Highway Maintenance Costs. . . .	177
127. Working with the German Press. . .	178
128. Making Germans Traffic Conscious	178
 Chronology Topics	 180
Chronology.	181
Glossary of Abbreviations	193
Supporting Documents.	198
Other EUCOM-USAREUR Reports Accompanying this Volume. .	201

Charts

Chart 1--Organizational Structure of the European Com- mand as of 1 January 1950. preceding	31
2--Organizational Structure of the European Com- mand as of 31 December 1950. preceding	45
3--Organizational Structure CPX-50. preceding	91
4--Exercise RAINBOW preceding	99
5--United States Organization for Western European Defense Matters preceding	135

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The second part of the report deals with the results of the work and the progress of the work.

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CHAPTER I

International Developments and Their Effect upon the European Command

I. The Korean Conflict

1. General Effect of Korean War on the European Command

Outbreak of the war in Korea served to emphasize for the European Command (EUCOM) an already existing sense of urgency in its preparation to meet a sudden emergency which had been anticipated since imposition of the Berlin blockade. The sudden attack in Asia focussed attention upon the grave potentialities inherent in Europe, where similar circumstances prevailed. Germany, like Korea, was a divided country, adjacent to Soviet satellite nations with obviously aggressive intentions. But while the need for strengthening the European Command was readily and widely recognized, the immediate effect of the Korean war, with its pressing manpower and logistic requirements, was to weaken U.S. forces in Europe.

2. EUCOM Aircraft Assistance

a. Transfer Arrangements. On 21 July, EUCOM received an urgent request from the Department of the Air Force for a carrier group to assist with immediate airlift operations to the Far East. The directive provided that one troop carrier group, with all available airplanes, crews (pilots, copilots, navigators, radio operators, flight engineers, and flight traffic clerks), and maximum selected maintenance personnel, be attached to the Military Air Transport Service

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(MATS), McChord Air Force Base, Washington, for temporary duty (TDY) assignment. The directive provided, further, that the unit would be returned when the emergency ceased to exist, but that if the European situation required an earlier return, such return would be effected within a ten-day period.¹ The same day, the 61st Troop Carrier Wing was ordered to transport the 61st Troop Carrier Group as then constituted, plus necessary augmentation of maintenance personnel, from Rhein/Main, Germany, to McChord Air Force Base (AFB), Washington for TDY assignment with the Military Air Transport Service. The order provided, further that upon termination of TDY with MATS the 61st Troop Carrier Group, personnel and aircraft, would return to Rhein/Main AFB, Germany; that MATS would assume operational control of the unit on departure from home station and furnish it with routes, to include navigation, maps, handbooks, logistical support, and current communications information; and that the Continental Air Command (CONAC) would provide facilities and logistical support at McChord AFB.² The first airplane departed 0800Z, 21 July, and the others departed as soon as they could be accommodated in the pipeline.³ Between 21 and 25 July, thirty-five C-54 aircraft had been flown from Rhein/Main to the zone of interior over the MATS Atlantic route, carrying 142 officers and 405 airmen. The movement involved the transfer of all organic aircraft of the 14th, 15th, and 53d Troop Carrier Squadrons, Heavy, plus attached maintenance personnel. By 26 July, these units were established at the McChord Air Force Base, Washington, and began operations over the great-circle route to Japan in support of the Korean conflict. No official announcement of the movement was made in the European Command. Headquarters, United States Air Force (USAF), informed all its commands on 28 July that, henceforth, it would neither announce nor confirm unit movements, and directed that its major commands and subordinate units follow the same policy. On 6 December, MATS was directed by Headquarters, USAF, to move the 61st Troop Carrier Group and units to Asheja Air Base, Kyushu, Japan, for attachment to the Far Eastern Air Force for administration, operational control, and logistical support. On 16 December, USAF notified the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), that effective 1 January 1951, the 61st Troop Carrier units were to be relieved from assignment to Headquarters, 61st Troop Carrier Wing, Heavy, and

¹ Cable AFOOP - OD - 5961, DAF to CINCAFE, 20 Jul 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Item 11.

² Cables EOOPG - 8656, CINCAFE to 61 Trp Carr Wg, and EOOPG - 8662, USAFE to 61 Trp Carr Wg, 21 Jul 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Items 12 and 14.

³ Cable ECCG - 8657, USAFE to DAF, 21 Jul 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Item 13.

USAFE, and assigned to MATS, thus ending the group's indefinite temporary duty status.⁴

b. Resulting Personnel Problems. The movement order of 21 July created a number of personnel problems, among them the fact that the suddenness of the move left a number of dependents in the European Command. It was decided that the best interests of the service required that dependents of the military personnel involved be returned to the zone of interior, and airlift space for early August was set aside to the extent that the allocated space did not displace essential military personnel. Marriages to German nationals and other aliens which had been approved but not performed also provided morale problems, and many of the personnel requested that they be returned to the European Command. The requests were carefully screened by the group executive officer to determine their validity and to establish an equitable means of disposition.⁵ By the end of August, 238 dependents had departed for the United States, thirty-three by airlift. Those remaining departed before the end of 1950. Automobiles belonging to families who wanted them returned to the zone of interior presented another problem. A car caravan provided the answer, with sixty-five automobiles being driven to Bremerhaven in three different convoys on different dates. Airmen were utilized as drivers, and one officer was responsible for every ten cars.⁶

3. Lessons Learned

EUCOM studied the Korean conflict with a view toward taking advantage of combat lessons learned there. Training bulletins on lessons learned from operations in Korea, published by the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, were studied and distributed

⁴(1) Hist Data, 61st Trp Carr Wg, Hv, Rhein/Main AFB, 1 Jul - 31 Aug 50, pp. 9, 15, 16, 140. SECRET. In USAFE Hist Div. (2) Cable AFOOP - 00 - 5913, Hq DAF to CINCAFE, 14 Dec 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Item 58.

⁵(1) Hist Data, 61st Trp Carr Wg, Hv, Rhein/Main AFB, 1 Jul - 31 Aug 50, p. 140. SECRET. In USAFE Hist Div. (2) Cables EPMPD - 8696, CINCAFE to DAF, 21 Jul 50, and AFMTP - 59331, DAF to CINCAFE, 25 Jul 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Items 15 and 16.

⁶(1) Hist Data, 61st Trp Carr Wg, Hv, Rhein/Main AFB, 1 Jul - 31 Aug 50, p. 12. SECRET. In USAFE Hist Div. (2) Staff Conf Notes, Hq USAFE, 11 Aug 50. RESTRICTED. In USAFE Hist Div. (3) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, EUCOM Hist Div, with J. Tustin, Hist, USAFE Hist Div, 29 Jan and 5 Feb 51.

down to battalions.⁷ Request was made of the Department of the Army for shipment to EUCOM of late model Russian weapons captured in Korea. It was hoped to obtain enough to permit issuing a full set to each battalion-size combat unit for indoctrination and familiarization purposes. None had arrived by the end of 1950 although further correspondence designated specifically the kind of weapons wanted.⁸ Further training data based upon experiences in Korea and received by EUCOM concerned the successful utilization of liaison-type aircraft and ground control parties for the purpose of guiding tactical aircraft to specific targets.⁹ This information was relayed by EUCOM headquarters to interested units, together with further data received from the Department of the Army in reply to EUCOM's inquiry as to the type of liaison aircraft used to spot targets for close support Air Force missions in Korea and the type of radio used for communications between spotter and fighter bomber. These were the T-6 "Mosquito" aircraft, and the T-6 aircraft communication equipment VHF SCR-522 with four channels.¹⁰

4. Other Effects of the Korean War on EUCOM

The Korean war also weakened the logistic support of EUCOM from the zone of the interior because of the essential requirement to support the Korean action. This effect is discussed in pars. 73 and 74, below. In the face of this difficult logistical situation, however, the Korean war also initiated a move to reinforce the

⁷(1) Cable SX - 2189, CINCEUR to COFSA, 7 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II, Item 109. (2) OCAFF Tng Bul No. 1, 15 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II, Item 109a.

⁸(1) Cable S - 2669, CINCEUR to COFSA, 4 Oct 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II, Item 127. (2) Cable W - 93969, CINCEUR to COFSA, 5 Oct 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II, Item 129. (3) Ltr, Maj F. M. Graham, Asst AG, EUCOM, to TAG, 15 Dec 50, sub: Russian Equipment for Training in the European Command. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II, Item 148a. (4) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col P. V. Tuttle, G/Trp Tng Sec, OPOT Div Tng Br, 11 Jan 51.

⁹(1) Ltr, Maj Gen Edward M. Arnold, COFS FEC, to Maj Gen Charles L Bolte, ACOFS USA, 24 Jul 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, B/P. (2) Ltr, TAG to CINCEUR, 25 Aug 50, sub: Control of Tactical Air Support. SECRET. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Item 21a.

¹⁰(1) Cable SX - 1791, USAREUR sgd Handy to COFSA, 16 Aug 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Item 20c. (2) Cable, W - 89419, COFSA to CINCEUR, 22 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS USAFE (1950), Vol. I, Item 20d. (3) Memo, Lt Col C. P. Winton, SGS Staff Studies Off, to Lt Col H. Snyder, SGS, 4 Sep 50. SECRET.

European Command with additional troops, a move which in turn raised serious problems. Troop augmentation problems involving relations with British and French occupying forces are discussed in pars. 10 and 11, below. Internal manpower problems of the European Command are treated in Chapter III.

II. Relations with Soviets and Satellites

5. Threatened Invasion of West Berlin

Meanwhile, relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites continued to deteriorate throughout 1950. The easing of tension which followed the lifting of the Berlin blockade proved of short duration. In divided Germany, where occupying forces of the east and west faced each other and where, in event of trouble, its initial phases would be pinpointed, the undercurrents of basic differences rose to the surface. As early as January 1950, the communist-inspired Free German Youth organization (Freie Deutsche Jugend) announced that more than five hundred thousand East German youth would parade and demonstrate in the Allied sectors of Berlin during their Whitsuntide rally, to be held 26 - 30 May, 1950, in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. The rally was popularly known by its German name of "Deutschlandtreffen," and was held under the auspices of the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik), the Soviet-sponsored "peoples republic" in East Germany. The Allied powers felt that such an invasion of West Berlin might constitute a serious security threat and made their preparations accordingly. Announcement by the western occupation powers, with physical evidence to substantiate it, that they would employ their military forces to back up the West Berlin authorities, stimulated the morale of the West Berlin population and their police. It also served as a very powerful deterrent to the East German communists, who might have been tempted to go to great lengths, including an attack against the unsupported West Berlin police. The three western powers had prepared individual plans for evacuation of noncombatants, defense of vital installations, and suppression of disturbances. The planning and preparations undertaken by the U.S. Commander, Berlin, and the Berlin Military Post, together with the major lessons learned from the experience, are reported in detail in a special study prepared by the EUCOM Historical Division, under the title of "Security Aspects of Deutschlandtreffen: Preparations for Meeting the Threat of the Communist Rally in Berlin, Whitsuntide, 1950." Actually, there were no serious disturbances during the period. This was attributed, in large measure, to the firmness and preparedness with

which communist aggressiveness was met.¹¹

6. Planning on Countermeasures in Case of Soviet Restrictions on East-West Commerce

In March, Mr. John J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, discussed with General Handy the possibility of having to initiate countermeasures against Soviet or Soviet-designed actions in restriction of East-West commerce.¹² Accordingly, EUCOM headquarters prepared a plan which would, as required, regulate, curtail, or terminate traffic crossing the U.S. zonal borders adjacent to the Soviet Zone of Germany and Czechoslovakia. In general, the plan provided for the closing of all unofficial crossing points and the exercise of controls at official crossing points. It was to be implemented primarily by U.S. military personnel or by German personnel under U.S. military supervision. Additional features of the plan involved the control and supervision of German border officials, border police and state (Land) police; inspection and documentation of rail and vehicular cargoes; and regulation and proper documentation of personnel moving across this portion of the U.S. zonal border. The plan was designated Operation CONCOURSE, and was phased to permit either a gradual slowdown of traffic or a complete cessation of all such traffic, as desired. General Handy forwarded this plan to the U.S. High Commissioner, indicating that, to be truly effective, it would be essential for the three zones to work together in any implementation of such counterblockade measures and that the British must be prepared to implement a similar plan in their zone which must be coordinated with the EUCOM plan.¹³ Subsequently Mr. McCloy was requested to mention this to appropriate German governmental authorities to insure their cooperation, and to discuss this matter with the British and French High Commissioners with a view to obtaining similar action on the part of their occupation authorities.¹⁴ Mr. McCloy informed Chancellor Adenauer of the

¹¹ EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Security Aspects of Deutschlandtreffen: Preparations for Meeting the Threat of the Communist Rally in Berlin, Whitsuntide, 1950. SECRET.

¹² Ltr, Gen Handy to Mr. McCloy, 13 Mar 50. SECRET. In EUCOM SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 4c.

¹³ (1) Ltr, Gen Handy to Mr. McCloy, 27 Apr 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 10b. (2) Memo, Col B. E. Thurston, Asst DCOFS for Opns, to Brig Gen E. T. Williams, DCOFS for Opns, 27 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 16.

¹⁴ (1) Ltr, Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 12 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Items 13a and 15. (2) Ltr, Gen Handy to Mr. McCloy, 29 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 17. (3) Ltr, Gen Handy to Mr. McCloy, 30 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 27.

existence of the plan, but felt it unnecessary to discuss the matter further until a coordinated plan for the three zones had been effected. Further, Mr. McCloy informed General Handy that both the British and the French High Commissioners had been notified concerning the existence of Operation CONCOURSE and requested that British and French military authorities be approached in order to effect tripartite consideration.¹⁵ General Handy then forwarded letters to General Guillaume and to General Keightley, with copies of Operation CONCOURSE attached, which suggested that they send representatives to Heidelberg on 16 October 1950 for the purpose of coordinating their respective zonal plans with the U.S. plan.¹⁶ The French agreed to send a representative. However, the British indicated that they had not received instructions from their High Commissioner and as a result were not prepared to participate in tripartite discussions concerning this matter.¹⁷ At the end of 1950, additional action on this matter had not been taken pending further word from the British.¹⁸

7. Controlling Shipment of Critical Materiel to Soviets and Satellites

EUCOM was confronted in 1950 with the danger inherent in the uncontrolled shipment of war potential products to the Soviet Union

¹⁵ (1) Ltr, Mr. McCloy to Gen Handy, 27 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 33A/a. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 29 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 35a.

¹⁶ (1) Ltrs, Gen Handy to Lt Gen Sir Charles F. Keightley, CINC BAOR, and Gen August Guillaume, CCFPA, 4 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Items 36 and 37. (2) Ltr, Gen Handy to Mr. McCloy, 12 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 41.

¹⁷ (1) Cable 483 - COS (SMC IN 1451), COFS, BAOR, to CINCEUR, 10 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 40. (2) Ltr, Lt Gen Sir Charles F. Keightley, CINC BAOR, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 12 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 43a. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col B. F. Taylor, C/Sp Plans & Policy Br, OPOT Div, 15 Jan 51.

¹⁸ Memo, Lt Col C. P. Stone, Asst to DCOFS for Opns, for Brig Gen E. T. Williams, DCOFS for Opns, 13 Oct 50, sub: Tripartite Meeting Scheduled for 16 October 1950. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 45.

and its satellites.¹⁹ EUCOM intelligence indicated that many such products were shipped both legally and illegally into the Soviet Zone and to the satellite states from the western zones. Among the products were critical items that tended to increase the Soviet war potential almost immediately, especially in the fields of atomic, chemical, and guided-missile warfare.²⁰ The matter was discussed with Chancellor Adenauer at an Allied High Commission Council meeting on 17 August in an effort to obtain the German Federal Republic's cooperation in preventing such shipments. In particular, reference was made to the shipments of seamless pipe, which increased mobility of Soviet armed forces, from Ruhr plants to Austria and to the illegal shipment of ball bearings and rubber-compounding agents. The Chancellor promised to investigate and the council appointed a working group to study the matter.²¹ More rigid procedures for closer control of shipments and thorough border inspections were suggested to the German authorities. However, a difficulty encountered was that when Germans were prohibited from shipping goods directly to the east across their own borders, they could circumvent the prohibition by selling to Western European firms that shipped the same items by water, rail and/or air directly to the Soviet Union or its satellites.²² The entire matter was considered of sufficient importance to warrant solution at the highest governmental level. As an interim measure, EUCOM recommended that HICOG deny the Soviets, or their agencies, all critically important products, as determined by EUCOM intelligence, being produced in the U.S. Zone for shipment to the Soviet Zone or to Soviet satellites. When possible, the manufacture of such items should be prohibited; and, if not, then the finished product should be impounded with a view to destruction or sale to friendly countries.²³ At a preliminary London meeting on export controls, delegates from the United States, Great Britain, and France had submitted joint recommendations for discussion with other countries participating in the consultative group meeting in Paris on 29 November. These

¹⁹ (1) IRS, DCOFS for Opns, to D/Intel, 3 Aug 50, sub: Shipment of War Potential Materials. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 21. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG, 12 Sep 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 31.

²⁰ Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG, 12 Sep 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 31.

²¹ Cable SMC IN 293, HICOG to Secy of State, 17 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 22.

²² Ltr, Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG, to Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, 21 Sep 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 33A/a-1.

²³ Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG, 12 Sep 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 091.311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 31.

delegates recognized that criteria for preventing exports to the Soviet bloc of goods urgently required for western defense were different from those theretofore applicable to international lists. They proposed, therefore, that such criteria should be considered by other organizations directly concerned with defense programs and with control of raw materials and goods in short supply to the west. It was agreed that deputies of the three Foreign Ministers on the North Atlantic Council should consider the problem and recommend action to be taken.²⁴ As of 31 December 1950, no positive action had been taken on a higher governmental level, and the same condition continued to exist.²⁵

8. Soviet Missions with EUCOM

a. Withdrawal of Travel Passes from Military Liaison Mission.

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on Control Mechanism in Germany, 14 November 1944, the U.S. and Soviet Commanders in Chief, Zone of Occupation Germany, exchanged military liaison missions. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission was located in Frankfurt, and the U.S. mission in Potsdam. Each consisted of fourteen military personnel, and their members held permanent passes entitling them to complete freedom of travel in the zones, except in places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision. Five U.S.-Soviet Zone crossing points were specifically designated for entry and exit of mission members, without any prior authorization being required. Dependents of mission members, however, required travel orders and, thus, when the EUCOM Adjutant General Detachment at Frankfurt was about to move to Heidelberg, the Soviet mission was notified, on 18 November 1949, that henceforth requests for such orders would have to be made seven days in advance in order to permit processing to Headquarters, EUCOM, for publication and return. Dependents required travel orders to leave the U.S. Zone in order to receive the authorized free rail transportation and to be covered while transiting the British Zone. They were not authorized to cross at the five crossing points.²⁶ The Soviet authorities protested

²⁴IRS, POLAD to SGS, 1 Dec 50, sub: Export Controls. SECRET. In SGS 091,311 (1950), Vol. I, Item 48a.

²⁵Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj D. W. Glenn, Staff Off, and Mr. F. H. Copp, C/Economic Sec, Intel Div Analysis Br, 8 Jan 51.

²⁶(1) IRS, D/CAD to VCOFS, 20 Mar 50, sub: Ltr from Col Ivanov to Gen Huebner re: entry/exit from American Zone by Soviet Officers. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 19. (2) Agreement, Military Liaison Missions Accredited to the Soviet and United States Commanders-in-Chief of the Zone of Occupation in Germany. Incl 1 to ltr, Asst AG to CG USAREUR, 2 Aug 50, sub: Travel of Members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, and for Soviets Transiting the U.S. Zone of Germany. AG 014,331 CAD - AGO. RESTRICTED.

against this change on 7 March 1950, alleging that it placed restrictions on free travel to and from the Soviet Zone of Germany. On 27 March, EUCOM replied that the five crossing points were still available to mission members, and that inconveniences, if any, might occur only if they preferred travelling from Frankfurt to Berlin. In such a case, they would require travel orders for clearance through the British Zone, since they were accredited only to the U.S. Zone. EUCOM further pointed out that, although it was originally estimated that travel clearance would require several days, actually travel orders had been issued within twenty-four hours from receipt of the request and that, from 15 November 1949 to 27 March 1950, only four such requests had been received.²⁷ Nevertheless, in retaliation, the Soviets withdrew the passes of the U.S. mission members on 12 May and substituted a pass permitting travel only between Potsdam and Berlin, their place of residence. As a matter of reciprocal action, EUCOM revoked the passes of the Soviet mission members in Frankfurt on 19 May, eight days later, and replaced them with passes good only for transit between their office and residence. Passage to Berlin, or the Soviet Zone, required special authorization for each trip. This action was discussed with HICOG and received full accord. The British and French Military Liaison Missions were likewise affected and took similar action.²⁸ The Soviets protested once again, on 7 June, maintaining that the EUCOM travel restrictions violated the agreement for an exchange of missions. EUCOM, however, answered on 19 June that the restrictions were precipitated by their own action and that when they were ready to comply with the original agreement, EUCOM would reciprocate.²⁹ A further complaint of the Soviets was that at least their mission members were entitled to the free run of the city of Frankfurt, since U.S. mission members

²⁷ (1) Ltr, Col Gen S. Ivanov, 1st Deputy HCOMDCS, Gps of Soviet Occupying Armies in Europe, to Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, EUCOM DCINC, 7 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 15a. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, VCOFS EUCOM, to Col Gen S. Ivanov, 1st Deputy HCOMDCS, Gps of Soviet Occupying Armies in Europe, 27 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 20.

²⁸ (1) Cable SX - 2937, CINCEUR to COMSA, 19 May 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 29. (2) Cable 1, HICOG to State Dept, 19 May 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 26.

²⁹ (1) Ltr, Col Gen S. Ivanov to Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, 7 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 40b. (2) Ltr, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, EUCOM DCINC, to Col Gen S. Ivanov, 1st Deputy HCOMDCS Gps of Soviet Occupying Armies in Europe, 19 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 47.

were able to travel freely between Berlin and Potsdam, and the four enlisted members residing in Potsdam were not restricted to residence and office quarters only. EUCOM, however, did not yield to this request, as it felt that doing so would probably delay regaining freedom of travel throughout the Soviet Zone. Any retaliatory tightening of restrictions against the Potsdam mission would not affect EUCOM adversely from an intelligence standpoint, since freedom of travel between Berlin and Potsdam was of no particular value while circulating in the entire Soviet Zone was.³⁰ Apparently this decision was sound, for on 11 July, in reply to the EUCOM communication of 19 June, the Soviet authorities advised that the permanent passes would be returned to the Potsdam mission members, authorizing free movement throughout the Soviet Zone. This was effective 14 July 1950, and on the same day EUCOM returned their former passes to the Soviet mission members in Frankfurt.³¹ On 2 August 1950 a new EUCOM directive was issued to cover travel of members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, as well as that of Soviet personnel transiting the U.S. Zone of Germany.³² During the latter part of the year there was an apparent change of Soviet attitude toward the U.S. Military Liaison Mission. Colonel John P. Evans, chief of the mission, was warmly received in Potsdam by General V. I. Chiuikov, chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, in a friendly personal office visit of over one hour's duration on 23 December. Subsequently six bottles of vodka were sent to him with seasonal greetings. On 30 December, the Soviet authorities promptly issued new passes for travel in the Soviet Zone by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission although delay and argument had been expected.³³

b. Soviet Request to Re-establish Repatriation Mission. Early in 1950, Maj. Gen. M. Yurkin, Chief, Department of Repatriation and Search for Soviet Citizens, Administrative Office of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany, requested EUCOM permission to enter

³⁰ Cable S - 3575, POLAD to HICOG, 30 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 53.

³¹(1) Ltr. Col Gen S. Ivanov to Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, 11 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 56a.
(2) EUCOM Press Release No. 683, 14 Jul 50, PID Rear. UNCLASSIFIED.
(3) IRS, D/CAD to SGS, 19 Jul 50, sub: Publication of Directive Regarding Soviet Mission. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 59.

³²Ltr, Asst AG to CG USAREUR, 2 Aug 50, sub: Travel of Members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, and for Soviets Transiting the U.S. Zone of Germany. AG 014.331 CAD - AGO. RESTRICTED.

³³Cable SX - 1050, CINCEUR to COFSA, 3 Jan 51. SECRET. In CAD files.

the U.S. Zone, Germany, for purposes of discussing questions connected with the repatriation of Soviet citizens.³⁴ The former Soviet Repatriation Mission, located in Frankfurt, Germany, was expelled in February 1949, because EUCOM felt that the small number of Soviet citizens available for repatriation did not justify its existence. However, the Soviet authorities have since made repeated efforts to have the mission re-established.³⁵ EUCOM was not averse to repatriation work on their part, but maintained that repatriation of the few remaining Soviet nationals could well be handled by the personnel of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission.³⁶ Nevertheless, the request for a conference was granted and on 3 February discussions were held in Heidelberg between Soviet representatives and Col. B. E. Ferris, head of the Civil Affairs Division. The Soviet representatives consisted of Major General Yurkin, and his assistants, Colonel Gavrizov and Lieutenant Colonel Verschinin. Also present were Colonel Pavlov, Chief, Soviet Military Liaison Mission, his interpreter Lieutenant Terokin, and Mr. Donald Hyde, International Refugee Organization (IRO) liaison representative with the Civil Affairs Division. The entire discussion proved merely another request for re-establishment of the Soviet Repatriation Mission in the U.S. Zone, Germany, in order to accelerate the return of Russian nationals to their country. General Yurkin was advised that "since this was a request on his part he should initiate the request from his Berlin office and route it through normal channels to the U.S. authorities." The general then asked permission to visit some of the displaced person (DP) camps. He was told this was impossible because U.S. authorities had received no answers to two letters written to his office, asking for the repatriation of American dead in the Soviet Zone of Germany. He expressed regrets and gave assurance that immediately upon his return to Frankfurt he would issue orders that the letters be answered at once. He also stated that permission would be granted

³⁴ (1) Memo, Maj H. H. Hammond, C/SGS Staff Studies, to Gen Handy and Gen Huebner, 30 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 1. (2) EUCOM Cir 11, 27 Jan 49, sub: Repatriation of Soviet Citizens Subject to Repatriation Under the Yalta Agreement. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM Cir 58, C 2, 28 Mar 49, sub: Privileges of Soviet Liaison Personnel in Assembly Centers Other Than Those Wholly Soviet. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁵ (1) Memo, Maj H. H. Hammond, C/SGS Staff Studies, to Gen Handy and Gen Huebner, 30 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 1. (2) Memo, Harvey L. Horwich, EUCOM Hist Div, 11 Feb 50, sub: Report on Berlin Trip, pp. 19 - 20. SECRET. In Hist Div Doc Br.

³⁶ IRS, D/CAD to SGS, 28 Mar 50, sub: Query Concerning Major General Yurkin. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 12.

for U.S. personnel to repatriate the soldier dead indicated in the two letters. General Yurkin was informed that until this written permission was received he could not go outside the Heidelberg-Frankfurt area.³⁷ This pressure was also effective, for on 9 February the Soviet authorities gave permission to the American Graves Registration Command unit to enter the Soviet Zone of Germany to disinter the bodies of U.S. officers and soldiers and return them to the U.S. Zone.³⁸ The unit received most unexpected cooperation from the Soviet authorities in the turnover of bodies of deceased U.S. military and merchant marine personnel. The Soviet authorities even provided a specially prepared railroad car, zinc-sealed caskets bearing bronze plates, and an honor guard, for the transfer in Berlin.³⁹

c. Termination of Reparation Mission. In keeping with its policy of limiting the movement of Soviet nationals in the U.S. Zone, Germany, EUCOM made inquiry of HICOG during May 1950 concerning the Soviet Reparation Mission, which was accredited to the HICOG Protocol Division. No comparable American mission was maintained in the Soviet Zone and EUCOM maintained that the mission should be requested to leave the zone if its work was accomplished.⁴⁰ The mission consisted of three persons and maintained an office in Frankfurt. Its work concerned the dismantling and delivery of plants and equipment made available for reparation. Actually, final shipment of reparations to the Soviet Union from the U.S. Zone had been completed in May 1949. Nevertheless, the mission was permitted to continue pending final decision concerning fifteen plants tentatively earmarked for delivery to the Soviet authorities. When the plants were finally allocated to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (IARA) and the purpose of the mission in the U.S. Zone

³⁷(1) IRS, D/CAD to CINCEUR, 3 Feb 50, sub: Vist of Major General Yurkin and party. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 7. (2) Cable SC - 11628, CINCEUR to US Elm, Interzonal Facilities Bureau, Berlin, 30 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 2. (3) Cable SX - 1324, USAREUR to Mil Posts and IRO, 31 Jan 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 4.

³⁸(1) Memo, Miss Simpson to Gen Noce, 9 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 9. (2) Memo, Harvey L. Horwich, EUCOM Hist Div, 11 Feb 50, sub: Report on Berlin Trip, pp. 19 - 20. SECRET. In Hist Div Doc Br.

³⁹Cable SX - 1050, CINCEUR to COFSA, 3 Jan 51. SECRET. In CAD files.

⁴⁰Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG, 29 May 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 36.

accomplished,⁴¹ HICOG replied on 12 June that there was no reason for this mission to continue. Before final action was taken to send out the mission, Mr. McCloy wished to consult the State Department. He also wanted to choose an appropriate time when ordering the mission out would have the best political effect.⁴² So far as the State Department was concerned, HICOG was authorized to terminate the mission whenever it was deemed most suitable. It interposed no objections to postponement.⁴³ On 5 July, the three members of the mission left Frankfurt for Berlin under sixty-day leave orders issued at their request. They failed to return within the specified time, and having had no further word from them as late as November, HICOG decided the time was then propitious for cancelling the mission's accredited status. Accordingly, the Allied Contact Branch, Civil Affairs Division, was requested to arrange with the Soviet Military Liaison Mission for one of its members to accompany HICOG officials to the residential and official quarters provided the Soviet Reparations Mission in Frankfurt, to remove their personal belongings. This was accomplished and on 20 December the Soviet Reparations Mission ceased to have accredited status in the U.S. Zone of Germany.⁴⁴

9. Czech Aircraft Incidents

a. The Erding Air Base Incident. Three Czech C-47 type aircraft carrying a total of eighty-five persons landed at Erding Air Base, U.S. Zone, Germany, between the hours of 0710 to 0802Z on 24 March 1950, illegally and without prior warning. Available information indicated that the flight of the three planes to Germany was the result of a pilot's plot rather than an operation of wide ramifications. It was planned by the pilots the day before and only a

⁴¹ Cable 357, HICOG to Secy of State, 6 Jun 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 40a.

⁴² Ltr, Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy HICOG, to Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, 12 Jun 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 41a.

⁴³ Cable 285, State Dept to HICOG, 28 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 322.01 USSR (1950), Vol. I, Item 52.

⁴⁴ (1) Ltr, E. F. McCollum, C/Prop Div Reparations & Restitution Br, HICOG Office of Economic Affairs, to Maj P. E. Connor, Jr., Allied Contact Br, CAD, 21 Nov 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In Prop Div, HICOG Office of Economic Affairs. (2) Memo, E. P. McCollum, to H. E. Ferrell, HICOG Office of Political Affairs, 20 Dec 50, sub: Detachment of Russian Liaison Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In Property Div, HICOG Office of Economic Affairs. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with John R. Cain, Sp Asst to C/Property Div, HICOG Office of Economic Affairs, 30 Jan 51.

few of the passengers were aware of the "escape." They were quite surprised when the aircraft landed at Erding Air Base rather than at Prague, their destination. Religious reasons and personal fear were given as explanation of the flight.⁴⁵ USAFE immediately notified EUCOM headquarters by telephone, and a preliminary report was sent to the U.S. Embassy, Prague, with information copies to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and HICOG headquarters in Frankfurt. The Czech consul general in Munich was advised of this unlawful landing in sufficient time to permit his having a representative at the Erding Air Base within twenty-four hours. Of the eighty-five persons, twenty-six indicated a desire to remain in Germany. Thus, interrogation of this latter group by a detachment of the 66 CIC and a USAFE intelligence team was started at once. HICOG was requested to arrange through the Land Commissioner, Bavaria, to accept U.S. responsibility for the persons desiring to return to Czechoslovakia, and also to accept, as soon as CIC and Intelligence screening was completed, the U.S. responsibility for those preferring to remain in Germany. This latter group was later turned over to appropriate German authorities for processing as political refugees. Immediately upon arrival, the Czech vice-consul requested that food and lodging be provided by the base until such time as he could obtain proper papers and transportation for those wishing to return to Czechoslovakia. During their stay, the entire group was accorded every possible consideration consistent with military security and available facilities. The men were billeted in bachelor officers' quarters (BOQs) and the women in Women's Air Force quarters. The food served them was identical to that served the airmen at Erding. Mess personnel worked overtime to feed the returnee group on the night of 27 March and the morning of 28 March so that they might have a hot meal prior to their departure by bus for Czechoslovakia. In order to make their stay on the base more pleasant, cigarettes, matches, candy, and chewing gum were distributed and a tour of the unclassified portions of the base was conducted for them. Although they were served 696 meals, no charge was made either for food or quarters. It was felt better to forego such charges rather than provide material for any possible distortion of facts. The Erding commanding officer made a personal inspection of the quarters on 25 March and talked with the English-speaking members of the group. They indicated there was nothing lacking for their comfort. The persons returning to Czechoslovakia actually cleared Erding Air Base 0830 hours on 28 March 1950. No incidents occurred except that the Erding Air Base commander requested the returnees to sign a statement acknowledging that they had received good treatment while in

⁴⁵(1) Cable SX - 2108, CINCEUR to US Embassy, Prague, 24 Mar 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 4.
 (2) Hist Data, 85th Air Depot Wing, Erding AFB, 1 - 30 Mar 50. SECRET. In USAFE Hist Div.

the hands of the Air Force. Thirty-one signed the statement, but after the Czech vice-consul spoke to them, several scratched their signatures and the others refused to sign. Their departure was not delayed by reason of the refusal. The three C-47 planes were given minimum required daily maintenance and payment of dollar charges for landing, storage, and service facilities was required before USAF released the planes. In notifying the air attache, U.S. embassy, Prague, that the three planes were being held pending disposition instructions, it was recommended that pressure be asserted in this connection to either accomplish the return of two other Czech planes remaining in the U.S. Zone since 1948 or to obtain Czech acknowledgment of their abandonment.⁴⁶ Decision was reached by Czechoslovakia to abandon these two planes.⁴⁷ Upon payment of \$1,304.94 due as charges on two other planes released in 1948 for return to Czechoslovakia, and the amount of \$154.50 accrued charges on the three C-47 planes, which had landed on 24 March 1950, plus the costs of gas and oil required for their departure, the three planes were released and departed for Czechoslovakia on 3 May 1950.⁴⁸

b. Resulting New Policy Directive. The handling of this incident revealed the need for a written EUCOM policy on such matters. Thus, a letter directive was drafted by EUCOM headquarters, and coordinated at a conference in Heidelberg on 26 April with representatives from USAF, HICOG, USAREUR, and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany (USNAVFORGER). It was published on 8 August 1950, and dealt with policies of EUCOM headquarters in connection with the processing of aircraft and personnel involved in unauthorized

⁴⁶(1) IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Opns, 29 Mar 50, sub: Resume of Czech Refugee Aircraft Incident 24 March 1950. SECRET. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 19. (2) Cable SX - 2453, HICOG (Heid) to HICOG (Fkft), 15 Apr 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 38. (3) Cable 30, Amer Embassy, Prague, to State Dept, 18 Apr 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 38. (4) Cable 63, Amer Emb, Prague, to State Dept, 19 Apr 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 41.

⁴⁷(1) Cable P - 350, Air Attache, Prague, to CINCEUR, 10 May 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 52. (2) Cable SX - 2861, USAREUR to USCON, 12 May 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 (1950), Vol. I, Item 53.

⁴⁸(1) Cable SX - 2676, CINCEUR to USAF, 1 May 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 092 (1950), Vol. I, Item 48. (2) Cable EOOP - 7782, USAF to 85th AF Depot Wg, Erding AFB, 2 May 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 50. (3) Cable SX - 2707, POLAD to HICOG, 3 May 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 51.

landings in the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany.⁴⁹

c. Later Incident at Pottmes. Another unlawful landing of a Czech aircraft in the U.S. Zone occurred on 12 August at Pottmes, Germany, within the area of the Augsburg Military Post. The plane was a two-motored, five-passenger aircraft, carrying a family of four besides the pilot.⁵⁰ It started for Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia, where the head of the family was purportedly going for his health. In reality, he was escaping from a pending arrest in connection with his liquor business in Czechoslovakia. In midair the pilot was threatened with a pocketknife and forced to turn over the controls to a son who endeavored to reach Switzerland, but had to land in Germany because of an insufficient fuel supply.⁵¹ The pilot asked leave to return to Czechoslovakia, and the family sought asylum in Germany as political refugees.⁵² Contact was made with the Czechoslovakian consul, and the matter was handled by the Augsburg Military Post and a representative of HICOG. On 25 August, the pilot was permitted to fly out the plane to Czechoslovakia upon payment of \$662.50, the accrued service charges. A truck and pickup party of five Czech citizens, sent by Czechoslovakia to effect return of the aircraft, left on the same day, accompanied by a military police escort to the border crossing point at Waidhaus.⁵³ The family

⁴⁹(1) Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, VCOFS, to CG, USAFE, 24 May 50, sub: Reports of Foreign Aircraft - Unauthorized Landings, Crashes, Unusual Concentrations and Overflights. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 53a. (2) Ltr, John J. McCloy, HICOG, to Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM VCOFS, 29 Jun 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 54a-1. (3) Memo, Maj Gen Robert W. Douglass, Jr., COFS USAFE, to CINCEUR, 14 Jul 50, sub: Report of Foreign Aircraft - Unauthorized Landings, Crashes, Unusual Concentrations, and Overflights. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 58. (4) IRS, D/OPOT to SGS, 14 Jul 50, sub: Letter to Gen Noce from Mr. McCloy, 20 Jun 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 57a.

⁵⁰Cable U - 351, AMP to CINCAFE, 13 Aug 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 64.

⁵¹Cable S - 2070, AMP to USAREUR, 14 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 68.

⁵²Cable 069 - A, AMP to USAFE, 14 Aug 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 66.

⁵³(1) Cable SX - 1917, CINCEUR to AMP, 23 Aug 50. SECRET. In OPOT Div Opns Br files. (2) Cable U - 379, AMP to USAREUR for D/OPOT, 25 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 80. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj R. M. Bringham, Staff Off, OPOT Div Opns Br, 10 Jan 51.

of four was given asylum in Germany as political refugees.⁵⁴

d. Czech Countercharges. On 10 July, the U.S. embassy at Prague, Czechoslovakia, received a note of complaint from the Foreign Office on the frequent crossings of air space over Czechoslovakia by American military aircraft, citing instances that allegedly occurred on 1, 3, and 4 July. These flights were represented as violations of international flying regulations and demand was made for immediate action to avoid any such further flights. Investigation, however, disclosed no basis for the accusation. The embassy suggested that the note was apparently drafted to support the "potato bug" accusations that the Czechs were then hurling against the Americans. These charges alleged that U.S. planes had dropped Colorado beetles over an extensive area in Czechoslovakia in order to destroy potato crops there.⁵⁵

III. Other International Matters Affecting the Occupation

10. Augmentation of Forces in Germany

At their New York meeting in September 1950, the Council of Foreign Ministers declared that the Allied Governments considered that their forces in Germany had, in addition to their occupation duties, the important role of acting as security forces for the protection and defense of the free world, including the German Federal Republic and the western sectors of Berlin. They further declared that to make this protection more effective the Allied Governments would increase their forces in Germany. They stressed further that they would treat any attack against the German Federal Republic or the western sectors of Berlin from any quarter as an

⁵⁴Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Mr. A. J. Hogden, Admin Off, POLAD, 11 Jan 51.

⁵⁵(1) Cable 1, U.S. Embassy, Prague, to HICOG, 10 Jul 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 52. (2) Cable S - 1202, CINCEUR to USAFE, 13 Jul 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 59. (3) Cable EOOPB - 8671, CINCAFE to CINCEUR, 21 Jul 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 Czech (1950), Vol. I, Item 63. (4) Stars and Stripes, July 3, 1950, p. 1.

attack upon themselves.⁵⁶

11. Disregard for Zonal Boundaries

a. Revision of Agreements. At the same meeting, the Council of Foreign Ministers also made the following decision: "The ministers agreed in principle that for the purpose of positioning troops in the light of the common cause, the interior zonal boundaries would be disregarded, and further, that the High Commissioners in consultation with the military representatives would proceed to work out and put into effect this agreement."⁵⁷ This decision required that the charter of the Allied High Commission be amended as regards the following provision: "The forces of occupation of the Three Powers in Germany shall remain stationed in their respective zones of occupation. Command of the forces of occupation in each zone and control of their related military establishments shall remain with the respective commanders of the forces of occupation in such zone."⁵⁸ The High Commissioners agreed to amend the first sentence to read: "The forces of occupation of the Three Powers, and forces of other Powers participating in the defense of Germany, shall be stationed in such areas as the High Commissioners and the respective Commanders-in-Chief may in consultation determine."⁵⁹ Revision of the second sentence, since it related to the command of troops, was left for the three zonal commanders. Since Mr. McCloy was the chairman of the Council of the Allied High Commission for the month of November, he asked General Handy to take the initiative in the matter.⁶⁰ General Handy wrote to the British and French zonal commanders, requesting that representatives from their headquarters meet with his representative in Heidelberg as soon as possible and

⁵⁶ (1) IRS, POLAD to CINCEUR, 27 Sep 50, sub: Discussions of Foreign Ministers. SECRET. In SGS 334 CFM (1950), Vol. I, Item 9. (2) EUCOM Memo to all Staff Div Heads, 20 Sep 50, sub: News Release. AG 000.7 SGS - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 334 CFM (1950), Vol. I, Item 8.

⁵⁷ Memo, Col S. G. Conley, D/OPOT, to COFS, 11 Oct 50, sub: Exchange of Facilities and Rights between French and American Zonal Commanders in Germany. SECRET. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 9.

⁵⁸ Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany, Sec. I (3). UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁹ Ltr, James E. King, HICOG Exec Secy, to Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, 12 Nov 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 20.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

submitted for their consideration a proposed draft to replace the second sentence.⁶¹ Replies were received from both commanders, favoring the meeting and advising of their respective representatives. At a series of conferences in Heidelberg during the month of December, the tripartite committee succeeded in preparing a draft that met with the approval of the three commanders in chief, occupation forces, Germany. At the close of the year, the draft had been transmitted to the Allied High Commission.⁶² The text of the draft was as follows:⁶³

1. The stationing within Germany of forces of the three occupying Powers outside of their respective Zones will be as agreed between appropriate High Commissioners and the respective Commanders-in-Chief. The forces of other Powers participating in the defense of Western Europe and deployed within Germany for that purpose may be stationed in such areas of an Occupation Zone as are agreed by the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief of the Zone concerned.

2. Command of the forces of the three occupying powers is vested in their respective Commanders-in-Chief regardless of their positioning within the three zones. If, however, operational control of all or part of any of the forces of one power located in the occupation zone controlled by one of the other two powers became necessary such operational control together with necessary administrative arrangements will be mutually agreed between the High Commissioners and the Commanders-in-Chief in the Zones concerned.

⁶¹ (1) Ltrs, Gen Handy to British and French Zonal Comdrs, 15 Nov 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Items 21, 22. (2) Cable SC - 3297, CINCEUR to HICOG, 3 Nov 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 18.

⁶² (1) Ltrs to EUCOM CINC from Lt Gen Sir Charles F. Keightley, BAOR CINC, 20 Nov 50, and from Gen C. A. Guillaume, CCEFA, 22 Nov 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 334 Allied HICOG (1950), Vol. I, Items 21, 22. (2) IRS, DCOFS for Opns, to D/OPOT, 11 Dec 50, sub: Revision of High Commission Charter. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 334 Allied HICOG (1950), Vol. I, Item 27. (3) IRS, POLAD to OPOT, 20 Dec 50, sub: Occupying Forces in Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. In OPOT Div Sp Plans Br files. (4) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col B. F. Taylor, Chief, Sp Plans & Policy Br, OPOT Div, 15 Jan 51.

⁶³ HICOG Outgoing Cable CN - 8992, 13 Dec 50. CONFIDENTIAL.

3. Control of the related Military establishments and services of the three occupying powers is vested in their respective Commanders-in-Chief regardless of their positioning within the three zones. Administrative arrangements for forces of one occupying power when located in the zone controlled by one of the other two occupation powers will be as mutually agreed between the High Commissioners and the Commanders-in-Chief of the two powers concerned.

4. Command and administrative arrangements of the forces of Allied Nations other than the three occupying powers stationed within Germany will be a matter for governmental agreement between such nations and the occupation power concerned.

5. Existing agreements which have been concluded between two or all of the three occupying powers will not be altered by the foregoing without the mutual agreement of the High Commissioners and Commanders-in-Chief in the occupation zones concerned.

b. Negotiations on Facilities and Rights. An exploratory meeting attended by representatives of the three zonal commanders was held in Heidelberg on 2 October. The British representative appeared only in the capacity of an observer, having been instructed not to participate in the discussions. EUCOM offered the French barracks to accommodate approximately 63,000 troops in two areas, one located in the north of the U.S. Zone around Kassel, and the other south of Augsburg. The French subsequently requested space for an additional 15,000 troops. They offered EUCOM barracks for 17,000 troops, but EUCOM asked for space to accommodate 32,000 troops west of the Rhine in the French northern zone of occupation. Following the meeting, members of the staffs of the French and United States occupation forces inspected available barracks and other facilities required for troops stationed outside their national zones. EUCOM also studied the problem of reciprocal rights in the United States and French Zones of Occupation. These included such items as: housing facilities for both military personnel and dependents, depot areas, training areas, and airfields; new construction and alteration of existing structures; leasing of realty and requisitioning of both real and personal property; disciplinary and judicial powers over civilian and dependent personnel; freedom of transit across zonal boundaries; extension of occupation costs and mandatory expenditure policies and procedures; maintenance of intelligence agencies; and establishment of military and dependent schools. Provisions for many of these contingencies were already contained in an existing agreement, dated 6 February 1947 and entitled: "Agreement for United States and French Rights in French and United States Zones of

Occupation." The agreement had to be revised, however, in order to make it applicable to the new exchange of facilities and rights, and to any similar future exchange between the French and American zonal commands. No arrangements were made with the British or between the British and French by the end of 1950 since the military commander of British forces in Germany had not yet been instructed to negotiate such arrangements.⁶⁴

12. New Line of Communication Through France

As far back as 1948, the Logistics Division recommended that EUCOM cease to rely exclusively upon Bremerhaven as a sole port for servicing the supply needs of the U.S. Forces in Germany. It was felt that the tense world situation made it imperative that supplies be stockpiled in France and that a line of communications (LOFC) be established between a French port and the German frontier.⁶⁵ Early in November 1949, EUCOM communicated to the French general staff its requirements for LOFC installations, and the French staff, in turn, prepared studies based upon installations available. The entire matter was discussed at a Paris conference on 2 December 1949, held under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defense and attended by representatives from EUCOM, the State Department, the French Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Finance. Between 15 - 30 December 1949, a LOFC survey team, comprising representatives from the various technical services and the French general staff, made a reconnaissance of the installations. This was followed by meetings between representatives of EUCOM and the French general staff during January 1950 in which cost estimates were prepared for establishing and operating the line of communications during the first year and the years to follow. The estimates were submitted by the French general staff to the French Ministry of National Defense, and by EUCOM to the Department of the Army.⁶⁶ In March

⁶⁴(1) Ltr, Gen Handy to Mr. McCloy, 17 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 9. (2) Memo, Col S. G. Conley, D/OPOT, to COFS, 11 Oct 50, sub: Exchange of Facilities and Rights between French and American Zonal Commands in Germany. SECRET. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 9.

⁶⁵(1) Cable 243 (SMC IN 236), State Dept to U.S. Embassy Paris, 1 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 France (1950), Vol. I, Item 1, Tab A. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. D. Duncan, Log Div, D/Dir, Plans, and Maj Leonard E. McCormick, Staff Off, Log Div Plans Br, 12 Jan 51.

⁶⁶(1) Cable S - 1316, CINCEUR to COFSA, 31 Jan 50. SECRET. In Log Div Plans Br. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen Mason J. Young, CG 7966 EUCOM Det, to CINCEUR, 20 Dec 50, sub: Review and Analysis Conducted in Connection with the LOC between U.S. Embassy, Paris, and the French Foreign Office. SECRET. In Hist Div Doc Br. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj Leonard E. McCormick, 16 Jan 51.

1950 the American Embassy in Paris began negotiating with the French Foreign Office to effect an agreement on this subject between the United States and France.⁶⁷ In April 1950, the commander in chief notified the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, that lack of instruction from Washington was preventing the U.S. embassy in Paris from pressing for an agreement on the matter, and expressed the belief that France would be more cooperative before rather than after Congress had acted on MDAP for the fiscal year 1951. General Handy suggested that the prospective availability of funds for 1951 necessitated prompt negotiations in order to complete arrangements for establishment of "this essential element of my military position."⁶⁸ On 6 November 1950, after many administrative, technical, and diplomatic difficulties, the two governments signed an agreement for establishment of a line of communication across France, from the La Pallice-Bordeaux area to the German frontier. The agreement provided for its continuance over a period of five years and for automatic renewal unless terminated by six months advance notice on the part of either government. A major point of difficulty in the negotiations was financing the project. This was resolved by the United States agreeing to pay eight billion francs toward the ten billion francs estimate of costs for the first year's installation and operation, with the French contributing the remaining two billion. For purposes of calculation, the estimate included the pay of American military personnel stationed in France in connection with the line of communication, a responsibility that was to be borne directly by the U.S. Government. A portion of the agreement authorized the U.S. forces to employ up to 750 Polish displaced persons from the U.S. Zone, Germany, their status while in France to be the same as that of the U.S. armed forces. Authority was also granted to install and operate the radio facilities necessary for LOFC operations.⁶⁹ It was further agreed that the two countries would negotiate for an agreement concerning the status of military personnel of either country stationed on the territory of the other and that during the interim period, the French-American

⁶⁷(1) Cable W - 80568, COFSA to CINCEUR, 14 Mar 50. SECRET. In Log Div Plans Br. (2) Cable 243 (SMC IN 236), State Dept to U.S. Embassy Paris, 1 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 France (1950), Vol. I, Item 1, Tab A.

⁶⁸Cable, Handy to CCUSA for Collins, 25 Apr 50. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Item 28b.

⁶⁹(1) Agreement Between the United States of American and the Republic of France Regarding the Establishment and Operation of a Line of Communication Across France, 6 Nov 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 18a.

(2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj Leonard E. McCormick, Staff Off, Log Div Plans Br, 16 Jan 51.

Civil Affairs Agreement of 1948 would continue in effect.⁷⁰ A supplemental agreement at service level, signed on 14 December 1950, arranged for the procurement of needed supplies, services and facilities from the French economy through requisition upon the French Liaison Mission. These included such items as rail transportation, telecommunication, bulk POL storage, construction, repairs, real estate, and personal services. On the same day, the French American Fiscal Liaison Office (FAFLO) was established to effect settlement between the American and French authorities for expenditures made in connection with the line of communication. Personnel for FAFLO was to be furnished by the French Liaison Mission, the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and the Finance Office, U.S. Army, Paris.⁷¹ Agreement was also reached on all points of revision of the agreement of 1948 excepting that relating to the question of criminal jurisdiction.⁷² On 28 November, the Brest Municipal Council adopted a resolution requesting that a supply base similar to the one at Bordeaux, be established at Brest. The resolution was adopted by a nineteen to seventeen vote after an all-night session, with socialists and communists opposed. EUCOM, however, took no action in this regard. Despite the voluminous anti-American propaganda carried on in the local and Parisian communist newspapers against the establishment of the line of communication, no difficulty had been experienced at Bordeaux and La Pallice with the unloading of ammunition at

⁷⁰(1) Agreement Between the United States and France Regarding Facilities for United States Forces in France in Connection with the Occupation of Germany or Austria, 16 Jan 48. SECRET. In SGS 092 France (1950), Vol. I, Item 1. (2) Memo, Capt G. E. Richardson, SGS Staff Off, to Lt Col H. Snyder, SGS, 7 Jun 50, sub: US - French Civil Affairs Agreement. SECRET. In SGS 092 France (1950), Vol. I, Item 1. (3) IRS, SGS to JA, 6 Dec 50, sub: Revision of US - French Civil Affairs Agreement. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 29.

⁷¹(1) Agreement Relating to the Procurement of Supplies, Services, and Facilities from the French Economy for Operation of the Line of Communication Across France, 14 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950), Vol. I, Item 34a. (2) Operating Procedure for the French-American Fiscal Liaison Office, 14 Dec 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 322.01 Liaison Arrangements (1950), Vol. I, Item 48.

⁷²(1) Memo, Lt Col Andrew D. Kane, C/Mil Just Br, JA Div, to Lt Col T. S. Clark, SGS Admin Off, 12 Dec 50, sub: Cable from U. S. Embassy Paris to CINCEUR Ref. No. 65, dated 8 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 092 Inter-Allied Agreements (1950); Vol. I, Item 32b. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. D. Duncan, Log Div, D/Dir, Plans, and Maj Leonard E. McCormick, Log Div Plans Br, 12 Jan 51.

these ports.⁷³ Following the preliminary survey conducted by EUCOM teams in February, the French Government "leaked" information to friendly media concerning the use of a French port by the United States, and considerable interest in the negotiations was manifested by the French press. The matter was considered crucial by EUCOM authorities, inasmuch as it could prove a source of anti-American propaganda, and EUCOM suggested that the announcement be made on a higher than military level. A news item designed to avoid adverse political or psychological reactions by the French was prepared by the 7966 EUCOM Detachment for release at the conclusion of the agreement. It described the LOFC as a "supplement to existing facilities of U.S. Forces in Europe," "an aid to the economy of France," and stated that the agreement had been reached in "an atmosphere of understanding and accord."⁷⁴ Final news releases on the line of communications were in this vein. (For further details of the LOFC across France, see pars. 42 and 76, below, and 1950 USAREUR Report, pars. 39 and 43.)

13. Opening of EUCOM Dependents Schools in France

The assignment of EUCOM organizations in France created a corresponding increase of school-age dependents residing in that country. Their number totaled 150 for 1950, but this was expected to reach 300 by January 1951, and as many as 1,300 before the end of the fiscal year 1952. Since French private schools were expensive and generally unavailable, and the public schools presented language and curriculum problems that handicapped American children, EUCOM had to extend its dependents school system into France. In 1950, elementary schools were established in Paris and Verdun. The schools were limited to dependents of personnel with EUCOM detachments and the Army portion of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Dependents of other Department of the Army personnel and U.S. government employees stationed in France were to be accepted on a space-available basis provided per capita cost was furnished through appropriate funding. Priority for such space was as follows: non-Army MAAG dependents, Only Field dependents, other Department of Defense dependents, and dependents of other U.S. Government employees. High school was provided only for dependents of personnel with EUCOM detachments and the Army MAAG in France. These dependents were accommodated at the EUCOM High School in Frankfurt, Germany, where dormitories were operated

⁷³ (1) "Brest Asks Establishment of U. S. Supply Base," Stars and Stripes, November 30, 1950. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj Leonard E. McCormick, Log Div Plans Br, 16 Jan 51.

⁷⁴ IRS, G/PID to COFS, 27 Sep 50, sub: Press Release Announces New LOC Across France. SECRET. In SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 104a.

seven days weekly. No special charges were assessed, nor was transportation to and from France furnished.⁷⁵ The cost of operating EUCOM schools in France for the year 1950 was absorbed within the FY 1951 budget.⁷⁶ (Other effects of international developments on the European Command are developed topically in succeeding chapters of this report as well as in the appended Annual Narrative Report of USAREUR for 1950.)

⁷⁵ (1) IRS, P&A Div to DSD, 31 Oct 50, sub: Dependents Schools in France. UNCLASSIFIED. In DSD Gen files No. 352.98. (2) Cables S - 2911, 14 Oct 50, and W - 94884, 23 Oct 50, between CINCEUR and TAG. SECRET. In DSD files.

⁷⁶ (1) DSD Sch Population Rept, 31 Dec 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with G. F. Fuhrman, DSD Fiscal Off, 15 Dec 50 and 23 Jan 51.

CHAPTER II

Mission and Organizational Changes

I. Mission

14. Evolution of EUCOM Mission

In the five and a half years from D-Day to the end of 1950, the mission of U.S. troops in Europe had come almost full circle. From full-scale hostilities it had moved through peacetime occupation of a former enemy nation to combat readiness for joint defense against a persistent foe of the western democracies. The changing mission was well defined in a memorandum for General T. T. Handy, Commander in Chief, EUCOM, from Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, Commanding General, USAREUR. After noting that he shared cognizance with General Handy that emphasis had changed from occupation to readiness for war, General Eddy continued:

The rearmament program at home and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been translated into meaning for EUCOM by the President's announcement that U.S. Forces in Europe will be increased.... Our primary purpose in Europe is to attain maximum operational readiness in the minimum time. For the first time there are prospects that we may attain the capability not only to defend the line of the Rhine but also to increase that

capability to the ultimate objective of defeating invading communist forces east of the Rhine.¹

Practical recognition of the shift in emphasis from occupation duties to a defensive tactical role was evidenced in a major revision of the command structure and activation of the Seventh Army, incorporating the principal Army elements of the European Command. (See par. 24, below.)

15. Letter of Instruction Defining EUCOM Mission

The basic mission of the European Command headquarters had been defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946.² During 1949 efforts had been made to define more specifically the mission of the Commander in Chief as joint commander. These efforts acquired greater urgency as a result of the reduction in the number of subordinate commands and an increasing tendency toward unification. After the preparation of several drafts in 1949, a final letter of instruction was approved by General Handy and published on 18 January 1950. It set forth the mission of the Commander in Chief in relationship to his major subordinate commands, as well as the missions of the major commands themselves.³ The mission of the Commander in Chief as defined in this letter of instruction was the same as that outlined in a draft prepared in late 1949, and described in a preceding volume in this series.⁴ Implicit in this letter was the authority of the Commander in Chief to exercise unified command over all the U.S. forces in Germany allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

16. Additional Statement of Mission

An SGS paper prepared in 1950 again emphasized the exercise of joint command as the primary mission of the Commander in Chief. It listed the following responsibilities in addition to those outlined in the letter of instruction:

Provide required support to the CG, USFA; CINCNELM; and COMGENSAC /Commanding General, Strategic Air Command/ for the execution of their mission.

¹Memo, Gen Eddy for Gen Handy, 13 Sep 50, sub: Operational Readiness. SECRET. In SGS 381 (1950), Item 18.

²JCS Paper 1259/27, 11 Dec 46. CONFIDENTIAL. In JCS Library.

³Ltr, 18 Jan 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. AG 322.011
GOT - AGO.

⁴EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, p. 167.

Render required administrative and logistical support to the CG, USFA.

Plan for the preparation and execution of his assigned missions in the event of a general emergency and submit such plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

Coordinate these emergency plans with other commanders under JCS who have contiguous fields of responsibility and cooperate with those commanders in the execution of their assigned missions.

Plan and prepare for evacuation, in event of emergency, of U.S. nationals from areas within or adjacent to his scope of command responsibilities. Such plans will be implemented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Be responsible, in addition to the above operational and strategic responsibilities, for coordination of logistical and administrative support of component forces of the command and provide a balanced program for necessary military effectiveness...

(a) For preparing and submitting to the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army) budget requests for the operation and maintenance of his unified headquarters.

(b) For coordinating these logistical and administrative policies and procedures through the separate military commanders of component forces. The commanders of the component forces will retain control of his logistical support system and operate it in accordance with his departmental instructions. This however will be under the broad policy direction of CINCEUR.

(c) For making recommendations to the commanders of the component forces for the joint use of facilities, special procedures of supply, and any other matter he deems will lead to the effecting of economy consistent with military efficiency within the European Command.

(d) For reviewing requirements, recommending priorities and programs which will insure

maximum economy of funds, supply, facilities and personnel, and which will provide the maximum balanced program referred to above.⁵

17. Responsibilities of CINCEUR under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program

With the inauguration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in Europe, CINCEUR was designated U.S. Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe, with the mission of carrying out instructions of the Secretary of Defense and representing him on all matters pertaining to the military assistance program in Europe. He was to coordinate with the State Department and act as the senior military adviser to MDAP, in which capacity he served as a military member of the European Coordinating Committee.⁶ He was also charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with responsibility for insuring that Department of Defense agencies necessary to support military assistance activities within the European regional areas were adequate. Administrative, logistical, training, and communications support of MAAG organizations was a function of the European Command. These responsibilities were carried out by appropriate staff divisions, each of which designated one officer to attend to military assistance matters. (A detailed study of this program is presented in Chap. VI, below.)

18. Mission of CINCEUR as Occupation Commander


While major emphasis was shifting to the role of CINCEUR as commander in chief of a joint command charged with building a strong defense force, he continued to perform his mission as occupation administrator. This mission had been most recently defined early in 1949 by Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, then Deputy Chief of Staff, EUCOM, in a revision of an earlier statement on the mission of the European Command. The occupation mission thus defined included the task of reorienting Germany to the west by providing example, maintaining discipline, and influencing German youth through the GYA to accept Western ideas. Another task was the reduction of the burden of the occupation on the U.S. economy by reducing as much as possible, without impairing efficiency, the employment of U.S., Allied, neutral, and German personnel and by closing out DP camps,

⁵SGS Paper, n.d., sub: Statement of Mission, CINC, EUCOM. SECRET. In SGS 322 EUCOM B/P.

⁶(1) Ltr, Secy Def to CINC, 25 Nov 49. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 (1949), Item 101. (2) Cables WX - 96489, 15 Nov 49; W - 94650, 23 Sep 49. CONFIDENTIAL.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMAND


AS OF 1 JANUARY 1950



*BOTH UNITS ASSIGNED TO AND ADMINISTERED BY EUCOM, BUT REPORTING DIRECTLY TO US HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY (HICOG).

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMAND*

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1950



* USAREUR, THOUGH STILL IN EXISTENCE,
WAS NO LONGER OPERATIONAL AS OF
31 DECEMBER 1950.

** BOTH UNITS ASSIGNED TO AND ADMINISTERED BY
EUCOM, BUT REPORTING DIRECTLY TO US HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY (HICOG).

reducing construction and real estate holdings, and exploiting German production rather than requisitioning in the United States.⁷

19. EUCOM Support of SCAPE

In December the commander in chief was assigned the additional mission of rendering certain financial, logistical, and administrative support to the Supreme Commander, Atlantic Powers in Europe (SCAPE) upon his designation.⁸ (See par. 27, below.)

II. Organizational Matters

20. Organizational Structure, 1 January 1950

At the beginning of 1950, the European Command (EUCOM) consisted of three major commands and seven units and agencies other than major commands which were assigned and reported directly to EUCOM headquarters. (See Chart 1, Organizational Structure of the European Command as of 1 January 1950.)

a. Major Commands. Although not officially designated as such by EUCOM circulars published during the year, the following were considered to be EUCOM major commands in 1950: U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), with headquarters in Heidelberg; U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), with headquarters in Wiesbaden; and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany (USNAVFORGER), with headquarters during January in Berlin and for the remainder of the year in Heidelberg. Each major command was directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, EUCOM (CINCEUR), and administered, controlled, and supported its organic or attached units according to applicable EUCOM directives, as well as regulations of the individual services. In addition, each major command was required to render such support to other major commands, EUCOM units and agencies, or EUCOM commitments as might be directed by the commander in chief.

b. EUCOM Units and Agencies. Units and agencies other than major commands which were assigned to EUCOM as of 1 January were:

⁷Draft (original HWJ/5 Jul 48), revised 31 Dec 49, sub: Orientation in SGS.

⁸Cable W - 99200, COFS to CINCEUR, 19 Dec 50. SECRET.

7888 Special Troops, Headquarters, EUCOM, with headquarters in Heidelberg; 7966 EUCOM Detachment, located in Paris; 7755 Dependents School Detachment, in Karlsruhe; 7893 U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, in Potsdam; 7721 Claims Office Team, attached to United States Forces, Austria (USFA); the 7792 Office of High Commissioner, Germany, in Frankfurt; and the 7791 Office of U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB). The latter two agencies were assigned to and administered by EUCOM, but reported directly to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) on such functions as were directed by him. Although there was considerable discussion in EUCOM headquarters during 1950 concerning the advisability, because of their unique functions and wide areas of responsibility, of designating the 7888 Special Troops and the 7966 EUCOM Detachment as major EUCOM commands, no administrative action to do so was taken during the year. However, it was found necessary during 1950 to issue a special letter of instruction clearly defining the specific missions and functions which were peculiar to the 7966 EUCOM Detachment. These concerned, in the main, operations connected with the establishment and subsequent functioning of a logistical line of communications (LOFC) across France.⁹ (See this report, pars. 12, 42, 76; and 1950 USAREUR Report, pars. 39 - 43.)

21. Composition of Headquarters, EUCOM, at the Beginning of 1950

Although designated a unified command in 1947 by instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), EUCOM during 1950 was not actually operating as such within strict definition of the JCS term. At the beginning of 1950, EUCOM headquarters was almost totally manned by Army personnel who functioned operationally in the place of a joint headquarters staff. Under these circumstances, EUCOM could be considered a unified command only in the sense that its operations were applicable to the three component services, but not in the sense that equal representation from all services was reflected in the composition of the headquarters staff. Exception to strict adherence to JCS directives requiring participation on a joint staff by each of the services assigned to EUCOM had been granted by the JCS as far back as 1947, upon a request made by General Joseph T. McNarney, then European theater commander. (See 1950 USAREUR Report, par. 9c.) Between 1947 and 1950, numerous

⁹(1) Draft, EUCOM Cir (unpublished), sub: Designation of Commands, Units and Agencies of the European Command. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 (1950), Vol. I, Item 66. (2) EUCOM IRS, C/N 5, SGS to D/OPOT, 11 Apr 50, sub: EUCOM and USAREUR Commands. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 (1950), Vol. I, Item 6d. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Maj G. W. Fletcher, EUCOM OPOT Div Opns Staff Off, 12 Jan 51.

staff studies and organizational plans designing an actual joint theater headquarters were drawn up but none had been accepted for adoption by the commander in chief. Thus, the situation in which all but a few of the staff functions in EUCOM were carried out by Army personnel remained the same at the start of the current year.¹⁰

a. Office of the Commander in Chief. At the apex of the pyramidal EUCOM organizational chart throughout 1950 was the Office of the Commander in Chief. This office consisted of three major segments -- the Office of the Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary, General Staff (redesignated Secretary of the General Staff in May), all manned entirely by Army personnel. In January, the Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer was also carried on the rolls of the Office of the Commander in Chief, but following the opening of Headquarters, USNAVFORGER, at Heidelberg on 1 February, this position was dropped from the organizational chart. The position of CINCEUR was occupied throughout 1950 by Gen. Thomas T. Handy and that of chief of staff by Commanding General, USAREUR, Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, during the first seven months of the year. Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce became chief of staff for the remainder of 1950. In addition to his positions as Commanding General, USAREUR, and Chief of Staff, EUCOM, General Huebner also acted as Deputy Commander in Chief, EUCOM, a position which was dropped from the EUCOM organizational chart following the general's departure from the command in August.

b. General Staff. Although primarily designated as staff divisions of Headquarters, EUCOM, the general staff divisions normal to major military commands functioned in the European Command during 1950 in a dual capacity. Not only were these divisions assigned their usual functions in EUCOM, but they were designated and functioned as the general staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR as well. These general staff divisions were also responsible for supervising and coordinating the operations of certain administrative and technical staffs of both EUCOM and USAREUR. Such staffs were, however, actually designated as separate special staff divisions. Under Personnel and Administration Division were the administrative staffs and services: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Chaplain, and Dependent Schools; under Logistics Division were the technical staffs and services: Transportation, Quartermaster, Engineer, Chemical, Ordnance, Signal, and Medical. In addition to the usual general staff divisions, Headquarters, EUCOM, also included on its organization chart as general staffs the Office of the Comptroller, which included the Budget and the

¹⁰ EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, pp. 134 - 38. SECRET.

Finance Divisions, and the Military Posts Division, the latter a general staff division within the strict meaning of this term only in the European Command. These divisions were primarily assigned to Headquarters, EUCOM, but functioned additionally within Headquarters, USAREUR.

c. Special Staff. As in the case of the general staffs, most special staff divisions belonged primarily to EUCOM but served in a dual capacity. At the beginning of 1950, the special staff divisions of both EUCOM and USAREUR, in addition to those already listed as administrative and technical services, were: Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Historical, Headquarters Commandant, Special Services, Army-Air Force Troop Information and Education, and Public Information.

22. General Summary of Major Organizational Changes during the Year

As in previous years, major organizational changes both in the composition of Headquarters, EUCOM, itself, and in the commands, units, and agencies assigned to it, were numerous and of a variegated nature. Most significant of these changes was the creation during the latter part of the year of a field army in Europe and the concurrent withdrawal of all troops from USAREUR for assignment with this army. Of almost equal significance, though of less immediate effect upon command structure, was the offer by CINCEUR at year's end to place all EUCOM forces under the operational command of the newly appointed Supreme Commander, Atlantic Powers in Europe (SCAPE). (See par. 27c, below.) Other major organizational changes within the European Command included the activation of additional service and tactical units for support of or inclusion in the new field army; creation of Army elements to support U.S. overseas commitments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); diversion of existing units to handle activities concerned with the creation and support of a large-scale LOFC across France, and the organization, reorganization, activation, and discontinuance of units and agencies to make possible greater savings and economies which in the opinion of CINCEUR would put more power on the line by saving man-hours and spaces in the rear. Into this latter category would fall many organizational changes which on the surface would not appear major, but which, examined collectively, were of considerable importance.

23. Trends Affecting Organizational Changes

Though not always following logically in a natural progression of steps, i.e., one change in the organizational pattern coming as

the end result of, or being directly caused by, a previous one, organizational changes within EUCOM during 1950 were based for the most part, as in 1949, on specific major trends. These trends, however, could not be as sharply defined in 1950 as they were in the previous year. Changes in the organizational structure of a unit or an agency in the early part of 1950 might have been owing to factors of economy in personnel or operations, whereas further changes in the same unit or agency during the latter part of the year could have been necessitated by the build-up of tactical forces or the creation of new operational headquarters. For instance, the 7966 EUCOM Detachment was drastically depleted of personnel in January as a part of the command-wide retrenchment program, slightly replenished during the summer months to meet increased demands placed upon it by the establishment and support of the LOFC across France, and again brought almost to authorized strength in November and December in order to enable it to carry out further LOFC obligations. Factors pertaining to organizational changes within EUCOM during 1950 were not always as interdependent or interrelated as heretofore; the following were the major trends affecting alterations in the structural pattern during the year, summarized here, and discussed in detail in paragraphs 24 - 42, below.

a. Build-up of Tactical Forces. Started by the creation of USAREUR in the spring of 1947, when the process of transforming from occupational to tactical units was actually begun, the program of build-up of tactical forces within EUCOM reached a definite milestone in late November of 1950 with the creation of a field army, the U.S. Seventh, with headquarters in Vaihingen, and the subsequent transfer of all troops from USAREUR to the Seventh Army. Concurrent with its activation, Seventh Army was designated the parent organization for the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary (USCON) units, thus becoming EUCOM's first completely tactical, fully operational army headquarters since the U.S. Third Army was declared inoperational on 15 February 1947. (See pars. 24 - 28, below.)

b. Program of Economy in Personnel and Operations. Not alone a EUCOM plan, but one instituted by the Department of Defense and carried to every component of the three services both in the zone of interior and in all overseas commands, the program of economy in personnel and operations was a continuing one throughout 1950. Aim of this program was maximum effectiveness of personnel, space, and funds at minimum cost consistent with the requisite standards. To attain this goal EUCOM remained constantly vigilant through the year to see that a sound functional organization was at all times in operation in every unit and agency of the command. To this end, numerous changes in organizational structures within the command were made. (See pars. 29 - 33, below.)

c. Planning for the Establishment of an Actual Operating Unified Command. As in 1949, continuous studies were made in 1950 of the problem of setting up a truly joint headquarters in EUCOM with a staff in which key positions would be distributed equitably among representatives of the various service components in the command. In order to accomplish this, efforts were made throughout the period to secure a substantial number of qualified Air Force and Navy officers for duty in EUCOM headquarters. Though little success was achieved in securing this staff representation from the other services, and although no final approval was given to any proposed plan for complete reorganization of EUCOM headquarters, the problems inherent in both were constantly under surveillance and consideration by CINCEUR, and, to a minor degree, affected the internal organizational structure of the command. (See pars. 34 - 40, below.)

d. Creation of Units and Agencies to Handle U.S. Commitments in NATO and Obligations under the LOFC. In January the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), together with its Army components, was established as a subordinate agency of EUCOM. In April, the Department of the Army approved the mutual defense assistance program (MDAP) training of 1,545 foreign nationals from member nations of the NATO. These two developments necessitated the creation of additional EUCOM units and agencies to administer and support U.S. commitments under these programs. In addition, certain organizational changes, particularly within the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, were made necessary during the year by the increased support of activities concerned with the creation and functioning of the LOFC across France. All of these developments, while not immediately related, were parts of fast-shaping U.S. programs which would eventually culminate in an all-out, total support of Allied efforts to create an Allied armed force in Western Europe. (See pars. 41 - 42, below.)

III. Build-up of Tactical Forces

24. Creation of a Field Army

Prior to 1950, the lack of a complete and fully operational EUCOM army which would be able immediately to take the field in case of a general emergency had been of the utmost concern to CINCEUR. As early as 1947, with the creation of USAREUR, attempts had been made to initiate planning for the creation of just such a unit. Lack of personnel with which to man a field army, as well as

greatly decreased EUCOM funding programs from which to support it, had made serious consideration of the activation of this army impossible at that time. EUCOM responsibilities prior to 1950 were such that most personnel were required to perform duties strictly within limits defined by the primary mission of the military occupation of Germany. Faced with the need for a tactical force in EUCOM, yet unable to reach outside existing EUCOM army units to create one, CINCEUR early in the occupation designated U.S. Constabulary (USCON) as that EUCOM unit which in time of an alert would be transformed into an army which could take the field. The primary missions and functions of USCON were accordingly altered to embrace this additional responsibility, and alert plans of EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters were redesigned to reflect this change. In 1950, with world conditions unsettled, with U.S. and USSR relations uncertain, and with U.S. troops actually committed to battle in Korea, reliance upon USCON as a fully trained field army ready to act immediately in case of an alert was recognized as, at best, only an emergency measure upon which too much dependence could not be placed. CINCEUR had no assurance that USCON could be successfully transformed from an occupational force to a field army. Accordingly, he set into motion all machinery necessary to secure for EUCOM authority to create a field army which would be effective in case of an alert.¹¹

a. Request for Authorization to Create a Field Army. On 17 September, General Handy requested authority from the Department of the Army to take action at the earliest practicable date to create a field army in EUCOM. Such action, he explained, was necessary "in order to improve the military posture of the European Command." Authorization requested from Washington included the activation of a headquarters, field army, under T/O&E 200-1, 26 October 1944, with changes 1 through 5 (less AA section, p. 2, c. 4), a headquarters company, field army, under T/O&E 200-2, 26 October 1944, with changes 1 through 3; a headquarters, special troops under T/O&E 200-3, 26 October 1944, with changes 1 and 2, column 4, and a medical detachment, field army, under T/O&E 200-3, 26 October 1944, with changes 1 and 2, column 7 (all T/O&Es as amended by pertinent Department of the Army special regulations of the 650 series). In addition, authority was requested to inactivate Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and Special Troops, USCON, and to transfer 179 officer, 33 warrant officer, and 487 enlisted spaces from the 30 June 1951 EUCOM ceiling to the 31 December 1950 ceiling. These spaces would be utilized to overcome the difference

¹¹ Interv. S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

between spaces available from USCON and those required for the field army.¹²

b. Initial Planning for the Activation of a Field Army.

Shortly after CINCEUR's original request to Washington, an IRS was sent by the deputy chief of staff for operations to all EUCOM staff divisions requesting detailed information as to proposed functions and responsibilities of these divisions in the setting up of a field army.¹³ Consolidation of recommendations from the staff divisions was made the responsibility of the Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division (OPOT). OPOT later reported that although the comments and recommendations received were thorough and complete, most pertained only to those responsibilities and functions inherent in command, which would be carried out by an Army commander regardless of the place in which a field army might be organized. Since the information from the staff divisions was not that envisioned by the basic request, OPOT recommended to CINCEUR that an administrative order for issue to the commanding general, field army, be prepared by the Logistics Division. This order would be designed to bring into immediate focus every point that should be covered in setting up the army, and would bring about positive delineation of responsibilities, as well as the manner in which these responsibilities would be carried out. As an addendum to this, OPOT recommended that a step-by-step plan for the activation of the field army be drawn up and followed as closely as possible.¹⁴

c. Basic Decisions Concerning Functions and Responsibilities of CINCEUR and CG, Field Army. In the early stages of planning for the creation of the field army, certain basic decisions were made concerning the functions and responsibilities of CINCEUR and the commanding general, field army. These were:

(1) The concept of USAREUR would be dropped; CINCEUR would become in fact Commanding General, USAREUR.

(2) Channel of communications for administration and operations would be the Department of the Army to CINCEUR to commanding general, field army; technical channels would be utilized in the normal manner.

¹²(1) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50. (2) EUCOM ltr, CINCEUR to COFS, DA, undated, sub: Activation of Seventh Army and Inactivation of Headquarters United States Constabulary. AG 322 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³EUCOM IRS, DCOFS for Opns to all Staff Divs, 4 Oct 50, sub: Organization of a Field Army Headquarters. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴EUCOM memo, D/OPOT Div to DCOFS for Opns, undated, sub: Proposed Functions and Responsibilities for EUCOM and the Field Army. SECRET. In SGS 322 Army, B/P Staff Study: Organization of Field Army.

(3) EUCOM headquarters and field army headquarters would be located separately.

(4) All responsibilities of a governmental nature, and all responsibilities pertaining to joint servicing and joint utilization of areas or facilities would be reserved by EUCOM.

(5) The LOFC (France) and developments pertaining to it would remain the responsibility of EUCOM.

(6) Communications zone (COMZ) type units and service support units with primary mission of support of joint forces would remain under EUCOM.

(7) Policy and allocation functions pertaining to MDAP and other services, and policy and allocation functions as between COMZ type units and the field army would be retained by EUCOM.

(8) Those functions inherent in retention of over-all U.S. Army command, such as promotion, over-all courts-martial jurisdiction, and inspection general functions which are not usually performed by a field army, would be retained by EUCOM.

(9) Planning for and training post units in secondary tactical missions would be the responsibility of commanding general, field army.

(10) Schools and training facilities primarily for army combat would be assigned to the field army.

(11) All army units with primary tactical missions, including combat, combat support, and service support units would be assigned to the field army.

(12) A large portion of the detail work of administration, organization, training, and supply of army combat, combat support, and army assigned service support units would be done by field army headquarters.¹⁵

d. Final Plans for the Activation of a Field Army. Based upon these initial decisions concerning the functions and responsibilities of CINCENR and commanding general, field army, a definite step-by-step plan for the activation of the field army was drawn up. This included: preparation of an administrative order by Logistics Division, as recommended by (POT (see above); preparation by OPOT of a letter of instructions to commanding general, field army, stating mission, defining broad responsibilities, and setting forth

¹⁵ Ibid.

command relationship; preparation by Intelligence Division of an intelligence annex to the basic letter of instructions; preparation by OPOT of a training annex to the same letter; preparation by the Adjutant General of EUCOM general orders activating the field army and assigning the commanding general, and special orders assigning units to the army. In addition to the basic plan, further steps were taken to formulate directives to the commanding general, field army, calling for the reorganization of USCON units under new tables of organization and equipment. Concurrently, tentative EUCOM general orders were drawn up inactivating USAREUR and transferring to EUCOM headquarters all functions except those specifically delegated by the letter of instructions, with its various annexes, to the commanding general, field army. Although this last action, insofar as inactivation of USAREUR is concerned, was not taken during 1950, preparations to do so were made by both the OPOT and the Adjutant General Divisions.¹⁶ (See par. 25, below.)

e. Authority for Activation of the Seventh Army. On 20 November, CINCEUR received cable authority from the Department of the Army to activate Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Headquarters, Special Troops, and the Medical Detachment of the U.S. Seventh Army. By the same cable, authority was given CINCEUR to inactivate Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and Headquarters, Special Troops, USCON.¹⁷ (See USAREUR Report, par. 14g.) Confirmation by letter of this cable authority was not received by EUCOM until mid-December.

f. Activation of the Seventh Army. Pursuant to the authority contained in this Department of the Army message, Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Headquarters, Special Troops, and the Medical Detachment, Seventh Army, were activated at APO 46, effective 0001, 24 November, by EUCOM General Orders Number 53, dated 22 November. By the same general orders, and later by Department of the Army special orders, Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy was announced as Commanding General, Seventh Army, as an additional duty. EUCOM Troop Assignment Number 6, issued the same date, relieved the U.S. 1st Infantry Division from assignment to USAREUR and reassigned it to the Seventh

¹⁶(1) EUCOM memo, D/OPOT Div to DCOFS for Opns, undated, sub: Proposed Functions and Responsibilities for EUCOM and the Field Army. SECRET. In SGS 322 Army, B/P Staff Study: Organization of Field Army. (2) EUCOM ltr, CINCEUR to CG, 7th Army, 1 Dec 50, sub: Letter of Instructions. AG 300 GOT - AGO. SECRET. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

¹⁷(1) Cable W - 96978, COFSA, for GI sgd Witsell to CINCEUR, 20 Nov 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 381 EUCOM Opn Plans (1950), Vol. I, Item 44. (2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

Army, effective 24 November. All units previously assigned to USCON were similarly assigned to the Seventh Army by the same order.¹⁸ (See 1950 USAREUR Report, par. 14g.)

g. Instruction to the Commanding General, Seventh Army. Following the activation of the Seventh Army, a EUCOM letter of instructions was sent to the commanding general on 1 December. In this letter it was pointed out that the basic principles involved in determining the functions and responsibilities of the Seventh Army within the EUCOM organizational and administrative structure were that the Seventh Army was organized for action in the field, and that it was to be given everything that it would need for that purpose. However, Seventh Army was not to be burdened additionally with other responsibilities; i.e., administrative, area, etc. Specifically, Seventh Army was assigned the following missions:

(1) The training for and maintenance of combat readiness of all units assigned or attached to it. (See 1950 USAREUR Report, Chap. III.)

(2) The planning and operational responsibilities currently assigned to USAREUR in the EUCOM order for reinforced alert (ORA), EUCOM general alert order (GAO), and pertinent interzonal and bizonal agreements; the execution of the current USAREUR ORA, USAREUR GAO, and pertinent interzonal and bizonal agreements; the planning and operational responsibilities currently assigned to USCON in the USAREUR noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) and order for simple alert (OSA), and the execution of these orders. (See 1950 USAREUR Report, Chap. II.) Seventh Army was responsible for the above matters during the period between the activation of the Seventh Army and the completion of required revisions of emergency plans reflecting the changes brought about in command structure within EUCOM.

(3) Planning responsibility for all operations, in addition to those cited above, for which Seventh Army would be charged with execution; specifically, Seventh Army OSA, ORA, GAO, and NEO plans, and such other planning as might be assigned by CINCEUR to the Seventh Army. (See 1950 USAREUR Report, Chap. II.)

(4) Assumption of the internal security mission of USCON currently assigned by paragraph 4a, Internal Security Directive, Headquarters, USAREUR, 14 July 1950. (See 1950 USAREUR Report, pars. 22, 23.)

¹⁸(1) EUCOM GO 53, 22 Nov 50, par. I, sub: Activation of Seventh Army. RESTRICTED; par. II, sub: Announcement of Commanding General, Seventh Army. RESTRICTED. (2) DA SO 229, 24 Nov 50. (3) EUCOM Trp Asg 6, 22 Nov 50. RESTRICTED.

(5) The immediate reporting to EUCOM headquarters and other major commanders of any indication of imminent hostilities received through intelligence means under Seventh Army control.

(6) Coordination with appropriate agencies to insure accomplishment of assigned missions. (For coordination necessary to fulfill responsibilities in connection with secondary mission training of units, NEO, OSA, ORA, and GAO, direct communication between Seventh Army and major U.S. commands, military posts, and technical and administrative services was authorized. For coordination with British and French forces, each subject was to be considered separately, initial contact being made by EUCOM headquarters with further coordination being delegated to Seventh Army or retained by EUCOM headquarters as determined at that time.)

(7) Insuring the accomplishment of the provisions of paragraphs 3a and 4, Letter of Instruction, USAREUR headquarters, 18 January 1950.¹⁹ (These paragraphs dealt with U.S. Constabulary and 1st Division responsibilities.)²⁰

In addition to assigning these missions, the EUCOM letter of instructions to the Commanding General, Seventh Army, included several annexes which set forth the functioning of supply and administration between EUCOM headquarters, Seventh Army, and the military posts. It was explained in the basic letter that many desired changes in supply and administration were not included at that time, and that there would be modifications in both supply and administration with the advent of troop augmentation and other projected EUCOM developments. As rapidly as possible, however, the Commanding General, Seventh Army, was to take necessary action to provide complete logistical support for all units assigned or attached to it. This would be accomplished by use of logistical support units already assigned and planned for future assignment to the Seventh Army.²¹

h. Background of the Seventh Army. Selection of the numbered designation for the newly created EUCOM field army was neither arbitrary nor coincidental. Its organization at Vaihingen on 24 November was in actuality a reactivation of a hard-fighting World War II army with twenty-two months of combat operations. In 1943, the U.S. Seventh Army had participated in the first Allied landing on enemy-held Europe when it stormed Sicilian shores under the command of

¹⁹EUCOM ltr, CINCEUR to CG, 7th Army, 1 Dec 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. AG 300 GOT - AGO. SECRET.

²⁰USAREUR ltr, 18 Jan 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. AG 322.011 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

²¹Ibid.

Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. Later, under Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, the Seventh had swept ashore between Marseilles and Nice on 15 August 1944 as a part of the Sixth Army Group which assaulted Southern France in an effort to force a juncture with United States and British troops driving south from Normandy. The Southern France invasion was followed by campaigns in Alsace, Southwestern Germany and Bavaria, and finally in Austria where the German Army Group G surrendered to Patch and Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, commander of the Sixth Army Group. With the close of the war, the Seventh Army was given occupational duties in the Western Military District with headquarters in Heidelberg, and was deactivated there in colorful ceremonies on 31 March 1946. General Eddy, newly appointed commander of the reactivated Seventh Army, had been war-time commander of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division, and, late in World War II, XII United States Army Corps. At the time of his appointment as Commanding General, Seventh Army, and as late as 31 December 1950, General Eddy was the Commanding General, USAREUR.²²

25. Withdrawal of Troops from USAREUR

With the activation of the Seventh Army, and the concurrent assignment to that army of the 1st Infantry Division and all remaining units of USCON which had not been inactivated, the bulk of units and personnel assigned to USAREUR were withdrawn on 24 November. Further depletion of the organization occurred on 2 December when USAREUR military posts, including all assigned units, were reassigned to EUCOM headquarters, and again on the 15th and 27th of December when orders were issued reassigning all remaining units and personnel to EUCOM.²³

a. Original Plan for Discontinuance of USAREUR. At the time of CINCEUR's original request to the Department of the Army for authority to create a field army, it had been planned upon activation of this unit to discontinue Headquarters, USAREUR, since missions and responsibilities of USAREUR would then be assigned to the field army. Both OPOT and the Adjutant General Divisions of EUCOM had been instructed to draw up general orders discontinuing Headquarters, USAREUR, and it was planned to issue these at the same

²²(1) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50. (2) "Famous 7th Made First Combat Landing on the Shores of Nazi-Held Continent," and "Seventh U.S. Army Re-Activated at Vaihingen," Constabulary Lightning Bolt, December 1, 1950.

²³(1) EUCOM ltr, AG to CG, USAREUR, 2 Dec 50, sub: Reassignment of Military Posts and Assigned Units. AG 322 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM Trp Asg 8, 15 Dec 50. RESTRICTED. (3) EUCOM Trp Asg 9, 27 Dec 50. RESTRICTED.

time as orders activating the field army. However, after authority from the Department of the Army had been received to create the field army, and discontinue USAREUR, it was discovered that certain obstacles prevented its accomplishment. The principal obstacle was that final review jurisdiction in the case of courts-martial, not alone of personnel in EUCOM units proper, but also of personnel in units assigned to United States Forces, Austria, Trieste, Greece, and other areas of Europe where U.S. forces were present, rested in the senior army headquarters in Europe. In this case, it was Headquarters, USAREUR. Although EUCOM headquarters was staffed almost entirely with Army personnel, it was not per se an Army headquarters, but rather, in the strict limitations of Department of Defense terminology, an operational headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, itself an operational and not an administrative headquarters. Thus, in order to retain this jurisdiction over court-martial procedures and review, it was discovered, USAREUR headquarters would have to be retained at least as a paper organization. The only alternative to this would be for General Handy to issue an order designating himself as the Senior Army Commander in Europe, thus making a matter of administrative record his authority for retention of court-martial jurisdiction. Another obstacle to the immediate discontinuance of Headquarters, USAREUR, was the fact that Lieutenant General Eddy had been appointed Commanding General, Seventh Army, on an interim Department of the Army appointment made while Congress was not in session. As all such appointments required subsequent Senate confirmation, it was necessary to retain General Eddy on USAREUR rolls until Congress reconvened and his appointment was confirmed. By year's end, neither General Handy's issuance of an order designating himself Senior Army Commander in Europe, nor the Senate's confirmation of General Eddy's appointment as Commanding General, Seventh Army, had taken place.²⁴

b. Status of USAREUR at the End of the Year. Although all troops had been withdrawn, publication of directives had been discontinued, and to all intents and purposes it was no longer a functioning organization, USAREUR remained at the end of the year at least a paper organization with General Eddy still designated as commanding general.

26. Effect of Creation of the Seventh Army and Withdrawal of Troops from USAREUR Upon Organizational Structure of EUCOM

With the creation of a new army in the European Command, and the reduction to zero of troop strength in USAREUR, major changes

²⁴ Interv, S. Stone, Hist. Div, with Lt Col E. C. Townsend, EUCOM OPOT Div Plans Staff Off, 20 Dec 50.

in the over-all organizational structure of EUCOM, particularly with respect to command relationships, were inevitable.

a. Changes in the Organizational Structure. Most important of these structural changes was the elimination of USAREUR from the organizational chart of EUCOM and its replacement by the Seventh Army. Though not discontinued, USAREUR was no longer considered an operational headquarters and no position was given to it on the EUCOM chart. As reconstituted, the major commands of EUCOM at the end of the year were: Seventh Army, USAFE, and USNAVFORGER. In addition, the list of units and agencies other than major commands which were assigned to EUCOM and reported directly to this headquarters was increased by the addition of the 66th CIC Detachment, the 7756 Audit Agency, and the military posts, all previously subordinate to USAREUR. (See Chart 2, Organizational Structure of the European Command as of 31 December 1950.)

b. Changes in Composition of EUCOM Headquarters. With USAREUR no longer operational, there was no further necessity for the dual functioning of staff divisions. Elimination of USAREUR headquarters, however, did not alter the responsibilities of these divisions, as their missions remained the same: technical and administrative servicing of EUCOM commands, units, and agencies, as well as the same servicing of purely Army commands, units, and agencies. Whereas their basic assignments formerly had been with EUCOM, with duties performed in both USAREUR and EUCOM headquarters, staff divisions at the end of the year were directly assigned to EUCOM only. Basic structure of both general and special staffs, however, remained unchanged.²⁵

c. Revision of Format for Command Publications. In addition to personnel changes, the direct assignment of all U.S. Army troops to EUCOM made necessary certain revisions in command administrative procedures. Foremost among these was the discontinuance of further publication of USAREUR directives. All existing USAREUR circulars, command letters, weekly directives, and training publications were adopted by EUCOM, with their applicability limited to Army elements of the command. These publications were to be referred to by their old USAREUR designation and were to remain in effect until rescinded or republished under a EUCOM heading. A memorandum to all EUCOM staff divisions on 29 December established procedures to be followed in the future preparation and publication of various directives pending revision of the EUCOM Staff Procedures Manual. In the case of circulars, the existing system of assigning permanent numbers, by subject, was to continue in effect, and all circulars were to be

²⁵ Interv. S. Stone, Hist Div, with Maj C. W. Fletcher, EUCOM OPOT Div Opns Staff Off, 12 Jan 51.

published under a EUCOM heading. These were to be broad in scope, leaving basic implementation to the major commanders, Seventh Army, USAFE, and USNAVFORGER, unless it should become essential to standardize procedures by a detailed directive. If detailed implementation should be required for U.S. Army elements of EUCOM exclusively, a separate EUCOM circular, bearing the same number as the corresponding joint EUCOM circular, was to be issued with the limiting designation, "Applicable only to U.S. Army elements." Weekly directives under a EUCOM heading were to consist of two parts. Part I would contain matter applicable to major commands, EUCOM, while Part II would contain matter applicable to U.S. Army elements of EUCOM exclusively. Command letters and training publications were to be handled in much the same way. Should letters be applicable to one or more of the other services, in addition to all Army elements, two letters were to be published, one to the appropriate major commands and the other to Army elements of EUCOM. Training publications pertaining exclusively to Army elements were to be so designated.²⁶

27. Establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe

Establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe (SHAPE), and the organization, effective 20 December, of the United States Army element, SHAPE, had certain effects upon EUCOM which were only beginning to be noted at the end of the year. Though not an organization belonging to EUCOM, nor one coming operationally under its jurisdiction, the U.S. Army Element, SHAPE, was a Department of the Army unit and as such was to be given certain logistical support by EUCOM during its early days of organization.

a. Activation of 8478 AAU. On 22 December, Department of the Army general orders were issued, effective 20 December, organizing the United Army element, SHAPE, 8478 AAU (Secretary of the Defense Area), APO 55, with station in Paris.²⁷

b. EUCOM Responsibilities to SHAPE. At almost the same time as the creation of this U.S. Army element, SHAPE, CINCEUR was directed by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to render such financial assistance, consistent with established practices, which in the opinion of SCAPE would be required for his administration and

²⁶ EUCOM memo for all Staff Divs, 29 Dec 50, sub: Revised Format for Command Publications. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁷ Cable WCL - 34365, COFSA to CINCEUR, 22 Dec 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 SHAPE (1950), Vol. I, Item 9.

staffing. Simultaneously, CINCEUR was requested by the Budget Division, Department of the Army, to submit estimates of funds required for the remainder of fiscal year 1951 to cover the U.S. share of dollar requirements for support of Supreme Headquarters. Upon receipt of this request, the EUCOM annual funding program was to be augmented to the extent of the assistance rendered Supreme Headquarters pending development of a detailed program for SHAPE. On 27 December, CINCEUR was directed by the Department of the Army to furnish SHAPE all necessary logistical support, and at the same time was authorized and encouraged to maintain direct communications with SHAPE.²⁸

c. CINCEUR's Reporting of EUCOM Troops to SCAPE. Following Department of the Army authorization for direct communications between CINCEUR and SHAPE, and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Handy cabled General Eisenhower on 24 December that he was placing under his operational command as Supreme Allied Commander all forces of the European Command. On 28 December, General Eisenhower cabled CINCEUR that it was with the greatest of pleasure that he received General Handy's report, and welcomed CINCEUR and his command as they joined in the great endeavor. Pending further instructions, General Eisenhower notified CINCEUR that he was to continue in effect all previously existing plans, preparations, and command and operational arrangements.²⁹

28. Authorized Expansion of Labor Service Type Units

As part of the over-all EUCOM program of build-up of forces, and in order to expand the force of non-U.S. personnel organized as EUCOM mobile guard and technical units, CINCEUR in August authorized the Commanding General, USAREUR, and the Commanding General, USAFE, to increase their Labor Service personnel strengths by a total of 17,000 personnel. The Commanding General, USAREUR, was instructed to organize already assigned Industrial Police into forty Labor Service companies of two hundred men each, and to recruit, screen, organize, and train additional units utilizing the

²⁸(1) Cable W - 99200, COFSA fr C/Bud Div to CINCEUR, 19 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 SHAPE (1950), Vol. I, Item 1. (2) Cable W - 99619, COFSA sgd Collins to CINCEUR, 22 Dec 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 SHAPE (1950), Vol. I, Item 10.

²⁹(1) Cable S - 4317, CINCEUR sgd Handy to COFSA for Eisenhower, 24 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 SHAPE (1950), Vol. I, Item 11. (2) Cable W - 99870, DA pers fr Eisenhower to CINCEUR for Handy, 28 Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 SHAPE (1950), Vol. I, Item 16.

increased personnel authorization. The Commanding General, USAFE, was instructed to recruit, screen, organize, and train additional mobile type units utilizing increased personnel strengths, and to organize the type of units most needed to meet USAFE requirements.³⁰ (See par. 52, below.)

IV. Program of Economy in Personnel and Operations

29. European Command General Program of Economy

Throughout 1950, as in previous years, emphasis within the European Command was placed upon strict economy in both personnel and operations. As interpreted to meet the existing circumstances in EUCOM, the program of economy, carried on in all components of the armed forces both in the zone of interior and in the overseas commands, was defined as one in which the most effective possible use was made of personnel, space, and funds in every element of the command. Economy measures were not confined to effective use of allocated funds, but included the proper management of personnel and spaces to insure that sound, functional organizations were in operation in EUCOM. Realizing that economies of any kind result from effective business management, CINCEUR made every effort in 1950 to assure that the tools of organization (forms and reports control, work measurement, work simplification, and cost accounting) were being used to give EUCOM a flexible yet thoroughly efficient working organization, one in which the European Command could do more with less money and personnel and at the same time pay off in stronger defenses despite limited budgets. To accomplish these economies, two staff divisions within EUCOM headquarters were assigned responsibility for instituting command-wide programs; the Office of the Comptroller was made responsible agent for all programs of economy affecting personnel and administration, while the Logistics Division was given the responsibility for instituting programs of supply economy.³¹ (See 1950 USAREUR Report, pars. 16 - 19.)

³⁰ EUCOM ltr, 12 Aug 50, sub: Increased Personnel Strength Authorization for Labor Service Type Units. AG 322 OPOT - AGO. RESTRICTED.

³¹ Ltr, AG to Comdrs of all Comds Subord to USAREUR, 15 Jun 50, sub: Department of Army Economy Program Broadcast by Lt Gen Huebner, 18 May 50. AG 000.77 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

30. Establishment of a Budget Advisory Committee

Although a Budget Advisory Committee to review all deutsche mark budget estimates prior to their submission to HICOG had been established in EUCOM in October of 1949, no similar committee had been formed in the command to review dollar budget estimates. Accordingly, on 28 April such a committee was instituted to review all dollar budget estimates for CINCEUR prior to their submission to the Department of the Army. This committee was to be composed of the Deputy Comptroller, EUCOM, as Chairman, the Directors of the Personnel and Administration (P&A), OPOT, and Logistics Divisions, and the Chief, Budget Division, as members. The chairman of the committee was instructed to designate an officer from the Budget Division, EUCOM, to act as recorder without vote. Committee members were authorized to designate a senior alternate, in the grade of colonel, to act for, and in the absence of, the member for whom he was to be alternate. Later in 1950, a new Budget Advisory Committee to review all deutsche mark estimates was formed to replace the similar committee established in 1949. This new committee was to be composed of senior field grade officers from the P&A, OPOT, Logistics, and Budget Divisions, and the Office of the Comptroller, EUCOM, and of officers of comparable grade from USAFE and USNAVFORGER. In addition, one representative from HICOG was to be invited to attend meetings of this committee as a liaison observer. With the Deputy Comptroller, EUCOM, serving as chairman, the committee was assigned the responsibility of reporting to CINCEUR in reference to conformity of budget estimates with approved policies and programs, adequacy of budget estimates for the performance of EUCOM missions, and regard for every practical management improvement consistent with military efficiency.³²

31. Management Survey of EUCOM Staff Divisions

As another aspect of the continuous program of economy in personnel and operations, CINCEUR directed on 11 August that a management survey of each staff division in EUCOM headquarters be made by the EUCOM Comptroller. The purpose of this survey was to assist the heads of staff divisions in reviewing their functions, procedures, and organization. To aid the Comptroller in his assignment, the Directors of the P&A, OPOT, Logistics, and Civil Affairs Divisions, and the Comptroller, EUCOM headquarters, were each directed to nominate an experienced officer of the grade of lieutenant colonel or major to be made available to the Comptroller for

³²(1) EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, p. 120. SECRET.
 (2) EUCOM GO 20, 28 Apr 50, sub: Establishment of Budget Advisory Committee. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM GO 47, 2 Oct 50, sub: Budget Advisory Committee. UNCLASSIFIED.

the composition of a Management Survey Board. During the last five months of the year, five staff divisions of Headquarters, EUCOM, were surveyed. These were the Historical, Personnel and Administration, Inspector General, Public Information, and Armed Forces Information and Education Divisions.³³

32. Establishment of the EUCOM Logistic Planning Board

To cover still a third aspect of the program of economy in personnel and operations, the EUCOM Logistic Planning Board was established on 6 July by verbal order of CINCEUR and was later confirmed by issuance of general orders on 29 August. The purpose, function, and responsibilities of this board were to study available planning data, and to review the logistic planning forecasts and five-year construction plans submitted to it by major command logistic planning boards. The EUCOM board was to consist of the Director, Logistics Division, as president; the Deputy Chief, Engineer Division; the Chief, Control Branch, P&A Division; the Chief, Operations and Plans Branch, OPOT Division; and one staff officer, Service Branch, and one staff officer, Plans Branch, Logistics Division, the last-named officer serving as recorder. This board was reconstituted later in the year when the activation of the Seventh Army and the subsequent withdrawal of troops from USAREUR necessitated the recomposition of both the board structure and its primary function. Additionally, the board was enlarged to include representation from USAFE and USNAVFORGER. Its revised duties consisted of the reviewing of logistic planning forecasts and five-year master plans and construction programs submitted to EUCOM headquarters by the Commanding Generals, Seventh Army and USAFE, the Commander, USNAVFORGER, the Commanding General, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and all military post commanders except that of Wiesbaden; the assumption of all duties and responsibilities formerly exercised by the USAREUR Logistic Planning Board; and the responsibility for the semiannual EUCOM Logistic Planning Forecast.³⁴

³³ EUCOM ltr to heads of all Staff Divs, 11 Aug 50, sub: Management Survey, Headquarters, European Command. AG 322 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. For results of these surveys, see EUCOM Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, Chap. VII (Activities of Management Branch), par. 75.

³⁴ (1) EUCOM GO 42, 20 Aug 50, sub: Establishment of the EUCOM Logistic Planning Board. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM GO 61, 27 Dec 50, Sec. II, sub: Establishment of the EUCOM Logistic Planning Board. UNCLASSIFIED.

33. Other EUCOM Organizational Changes

Although not always as clearly so as in the case of the creation of the Budget Advisory Committee and the Management Survey and Logistic Planning Boards, other EUCOM organizational changes in 1950 were largely said to have been the result of the general program of economy in personnel and operations. Changes are listed chronologically by effective date.

a. Redesignation of Schools and Training Centers. Effective 1 March, ten EUCOM schools and training centers were redesignated as USAREUR schools and training centers. These agencies, with their new designations, were as follows: USAREUR Bandsmen School, USAREUR Engineer School, USAREUR Intelligence and Military Police School, USAREUR Ordnance School, USAREUR Quartermaster School, USAREUR Signal School, USAREUR Tank Training Center, USAREUR Finance School, USAREUR Medical Training School, USAREUR Transportation Training Center, and USAREUR TI&E School. At the same time, the operating units of eight of these schools or training centers were redesignated to reflect the transfer to USAREUR, and in the case of the Finance School and the TI&E School, they were to remain an integral part of EUCOM organizations. The remaining two schools were designated to be operated by units as indicated: the USAREUR Medical Training School by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 57th Medical Battalion (Separate), and the USAREUR Transportation Training Center by the 37th Transportation Highway Transport Division. Consideration had been given to the redesignation of these schools as early as 1949, but not until February 1950 was any action taken to effect the change. Reason given for the redesignation was the fact that although courses were open to personnel of all services under EUCOM control, the schools themselves were entirely supported by Army funds and staffed by Army personnel. At the time that the redesignations were made, General Handy indicated that it might have been better had the names not been changed, particularly inasmuch as there was at that time a need for building up a feeling of joint cooperation between the services at EUCOM level. However, no rescission of the redesignation order was made.³⁵

³⁵(1) EUCOM GO 8, 10 Feb 50, sub: Redesignation of Schools and Training Centers, etc. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM IRS C/N 1, D/OPOT to COFS, 21 Nov 50, sub: Redesignation of Service Schools. RESTRICTED. In SGS 352 (1950), Vol. II, Item 104. (3) EUCOM Memo for Record, Col Ralph W. Zwicker, Dep Dir/OPOT, 21 March 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 352 (1950), Vol. II, Item 104.

b. Redesignation of the Army-Air Force Troop Information and Education Division, EUCOM Headquarters. Under date of 10 March, EUCOM orders were issued redesignating the Army-Air Force Troop Information and Education Division, Headquarters, EUCOM, as the Armed Forces Information and Education, Headquarters, EUCOM. At the same time, USAREUR general orders were published establishing the Troop Information and Education Division as a special staff division of USAREUR headquarters. Although this, in effect, separated the two divisions administratively, it brought about little change in the activities of what had theretofore been a single staff division. Following the redesignation, USAREUR responsibilities and operations were performed concurrently with those of EUCOM and by the same personnel. Over-all policies and missions were not affected by the changes in designation.³⁶

c. Redesignation of Secretary, General Staff, EUCOM Headquarters. Announcement was made on 25 May of the redesignation of the Secretary, General Staff, Headquarters, EUCOM, as Secretary of the General Staff, Headquarters, EUCOM. This change was made in order to make the designation comply with the nomenclature prescribed by Field Manual 101 - 5 (Field Officer's Staff Manual), and brought with it no change in mission or functions.³⁷

d. Absorption of Signal Messenger Service Functions by Army-Air Force Postal System. Effective 0001 hours, 1 June, the Signal Messenger Service of EUCOM was discontinued. Beginning on that date, available material entitled to transmission through the mails under official penalty indicia were to be prepared in the proper manner and dispatched through the Army-Air Force Postal System. In order to provide mail service approximating that previously maintained by the Signal Messenger Service, subordinate EUCOM commanders were requested to issue instructions to Army, Air Force, and Fleet post offices to establish and maintain schedules for the receipt, dispatch, and delivery of official mail on weekends and holidays in addition to the normal work days.³⁸

e. Redesignation of Special Services Division, EUCOM. On 31 July the Special Services Division, Headquarters, EUCOM, was

³⁶EUCOM GO 16, 10 Mar 50, sub: Redesignation of the Army-Air Force Troop Information and Education Division, Headquarters, European Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁷(1) EUCOM GO 23, 25 May 50, sub: Announcement of Redesignation. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col G. P. Winton, EUCOM SGS Staff Studies Off, 17 Apr 51.

³⁸EUCOM ltr to CG's, USAREUR and USAFE, Comdr, USNAVFORGER, 17 May 50, sub: Absorption of Signal Messenger Service Functions by Army-Air Force Postal System. AG 311.1 AGX - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

redesignated the EUCOM Special Activities Division. The director of this division; together with a EUCOM Service Commanders Council composed of the Commanding Generals, USAREUR and USAFE, the Commander, USNAVFORGER, and one general officer designated by Commanding General, USFA, was to be responsible to CINCEUR for the control and supervision of the operations of the EUCOM Welfare Fund, EUCOM Exchange System, EUCOM Motion Picture Service, and EUCOM Special Services. At the same time, numerous other boards and councils were set up under the Special Activities Division. These were the EUCOM Welfare Board to give advice regarding the budgetary and funding responsibilities of the EUCOM Welfare Fund, the EUCOM Exchange Council to review management principles and the financial responsibilities of the EUCOM Exchange System, the EUCOM Motion Picture Service Board to make recommendations concerning policies and plans for the operation of the armed forces theaters and affiliated activities, and the EUCOM Athletic Board charged with the mission of making recommendations concerning the policy and conduct of EUCOM-level athletic programs and eligibility rules for participation in these programs.³⁹

f. Establishment of Labor Services Division, EUCOM Headquarters. The Labor Services Division was established as a special staff division, Headquarters, EUCOM, effective 1 August. The Chief, Labor Services Division, was to be responsible to the chief of staff for staff supervision of EUCOM Labor Service personnel and Industrial Police.⁴⁰ (See par. 51, below.)

g. Discontinuance of the 7721 Claims Office Team. The 7721 Claims Office Team was discontinued effective 15 November. Personnel and troop spaces of this unit were transferred to U.S. Forces, Austria. Prior to this transfer, the office team had been attached to U.S. Forces, Austria.⁴¹

h. Reorganization of the Office of the Comptroller. To handle more efficiently the increased demands placed upon it subsequent to its establishment by Department of the Army instructions in January of 1949, the Office of the Comptroller, EUCOM, twice during the current year made major adjustments in its internal organization. Throughout the year, the principal mission of this office was to formulate, coordinate and supervise matters pertaining

³⁹EUCOM GO 31, 31 Jul 50, sub: Redesignation of Special Services Division, European Command, etc. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁰EUCOM GO 34, 3 Aug 50, Sec. I, sub: Establishment of Labor Services Division, Headquarters, European Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴¹EUCOM GO 49, 3 Nov 50, sub: Discontinuance of the 7721 Claims Office Team. UNCLASSIFIED.

to budget, fiscal, management, auditing and statistical activities of the European Command.⁴² On 1 April 1950, responsibility for the supervision of the reports control system was transferred from the Adjutant General Division to the Office of the Comptroller, necessitating an internal transfer within the Office of the Comptroller of supervision of this activity from the Management Branch to the Statistical Branch. By far the most comprehensive of the two adjustments in internal organizational structure made during the year, however, was that which took place in December. At this time, the Plans and Policy Branch was discontinued, with all Plans and Policy Branch functions, including liaison with HICOG, being assumed by the Comptroller. Concurrently, a Management Survey Section was established in the Management Branch to conduct field management and organization surveys of staff divisions of EUCOM headquarters, military posts, and technical service installations, and to control office space assignments in Campbell Barracks to insure optimum space utilization. All cost accounting functions heretofore exercised by the Chief, Finance Division, were transferred to the Management Branch, Office of the Comptroller, with the concurrence of the Chief, Finance Division. Several sections and branches of the office were redesignated and their duties and functions somewhat altered. The Works Processes and Analysis Section was redesignated Works Processes and Costs Section, Management Branch, its functions being to supervise all employee suggestion, work simplification, work measurement, and cost accounting and analysis programs of the command. The Statistics Branch was redesignated Program Review and Analysis Branch with two sections: (1) the Reports Control Section to administer and supervise reports control activities; and (2) the Program Planning, Analysis and Evaluation Section to administer and supervise the Department of the Army review and analysis program as well as such other statistical or special studies as might be assigned, including the necessary drafting requirements, and the compilation, editing, and interpretation of the monthly statistical summaries. Additionally, the Administrative Section was redesignated the Administrative Branch without changes in functions.⁴³

i. Establishment of Provost Marshal and Adjutant General Divisions, EUCOM Headquarters, as Commands. On 14 and 21 December, respectively, the Provost Marshal and Adjutant General Divisions, EUCOM headquarters, were established as EUCOM commands, to consist

⁴² See EUCOM Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, Chap. I, par. 2.

⁴³ (1) EUCOM Office of Comp, Office Memo 8, 1 Dec 50, sub: Reorganization of the Office of the Comptroller, EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Maj Dorothy L. McLellan, EUCOM Comp Staff Studies Off, 12 Jan 51.

of the divisions themselves and such units as might in the future be assigned to them. Designation of the Adjutant General Division as a EUCOM command followed closely the activation of the 7879 Publications Depot and Records Center at Hoechst. (See 1950 USAREUR Report, par. 20b.) This unit, together with the 65th Machine Records Unit and the 7968 Machine Records Augmentation Detachment, were subsequently assigned to the Adjutant General Division. The only changes within the division which were brought about by this designation of the Adjutant General Division as a command were in the number and manner of reports required.⁴⁴

V. Planning for Establishment of an Operating Unified Command

34. Reorganization Plans

a. General. It was General Handy's intention at the beginning of 1950 to retain the existing organizational structure of the command until "relationships and responsibilities arising from the new situation in Europe settle into position." Meanwhile, the question of a reorganization of EUCOM Headquarters was under continuing study during most of 1950. One of the first considerations in planning for reorganization was the implementation of a unified command as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which all three major services would enjoy appropriate representation.⁴⁵

b. Command Group Planning. In 1949 the Commander in Chief had instructed General Cannon, CG, USAFE, General Huebner, CG, USAREUR, and Admiral Wilkes, COMNAVFORGER, to study possibilities for reorganization of the command with a view to attaining a more complete unification of the operations of the three services in

⁴⁴(1) EUCOM GO 58, 14 Dec 50, sub: Establishment of the Provost Marshal Division, Headquarters, European Command, as a Command of the European Command. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM GO 60, 21 Dec 50, sub: Establishment of the Adjutant General Division, Headquarters, European Command, as a Command of the European Command. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with CWO O. E. Benson, EUCOM AG Div Admin Off, 17 Apr 51.

⁴⁵Remarks by Gen W. B. Palmer, VCOFS, Org of Hq EUCOM, 1 Jan 50. In SGS 322/1 EUCOM, Case I. (2) JCS Paper 1259/27, 11 Dec 47, Unified Command. In SGS files.

Europe. The plan submitted by the Command Group on 18 November 1949 proposed that no separation of Army and EUCOM staffs be undertaken at that time.⁴⁶ A revised draft of the plan, taking into consideration certain of General Handy's comments on the original document, was prepared in April 1950. The revision was signed only by the Navy and Air Force Commanders, and a minority report embodying certain departures from the plan was prepared by the Army's representative, General Huebner.

35. The Air Force Position

a. Air Force Objections to the EUCOM Staff. In February General Handy had requested a statement of the main points at issue between the Army and the Air Force. These points were summarized by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations as follows: The Air Force contended that it was on the same level with USAREUR headquarters and objected to dealing with the EUCOM staff, which it claimed was more a USAREUR than a EUCOM staff. It further maintained that EUCOM headquarters should be only a small planning and policy group, not an operating staff; that USAREUR should be a separate headquarters; and that the EUCOM Chief of Staff should not at the same time be a commander of one of the services of the Command.⁴⁷ The Air Force was also opposed to the principle of a joint staff, favoring instead a system of boards similar to the existing Petroleum Board upon which all three of the major commanders were represented.

b. Recommendations by the Navy and Air Force. Recommendations in keeping with the above views were incorporated in the command group plan for reorganization approved by the Navy and Air Force in 1950. Particularly, it was suggested that the positions of the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander in Chief, EUCOM, and of commanding general, USAREUR, not be held by one individual. In fact, inasmuch as the JCS directive on unification specified that in the absence of the Commander in Chief the next highest officer should assume command, regardless of service, it was considered that the office of the Deputy Commander in Chief was not even authorized. It was further recommended that USAREUR, rather than EUCOM, be responsible for all military posts except Wiesbaden and for all unilaterally operated technical services, since these were operational functions which were neither the primary mission of EUCOM nor the responsibility of the Air Force or Navy as members of the unified command headquarters.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1949, pp. 139 - 42.

⁴⁷ Memo, Col J. G. Hill, DCOFS for Opns, for Lt Col Evans, 12 Feb 50. In SGS files.

⁴⁸ Draft Plan for Reorg of Hq EUCOM to CINC from Comd Grp, 27 Apr 50. In SGS 322/1, Case I.

36. The Army's Position

a. General Huebner's Minority Report. General Huebner did not concur in the views of General Cannon and Admiral Wilkes on three issues, the most important basis of dissent being his conviction that the role of the Air Force and the Navy in CINCEUR's mission was strictly supporting. He felt therefore that the Army commander should continue to act in the dual capacity of Commanding General, USAREUR, and Chief of Staff, EUCOM, and that his rank should be second only to that of the Commander in Chief, whether or not he appeared as deputy commander in chief on organization charts. He called attention to the failure of the plan to include technical services on the Commander in Chief's staff. This, he said, would necessitate the delegation of CINCEUR's numerous logistical missions to one or more subordinate commanders and would prove a disastrous handicap in an emergency. Finally he noted that the plan did not take into account the problems of location, housing, and communications which must be considered in planning a separate EUCOM staff.⁴⁹

b. Additional Views. It was pointed out by Army officials that neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the Department of the Army had directed reorganization, and that until EUCOM's operational role in war was determined, plans for revision of the Command structure were of little value. It was suggested by the deputy chief of staff for operations that in the meantime the addition to the EUCOM staff of four Navy and eight Air Force officers, then being negotiated, would "increase the joint complexion of EUCOM Headquarters."⁵⁰ (See par. 38, below.) The deputy chief of staff also recommended that the Army commander be designated deputy commanding general, EUCOM, thus retaining control of the Joint EUCOM-USAREUR staff without conflicting with the JCS directive. This officer need not wear the hat of the chief of staff, and it was in fact suggested that the current vice chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, be redesignated chief of staff, and that the office of vice chief of staff be eliminated.

c. Action Taken. This last recommendation was acted upon on 12 August when General Noce became chief of staff, and his former office as vice chief of staff was abolished.⁵¹ With the exception of this step and the elimination of the position of deputy commander

⁴⁹ Memo, Huebner for CINC, Jun 50, sub: Organization of Staff, European Command. In SGS 322.

⁵⁰ Memo, DCOFS for Opns for Handy, 6 Jul 50. In SGS 322/1.

⁵¹ GO 38, 12 Aug 50.

in chief after General Huebner's departure, no further action was taken in connection with the command group plan in 1950, and the question of unified command was suspended pending clarification of the part the European Command was to play in Atlantic Pact defenses.

37. Other Reorganizational Planning in 1950

a. Recommendations by Deputy Chief of Staff. In connection with the study of reorganization undertaken by the command group, the deputy chief of staff recommended in February that two studies be made. The first would approach the problem from the standpoint of a peacetime theater headquarters with only its own housekeeping responsibilities, entailing establishment of a separate USAREUR headquarters or a consolidation of Army headquarters with one of the other major headquarters. The alternative would be a headquarters designed to assume the functions of a theater headquarters in war, similar to the existing arrangement by which the Constabulary headquarters would serve as the Army field headquarters in emergencies, but with the Navy and Air Force represented.⁵²

b. General Huebner's Proposals for EUCOM and USAREUR Reorganization. On 13 February, General Huebner directed preparation of a plan for reorganization of both EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters in which EUCOM headquarters would function as an over-all command of the three military services and of the communications zone, both in peace and war.⁵³ It would be staffed by personnel of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. It was to be a small headquarters designed to permit an easy transition from peacetime to wartime operations. USAREUR headquarters would establish the communications zone in time of emergency, would carry the Army administrative load for EUCOM, and would deal with the Department of the Army both in peace and war on behalf of Army elements in the European Command. A field army centered around the Constabulary, the status of which would be governed by current emergency plans, would be administered by USAREUR. Finally, "there was to be no wearing of two hats by personnel of USAREUR and EUCOM." Accordingly, a number of staff divisions were queried as to the Air Force and Navy personnel requirements of their respective organizations, and a top secret plan was drawn up by the OPOT Division incorporating these estimates and the principles laid down by General Huebner.⁵⁴ Although this plan was

⁵² Memo, Col J. G. Hill, DCOFS for Opns, for Lt Col Evans, 12 Feb 50. In SGS 322/1 EUCOM, Case I.

⁵³ IRS, Asst DCOFS for Opns to D/OPOT, 13 Feb 50. In SGS 322/1, Item 10. SECRET.

⁵⁴ Reorganization Plan, Col Horstman, OPOT Div, 6 Mar 50. AG 2113. TOP SECRET. In OPOT files.

shelved shortly after its completion, it illustrates a shift in Army thinking from more or less strict adherence to unification principles to assertion of the Army's predominant role in the European Command. Whereas General Huebner's dissenting opinion on the command group plan stressed the inadvisability of depriving the commander in chief of control of such agencies as the technical services, his earlier views were that Army administration should be purely a USAREUR function. Another fundamental change in Army thinking is demonstrated by General Huebner's later statement that the USAREUR commanding general should also be the chief of staff, a dual position obviously entailing the "wearing of two hats."

38. Air Force and Navy Representation on the EUCOM Staff

JCS Paper 1259/27, 11 December 1947, directed that each commander of a unified command have a joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the service under his command in key positions of responsibility. Pending agreement as to the most suitable European Command structure for the exercise of unified command, a study was prepared in January 1950 on inclusion of Naval and Air Force personnel on the EUCOM staff. This study recommended that eight Air Force and four Navy officers be assigned to the staff, and an agreement to this effect was concluded between General Handy and Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, in March.⁵⁵ There was considerable discussion at EUCOM headquarters as to the officer grades which should be requested, and to which divisions they should be assigned. In April the deputy chief of staff for operations recommended to the commander in chief that two Navy captains (or a captain and a Marine colonel) and two commanders be requested, inasmuch as "neither the Department of the Air Force nor of the Navy will agree to accept only 'Indians' in this staff and not chiefs."⁵⁶ Accordingly, a letter was dispatched to USNAVFORGER, requesting one captain or commander to be assigned to OPOT, one captain or commander for the Training Branch of OPOT, one commander for Logistics, and one commander for the Intelligence Division.⁵⁷ The deputy chief of staff for operations further proposed that EUCOM request the Air Force to provide five colonels, two lieutenant colonels, and one major. Although USAFE had proposed sending only seven officers, owing to a shortage of personnel in its

⁵⁵Written statement in answer to questions propounded by Hist Div, Lt:Col Requarth, OPOT, 13 Dec 50.

⁵⁶Memo, Hill for Handy, 11 Apr 50, sub: Assignment of Air Force and Navy Officers to EUCOM Staff. In SGS 322/1 Case I, Item 27. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁵⁷Ltr, VCOFS to COMNAVFORGER, 12 Apr 50, sub: Assignment of Navy Officers to EUCOM Staff. In SGS 322/1 Case I, Item 27. CONFIDENTIAL.

own headquarters, it was pointed out that under the provision of JAA FAR 1 - 11 - 65, 2 June 1949, the Air Force was required to provide eight officers. Five were already on duty with EUCOM -- a brigadier general as Director of the Intelligence Division, a colonel with Special Services, a lieutenant colonel in the Quartermaster Division, a major with Transportation, and a captain with the 7893 Liaison Mission at Potsdam.⁵⁸ It was planned to request four more Air Force officers, two for assignment as intelligence staff officers, one as a supply evacuation staff officer, and one as an operations and training officer.⁵⁹ However, this personnel was never assigned, and negotiations were suspended in August when USAFE headquarters announced that no further action would be taken until after 1 October. The receipt on 28 August of a revision to the JCS directive necessitated reconsideration of the entire question of unified command.⁶⁰ By the end of the year, of the twelve officers requested by EUCOM, only a Marine lieutenant colonel, a Navy captain, and four Air Force officers were actually assigned to the unified staff.

39. Move of COMNAVFORGER to Heidelberg

To effect closer coordination with EUCOM headquarters, Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, was closed at Berlin on 31 January and reopened at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, on the following day.⁶¹ The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, was authorized to prescribe such personnel as would be required to remain in Berlin to execute those functions which could not be accomplished in Heidelberg.

40. Administration of Joint Activities

One of the principal problems involved in unified command of the three services was the administration of agencies of a joint character, such as post exchanges, Special Services, Class VI supplies, and the Motion Picture Service. On 17 February, Generals Cannon and Huebner and Admiral Wilkes met for a discussion of the problem and agreed on principles governing the operation of such agencies. Firstly they recognized that the Army, Navy, and Air Force were coequal and should have equal representation in all

⁵⁸Memo, DCOFS fr Opns for Handy, 11 Apr 50, sub: Assignment of Air Navy Officers to EUCOM Staff. In SGS 322/1 (1950), Item 26. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁵⁹Ltr to CG, USAFE, Apr 50, sub: Request for Air Force Officers. AG 200.3 GPA. In SGS 322/1 EUCOM Case 1, Vol. I.

⁶⁰Written Statement. Lt Col Requarth, 13 Dec 50.

⁶¹GO 5, 28 Jan 50.

jointly owned or operated activities. The satisfactory operation of these services was a responsibility of the commander in chief, who was to be advised by the commander of the Army, Navy and Air Force on related policy matters. It was decided that a board should be constituted with equal representation of the three services to recommend to service commanders concerned the policy under which joint activities should be operated.⁶² The establishment of this board was directed by General Handy on 27 March.⁶³

VI. Creation of Units and Agencies to Handle U.S. Commitments in NATO and Obligations under the LOFC

41. EUCOM Responsibilities for Implementation of MDAP

In order to carry out missions assigned CINCEUR by the Department of Defense in his role as United States military representative for military assistance to member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), EUCOM was required to organize several new Army agencies during 1950. These agencies were set up as elements of a single, numbered Army group which was designated as a unit directly subordinate to EUCOM headquarters. As such, this agency received the same administrative and logistical support -- where existing military facilities could be extended for this support without requiring additional EUCOM funds -- as all other subordinate commands, units, or agencies of EUCOM.⁶⁴

a. Establishment of Army Components, 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group. Pursuant to instructions contained in a letter from the Department of the Army, EUCOM on 27 January established six Army components of the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), effective 1 February, with stations in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Italy, and Denmark. Each

⁶² Memo, Cannon, Huebner, Wilkes, for Handy, 17 Feb 50. In SGS 322/1 EUCOM, Case II, Vol. I.

⁶³ Memo, Handy for Maj Comdrs, 27 Mar 50. In SGS 322/1 Case I, B/P.

⁶⁴ EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Rept No. 4, 24 Jan 50, par. 5. UNCLASSIFIED.

of these components, organized under Table of Distribution No. 1390, Section II, was designated the Army Section at country level of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Until the activation of the parent organization, the 7950 JAMAG, the MAAG's were assigned directly to EUCOM headquarters.⁶⁵

b. Organization of the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group. To complete the over-all administrative structure of the Army elements of the MDAP organization in Europe, the 7950 JAMAG was organized on 9 January, with an effective date of 14 February. JAMAG headquarters director, the Military Assistance Program Advisory Group (MAPAG), and Plans North Atlantic Treaty (PLANAT) were in London, and PLANAT Paris Group in Paris. All components of the 7950 JAMAG were organized under Table of Distribution No. 1390, Section I. On 2 March, but with date of effectiveness retroactive to 14 February, EUCOM orders were published discontinuing Army Members, Joint American Military Advisory Group - Europe, with headquarters at 20 Grosvenor Square, London. Personnel of this unit were transferred to the already organized 7950 JAMAG (Army). Later in the year, one additional component of the 7950 JAMAG (Army) was established. This was the JAMAG United Kingdom Section, organized, effective 1 August, under Table of Distribution 1390-A, Column II, Section II. For activation of these components of the MDAP organization, EUCOM personnel authorizations were revised by the Department of the Army to reflect the increase in personnel spaces required.⁶⁶

c. Establishment of the EUCOM Mutual Defense Assistance Program Control Group. On 15 March, the European Command Mutual Defense Assistance Program Control Group was established and attached to the Office of the Comptroller, EUCOM headquarters. This group was assigned the responsibility for control of all MDAP budgeting, funding, fiscal, and related reporting activities. By agreement with the Director, P&A Division, a civilian personnel representative was detailed to duty with this group to insure effective utilization and administration within authorized funds.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ EUCOM GO 4, 27 Jan 50, sub: Organization of the Sections of the Joint American Military Advisory Group (Army). RESTRICTED.

⁶⁶ (1) EUCOM GO 7, 9 Feb 50, sub: Organization of the Army Section of the Joint American Military Advisory Group. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM GO 15, 2 Mar 50, sub: Discontinuance of the Army Members, Joint American Military Advisory Group - Europe. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM GO 41, 25 Aug 50, sub: Organization of the United Kingdom Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁷ EUCOM ltr to all Staff Divs, 14 Mar 50, sub: EUCOM MDAP Control Group. AG 334 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. See also EUCOM Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, Chap. VI, par. 68.

42. Organizational Changes in the 7966 EUCOM Detachment

Primarily a service or support type unit, the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, located in Paris, was in 1950 a microcosm in which were reflected in various ways the major trends affecting organizational changes within EUCOM. In January this agency lost a considerable portion of its personnel because the American Graves Registration Command, its predecessor unit, had exhausted a large portion of the funds budgeted for its operation in FY 1950. Later in the year its scope of responsibility was enlarged by the creation of the 7964 and 7965 Area Commands to handle U.S. commitments in connection with the buildup of the EUCOM LOFC operations in France. Finally, at year's end, the detachment was ordered to move from Paris to Orleans; at almost the same time it was instructed, as a EUCOM subordinate agency, to aid in the logistical support of the new SHAPE headquarters. By far the major portion of its activities, however, were concerned with the support of the LOFC operations.

a. Activation of the 7964 and 7965 Area Commands. In order to accomplish most effectively its mission of establishing, developing, and operating the EUCOM LOFC across France, a project enlarged with great rapidity during 1950, authorization was given in July for the 7966 EUCOM Detachment to organize from the already existing 7964 and 7965 Depot Companies the new 7964 and 7965 Area Commands with stations in Paris. Effective 18 August, these organizations were activated, the 7964 Area Command under Table of Distribution 303 - 1056, dated 20 July 1950, with an authorized strength of 46 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 406 enlisted men, and the 7965 Area Command under a similar table of distribution with an authorized strength of 59 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 614 enlisted men. The total strength of 1,309 personnel was taken from EUCOM spaces, no additional authorizations for personnel being requested from the Department of the Army. The new units were instructed to perform such missions and exercise such area jurisdiction as might be directed by the Commanding Officer, 7966 EUCOM Detachment.⁶⁸

b. Move of 7966 EUCOM Detachment from Paris. In late fall, the 7966 EUCOM Detachment was instructed by CINCEUR to move all operations and personnel from Paris to Orleans, France, this move to begin prior to 31 December. As available facilities to accommodate the entire headquarters were not immediately available at

⁶⁸(1) Cable ED - 679, 7966 EUCOM Det to USAREUR, 4 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 EUCOM Det (1950), Vol. I, Item 26.
(2) EUCOM Trp Asg 4, 15 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) 7966 EUCOM Det GO 35, 1 Aug 50. RESTRICTED.

Orleans, the Commanding General, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, requested and received from CINCEUR permission to operate for ninety days from three locations: a rear echelon, composed of a small detachment, would remain in Paris; a temporary base for personnel which could not be accommodated in Orleans would be established at Fontainebleau; and the major element of the detachment would open actual operating headquarters at Orleans. It was anticipated that at the end of the ninety-day period (i.e., by 1 March 1951), facilities would become available at Orleans for all of the headquarters except a small detachment which would remain in Paris.⁶⁹ (On the LOFC, see also this report, para. 12 and 76, and the 1950 USAREUR Report, para. 39 - 43.)

VII. Personnel Assignments in EUCOM

43. Major Assignments in 1950

Organizationally, the activation, discontinuance, redesignation, or reassignment of commands, units, and agencies were not the only major changes effected in EUCOM during the year. In addition, personnel shifts within key EUCOM staff and command positions in 1950 were numerous. By year's end, new officers had been appointed as chiefs of six divisions within the general staff and of six of a total of eight divisions within the special staff. Furthermore, a new chief of staff, deputy chief of staff for operations, deputy chief of staff for administration, and secretary of the general staff had also been designated, constituting an almost 100 percent change of personnel in key positions at a level of the secretary of the general staff or higher. These major assignments to key EUCOM staff and command positions during the year were as follows:

a. Col. Willis R. Slaughter was announced as the new Chief of Ordnance, replacing Brig. Gen. Edward E. MacMorland, on 25 January.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ (1) Cable, 7966 EUCOM Det sgd Young to CINCEUR, 29 Nov 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 EUCOM Det (1950), Vol. I, Item 61. (2) Cable S - 3853, CINCEUR sgd Handy to CG, 7966 EUCOM Det, 1 Dec 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 EUCOM Det (1950), Vol. I, Item 65.

⁷⁰ EUCOM GO 3, 25 Jan 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

b. Col. Herman O. Lane was appointed Inspector General in place of Maj. Gen. George J. Richards on 15 February.⁷¹

c. Col. Paul L. Singer followed Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf in the position of Deputy Provost Marshal on 16 February.⁷²

d. Col. Russell F. Albert replaced Col. Joseph C. Haw as Chief, Dependents School Division, on 24 February.⁷³

e. Lt. Col. Howard McC. Snyder, Jr. was announced as Secretary General Staff on 28 February. He assumed the position formerly occupied by Maj. Willys H. Pearson on 2 March.⁷⁴

f. Brig. Gen. Ray M. Hare assumed new duties as Chief of Ordnance, in place of Col. Willis R. Slaughter, on 9 May.⁷⁵

g. Col. Edward T. Williams replaced Col. John G. Hill as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations on 20 May.⁷⁶

h. Brig. Gen. Rex Van Den Corput, Jr., followed Maj. Gen. Jerry V. Matejka as Chief Signal Officer on 19 June.⁷⁷

i. Chaplain (Colonel) John S. Kelly became Chief Chaplain, EUCOM, on 5 July.⁷⁸

j. Maj. Gen. Alden R. Crawford was designated USAFE representative of the Area Petroleum Office, following Brig. Gen. Max F. Schneider in that position on 20 July.⁷⁹

⁷¹EUCOM GO 10, 15 Feb, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷²EUCOM GO 11, 16 Feb 50, Sec. II, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷³EUCOM GO 12, 24 Feb 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁴EUCOM GO 13, 28 Feb 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁵EUCOM GO 21, 9 May 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁶EUCOM GO 22, 20 May 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁷EUCOM GO 25, 19 Jun 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁸EUCOM GO 28, 5 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁹EUCOM GO 29, 20 Jul 50, Sec. I, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

k. Maj. Gen. Roy V. Rickard, formerly Chief of Special Services, was redesignated Director, EUCOM Special Activities Division, on 31 July.⁸⁰

l. Col. Harold C. Fellows, as Chief, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, assumed the position formerly occupied by Col. Otis McCormick on 1 August.⁸¹

m. Maj. Gen. Truman C. Thorson was relieved of his assignment as Chief, U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Soviet Zone of Germany, and was appointed Inspector General, EUCOM, replacing Col. Herman O. Lane, on 5 August. At the same time, Col. Floyd C. Harding was announced to replace General Thorson as Chief of the Military Liaison Mission.⁸²

n. Lt. Col. George T. Laughlin was appointed Chief, Labor Services Division, effective 1 August, on 3 August.⁸³

o. Brig. Gen. Bertram F. Hayford was appointed Chief of Transportation, vice Col. Calvin De Witt, Jr., on 8 August.⁸⁴

p. Col. George P. Lynch took over the duties of Col. Russell O. Smith as Headquarters Commandant on 10 August.⁸⁵

q. Col. Bjarne Furuholmen followed Col. David M. Fowler as Chief, Public Information Division on 11 August.⁸⁶

r. Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce became Chief of Staff upon Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner's departure from the command on 12 August.⁸⁷

⁸⁰EUCOM GO 31, 31 Jul 50, Sec. II, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸¹EUCOM GO 32, 1 Aug 50, Sec. I, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸²EUCOM GO 34, 3 Aug 50, Sec. III, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴EUCOM GO 35, 8 Aug 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁵EUCOM GO 36, 10 Aug 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁶EUCOM GO 37, 11 Aug 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁷EUCOM GO 38, 12 Aug 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

s. Col. Charles M. Busbee was announced as Chief, Labor Services Division, vice Lt. Col. George T. Laughlin on 14 August.⁸⁸

t. Lt. Col. Bailey S. Birdsong was appointed Deputy Area Petroleum Officer, Area Petroleum Office, and as an additional duty, U.S. representative of the Area Petroleum Office, replacing Lt. Col. Victor H. Moore, on 13 September.⁸⁹

u. Col. Edward J. O'Neill assumed the functions of Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration on 18 September.⁹⁰

v. Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw, Jr., was announced as Director, Logistics Division on 28 September.⁹¹

w. Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy was announced as Commanding General, Seventh Army, as an additional duty, on 22 November.⁹²

⁸⁸EUCOM GO 39, 14 Aug 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁹EUCOM GO 45, 13 Sep 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹⁰EUCOM GO 46, 18 Sep 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹¹EUCOM GO 50, 6 Nov 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹²EUCOM GO 53, 22 Nov 50, Sec. II, sub: Announcement of Commanding General, Seventh Army. RESTRICTED.

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a formal address, and it is the first of its kind since the signing of the Constitution. The President, James Buchanan, is addressing the Congress, and he is doing so in a very formal and dignified manner. He is discussing the state of the Union, and he is also discussing the issue of slavery. He is saying that the Union is in a state of crisis, and that the issue of slavery is the cause of this crisis. He is also saying that he is doing everything in his power to maintain the Union, and that he is asking the Congress to do the same.

CHAPTER III

Manpower in the European Command

I. Military Personnel44. Military Strength of the Command on 1 January

On 1 January 1950, the three service components of the European Command -- United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and United States Naval Forces, Germany (USNAVFORGER) -- represented a total of 103,038 assigned or attached U.S. military personnel. Except for a small percentage of this total, who were assigned to various small detachments, liaison missions, and separate units and organizations outside of Germany, virtually the entire 103,038 personnel were physically present within the three West Zones of Germany. As an inland joint command, EUCOM in 1950 showed an understandably high preponderance of Army personnel. The over-all ratio of Army to Air Force to Navy strengths on 1 January was approximately 81 to 18.6 to 0.4, or 83,394 to 19,244 to 400.¹ Within the Army component of the joint command, officer strength totaled 7,499, an excess of 226 over the current Department of the Army authorization, whereas the enlisted strength figure of 73,523 was 400 below that authorized by the USAREUR troop basis on 1 January. (See par. 45, below.) On that date, it was anticipated that slight command-wide decreases in the number of personnel on hand would be made prior to 30 June 1950 but that none of the three service components would suffer appreciably. A decrease of 1,288 personnel was foreseen for the command as a whole, with USAFE losing 984 of this total.²

¹USAREUR Monthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 49, p. 1. SECRET.

²Ibid., pp. 1 - 3.

45. Changes in Troop Basis for U.S. Army Forces

a. 1 January - 30 June 1950. Although a slight decrease in aggregate strength of the European Command during the first six months of 1950 was envisioned on 1 January, authorized Department of the Army troop ceilings for the Army component of EUCOM during that period actually reflected slight over-all increases. These theoretical ceilings (issued periodically to provide a basis for command-wide troop planning and manning, for the assignment or allocation of troops, and for requisitions for additional personnel)³ changed several times during this period. On 1 January, a planning figure for the first six months of 1950 was set at 82,539 spaces of which 7,327 were for officers, 386 for female medical officers, 856 for warrant officers, and 73,970 for enlisted personnel.⁴ During January, however, planning for the establishment of Army components of the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group (See par. 41a, above), caused two upward revisions to a total of 82,588 spaces.⁵ Other revisions during the period 1 January - 30 June were of minor significance, and, on 30 June, the approved Department of the Army troop ceiling for USAREUR stood at 82,597, an increase of only 185 spaces over the 1 January ceiling.⁶

b. 1 July - 31 December 1950. On 26 June the imminent activation of the 18th and 19th Engineer Combat Battalions caused the first marked revision of the authorized troop ceiling during 1950. In authorizing 1,600 additional military spaces -- 57 officer, 14 warrant officer, and 1,529 enlisted -- the Department of the Army anticipated that this command would supply personnel for the 18th and that the 19th would be manned by personnel furnished from the zone of the interior. Because of the requirements of the Korean situation, however, manning the 19th Engineer Combat Battalion was postponed. On 15 August the 18th Engineer Combat Battalion was

³Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col R. Talbot, C/Trp Orgn Sec, EUCOM OPOT Div, 11 Apr 51.

⁴USAREUR Monthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 49. SECRET.

⁵(1) Cable W - 98421, COFSA fr D/O&T to USAREUR, 12 Jan 50. SECRET. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) DA ltr, D/O&T, Gen Staff, DA to CINCEUR, 28 Nov 49, sub: JAMAG Organization -- Personnel Requirements (Table of Authorization, JAMAG). CS GOT 320.2. SECRET. In OPOT DA Space Accounting File, 1950.

⁶Recapitulation of EUCOM Ceiling from 25 June 1950 through 31 December 1950. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT DA Space Accounting File, 1950.

activated, utilizing 793 personnel of the authorized increase of 1,600.⁷ The remainder were absorbed into the newly activated 555th Engineer Group and the third battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment. Further increases on 18 September and 7 October raised the authorized ceiling by 2,400 and 1,989 personnel respectively. By 31 December, the ceiling for U.S. Army personnel in the command had increased to 88,593 spaces. Purposes for which these spaces were to be used included the activation of the 6th Infantry Regiment in Berlin (See 1950 USAREUR Report, par. 14d), provision of additional military personnel for JAMAG, and activation of the 485th Engineer Combat Battalion.⁸

46. Build-up of Major U.S. Army Tactical Forces in Europe

One of the most significant personnel developments of 1950 was the progressive build-up to desired overstrengths of the two major tactical units in the European Command, the 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary. On 31 December 1949, both units showed understrengths in warrant officer and enlisted categories and slight overages in officer strength.⁹ During the first four months of the year, the enlisted personnel shortages in these two units became even more noticeable. By the end of May, the 1st Infantry Division was at 96.5 percent of its total personnel authorization while U.S. Constabulary was at 97 percent. Losses in the 1st Infantry Division through application of the career guidance program (See par. 47e, below) were particularly heavy during the first few months of 1950. Despite these losses, however, particular effort was made to bring the infantry regiments and field artillery battalions to authorized strength in

⁷(1) Cable W - 8446, TAG sgd Witsell for G1 to CINCEUR, 26 Jun 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 Organization, Activation, and Discontinuance of Units (1950), Vol. I, Item 29. (2) Recapitulation of EUCOM Ceiling from 25 June 1950 through 31 December 1950. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT DA Space Accounting file. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col R. Talbot, C/Trp Orgn Sec, EUCOM OPOT Div, 11 Apr 51.

⁸(1) Cable W - 91823, COFSA from G1 sgd Witsell to CINCEUR, 18 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 OA&D (1950), Vol. I, Item 53. (2) Recapitulation of EUCOM Ceiling from 25 June 1950 through 31 December 1950. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT DA Space Accounting file, 1950. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col R. Talbot, C/Trp Orgn Sec, EUCOM OPOT Div, 11 Apr 51.

⁹Cable S - 1121, CINCEUR sgd Handy to COFSA for D/Plans and Opns, 13 Jan 50. SECRET. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 6.

order to achieve maximum training benefits during the summer training period.¹⁰ By a concerted effort to earmark all available personnel to combat units, both the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary exceeded 100 percent of their table of organization authorizations by mid-August. At that time, only the 16th Regiment of the 1st Division's three infantry regiments was still below table of organization strength, and troop assignments within tactical commands responsible to USAREUR were closely monitored in order to attain desired overstrengths. To accomplish this, new manning levels were set up for USAREUR providing for an increase in strength of tactical units to 105 percent of total authorized strength and a reduction in strength of military posts and technical services to 90 percent.¹¹ Reclassification of first three graders with non-combat military occupational specialties (MOS's) into combat MOS's and the subsequent transfer of these individuals from posts and technical services to combat units (See par. 47b, below) aided this process. By 15 September, both the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary had exceeded 105 percent of authorized assigned personnel, the former having reached 107.1 percent while U.S. Constabulary was at 105.1 percent. Revised plans in September called for a gradual increase in the overstrength of the 1st Division, the excess to be used as replacements for new unit activations.¹²

47. Military Personnel Policy Trends and Changes

During 1950 several important administrative and procedural changes were made in personnel matters affecting USAREUR officer and enlisted personnel. Among these were policy changes regarding length of overseas tours, readjustment of USAREUR first three graders, extension of foreign service tours and the subsequent extension of enlistments, and changes in requirements for promotions of enlisted personnel.

a. Changes in Policy Regarding Length of Overseas Tours. In February, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, then Commanding General, USAREUR, expressed considerable concern over the excessive lengths of continuous service in Europe of certain enlisted men of his command. Having already served four years in excess of the normal foreign service tour, some had re-enlisted and commenced new overseas tours which, if completed, would result in as much as ten years or more of uninterrupted service in Europe. General Huebner believed that such unusually long overseas tours adversely affected the efficiency of the

¹⁰Memo, USAREUR AG sgd Fitch to CG USAREUR, 17 May 50, sub: Enlisted Strength. SECRET. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 28g.

¹¹Memo, USAREUR AG sgd Fitch to CG USAREUR, 21 Aug 50, sub: Enlisted Strength. SECRET. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 74a-1.

¹²IRS, C/N 1, P&A to CG USAREUR, 18 Sep 50, sub: Enlisted Strength. SECRET. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 86.

personnel concerned and were detrimental to fulfillment of the occupation mission.¹³ On 28 February, USAREUR received permission from the Department of the Army to return immediately to the zone of the interior any enlisted person who had completed three or more years of service in this theater and whose lengthy overseas service was considered detrimental to his own efficiency and to the occupation mission. The exception to this rule was that such personnel who had already re-enlisted and started new tours of duty could not be returned until completion of one year of the tour. At the same time, the Department of the Army queried the European Command as to a proposed policy of limiting overseas service of enlisted personnel to a maximum of six consecutive years.¹⁴ Agreeing in principle with the proposed policy, the command stated two personnel categories which should be exempted: personnel desiring to make careers of continuous service with the same combat unit and critical specialists for whom replacements could not be furnished.¹⁵ By 31 December, the impact of the Korean action and the subsequent six-month freeze beyond the normal three year overseas tour (See par.c, below) had delayed further action in this matter.

b. Readjustment of First Three Graders in USAREUR. Early in the year, efforts to bring the 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary to authorized strength at the earliest practicable date (See par. 46, above), revealed a serious shortage of combat career field military occupational specialties (MOS's) in the upper three enlisted grades in combat units in the European Command. In June it was decided that two possibilities should be exploited to correct this situation. The first, an increase from 350 to 500 first three graders in monthly shipments from the zone of the interior, was only a partial solution to this problem.¹⁶ During the remainder of the year, the second possibility, a command-wide reclassification of first three graders with noncombat MOS's, was carried out. Realizing that a potential reservoir of combat NCO's were assigned to posts and technical services in noncombat capacities, USAREUR directed on 27 June that classification boards be set up for the purpose.

¹³Cable SC - 13035, USAREUR sgd Huebner to COFSA for D/P&A, 24 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 210.481 (1950), Vol. I, Item 12.

¹⁴Cable WCL - 39910, COFSA fr D/P&A to CINCEUR, 28 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 210.481 (1950), Vol. I, Item 13.

¹⁵Cable SC - 14051, USAREUR sgd Milburn to COFSA for G1, 10 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 210.481 (1950), Vol. I, Item 16.

¹⁶Memo, D/P&A to CG USAREUR, 22 Jun 50, sub: Status Report on Readjustment of First Three Graders in USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 37.

of screening all first three graders with noncombat MOS's. Prior to the convening of these boards, however, all transfers of first three graders were suspended for a sixty-day period to prevent such personnel from seeking and obtaining transfers to other service installations prior to their possible reclassification. On 7 July specific instructions as to procedures to be used in this project were issued to all commands directly subordinate to USAREUR. In all USAREUR units and commands except the 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Constabulary, and the 370th, 371st, and 373d Infantry Battalions (Separate), classification boards were to be set up to screen records of all enlisted personnel in grades E-5, E-6, and E-7 who had physical profile serials "A" or "B," who were not more than forty years old on the date of their nearest birthday anniversary, and who possessed primary MOS's not yet classified into introduced career fields. Particular attention was to be given (but not limited) to those MOS's (0014, 0097, 0152, 0274, 0283, 0320, 0337, 0409, 0566, 0581, 0816, 0821, 0931, 0965, and 2274) in which sizeable surpluses existed in the command. Noncommissioned officers who met these requirements were to be presumed qualified for reclassification into one of a number of combat career field MOS's. They were to appear in person before a classification board to be recommended for such in either a primary or potential primary status. Action on final reclassification, issuance of special orders, and entries on morning reports or enlisted men's qualification cards was to be accomplished by appointing authorities or records custodians only after notification of final disposition by USAREUR headquarters. In all cases, reassignments or transfers were to be accomplished upon instructions issued by this latter headquarters.¹⁷ By September, 620 men had been declared eligible for reclassification and reassignment by the various classification boards. At that time the program was temporarily suspended until it could be determined what effect the relaxation of certain promotion restrictions (See par. e, below) which had been in effect at the time the program was initiated, might have on bringing the combat units to their authorized first three grader strength. When the

¹⁷ (1) USAREUR ltr to all Mil Post Comdrs Dir Subor to USAREUR (incl BPE); CO 7888 Sp Trps, Hq EUCOM; and Chfs, Tech Svc (less Chem Div); PM Div and Sp Svc Div, 27 Jun 50, sub: Readjustment of Enlisted MOS's in the Upper Three Grades in USAREUR, AG 220.01 GPA - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of all Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR, 7 Jul 50, sub: Screening of Certain Noncommissioned Officers, AG 220.01 GPA - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

program was later resumed during November, its scope was somewhat reduced. By the end of December a total of fifty-five men had been reclassified and reassigned.¹⁸

c. Extension of Foreign Service Tours in July. On 25 July, CINCEUR was informed that all normal foreign service tours and all voluntary extended tours were to be automatically extended for six months effective 31 August. In carrying out provisions of this new directive, CINCEUR was directed to revoke orders for all military personnel returning to the zone of the interior subsequent to this date. In addition, names of all officers whose orders were revoked were reported to The Adjutant General in Washington in order that their assignments to other commands might also be recalled.¹⁹ On 26 July, all commands subordinate to USAREUR were directed to suspend processing of enlisted personnel for return to the zone of the interior for separation due to expiration of term of service.²⁰ On 8 August, the command was notified that any officer retained in the command under the provisions of the general six-month freeze but whose replacement had already arrived in the command or was en route for assignment, would be reported to The Adjutant General for reassignment instructions.²¹ By the end of the year, no additional changes had been made in these policies.

d. Extension of Enlistments of U.S. Army Personnel. On 28 July, a month after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, USAREUR was informed that enlistments scheduled to expire prior to 9 July 1951 were to be extended one year beyond the normal date of expiration of service unless voluntary extension or re-enlistment should be accomplished in accordance with Special Regulations 615 - 105 - 1 (Enlisted Personnel - Recruiting for Regular Army and Air Force), as amended. Individuals who desired to re-enlist were to be discharged and re-enlisted on the following day. The discharge certificate would be delivered to the individual only after re-enlistment had been effected.²² In

¹⁸(1) Memo, Chief MPB/P&A, 2 Nov 50, sub: Screening of Certain Noncommissioned Officers. UNCLASSIFIED. In P&A Div MPB files. (2) IRS, C/N 2, MPB/P&A to AG Div, 2 Nov 50, sub: Screening of Certain Noncommissioned Officers. UNCLASSIFIED. In P&A Div Central files. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div with Maj L. P. Collins, Jr., C/Enl Sec, MPB, P&A, 14 May 51.

¹⁹Cable W - 67056, TAG sgd Witsell to CINCEUR, 25 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 51.

²⁰Cable SX - 1416, USAREUR sgd Huebner to Maj Subor Comds, 26 Jul 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 57.

²¹Cable WCL - 37120, TAG sgd Witsell to USAREUR, 8 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 320.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 68.

²²Cable WCL - 35093, TAG sgd Witsell to USAREUR and other Maj Comds, 28 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 47.

August, supplemental administrative instructions concerning various categories of enlisted personnel were received. These and subsequent instructions were exceptionally favorable to personnel electing immediate discharge and re-enlistment on the following day; to inductees relieved from active military service upon expiration of twenty-one months' induction period who were immediately recalled to active duty as reservists; and to enlisted personnel with over twenty and less than thirty years of service who retired and were recalled to active duty on the following day. All normal re-enlistment benefits were to be extended to these categories. Personnel whose enlistments were extended involuntarily and those who extended voluntarily without re-enlisting immediately were not initially entitled to receive such benefits as re-enlistment bonuses or enlistment allowances, unused leave pay, travel allowances on separation, or payment of deposits.²³ On 16 October USAREUR was informed that all personnel on active duty who were currently enlisted in the Army of the United States (AUS) for one year under the provisions of Special Regulations 615 - 130 - 5, as amended, were either to be transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps upon completion of the one-year period and recalled to active duty in their present assignments for twenty-one months; or, if the individual volunteered for service in the Regular Army, be discharged to enlist in the Regular Army. This action was necessary before such personnel could legally be moved overseas, since provisions of Executive Order 10145, 27 July 1950, which had originally extended enlistments, did not release these individuals from the assignment limitations of the Selective Service Act of 1948. This act prohibited service beyond the continental limits of the United States for such persons during the one-year period.²⁴ Individuals who declined to volunteer for enlistment were to be processed and released from active duty upon completion of a total of thirty-three months active duty and submission of discharge application.²⁵

e. Changes in Requirements for Enlisted Promotions. Shortages of noncommissioned officers in units alerted for movement to the Far Eastern Command (FECOM) during the second half of 1950 caused the Department of the Army to relax certain restrictions and prohibitions placed upon promotion of enlisted personnel under provisions of the career guidance program, in effect throughout the Army since 1948.

²³(1) Cable WCL - 37512, COFF DA to USAREUR and Maj Comds, 9 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 49. (2) Cable WCL - 45318, COFF DA to USAREUR and other Maj Comds, 25 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 51.

²⁴Cable WCL - 49695, COFSA fr GI sgd Witsell to USAREUR and other Maj Comds, 16 Oct 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 52.

²⁵Cable WCL - 26729, TAG sgd Witsell to USAREUR and other Maj Comds, 16 Nov 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 53.

In July EUCOM was notified that enlisted career promotional procedures outlined in Department of the Army Circular 202, 1948, were to be suspended for units alerted for movement to FECOM.²⁶ In August, USAREUR was further affected by Department of the Army enlisted promotion policy changes when additional relaxations of career guidance personnel procedures were authorized. On 9 August, The Adjutant General notified USAREUR that, under existing conditions, it had become necessary to suspend until further notice certain portions of the assignment and promotion procedures prescribed by Circular 202, as indicated above; to institute controlled local position vacancy promotions; and to switch from permanent to temporary enlisted promotions. Under applicable tables of organization, local promoting authorities were authorized to promote qualified assigned enlisted personnel without regard to time in grade or service. Numbers of such personnel promoted were not to exceed local position vacancies or theater ceilings in each of the upper four grades. There were to be no restrictions on promotion within vacancies in the lower grades.²⁷ Within the European Command, promotion controls for each of the upper four grades were to be imposed by the headquarters itself to insure that promotion ceilings for the command were not exceeded.²⁸ After 18 August, all promotions to the grade of E-7 were to be made under quotas set up by EUCOM headquarters. Initially, the only quotas on promotion to E-7 were allotted to the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary since total vacancies in these two units exceeded the net vacancies in that grade in EUCOM. Promotion to the grades of E-6, E-5, and E-4 were restricted to organizations with the largest number of combat MOS's. Once these vacancies were filled, other commanders were to be allowed to promote noncombat MOS's as the EUCOM ceiling permitted. All commanders were authorized to promote to grades E-2 and E-3 against position vacancies as of 31 August. Promotions of eligible enlisted personnel to position vacancies was authorized provided requirements as to minimum time in grade and minimum time in service could be met.²⁹ On 1 September two final obstacles to enlisted promotions were removed. On that date, all previous provisions limiting enlisted promotions in the upper four grades to 80 percent of local vacancies were rescinded. After 1 September, too, qualified personnel could be promoted against position vacancies in all grades under applicable tables of organization without regard to

²⁶Cable W - 85907, COFSA fr GI, sgd Witsell to CINCEUR, TRUST, 13 Jul 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 220.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 9.

²⁷Cable WCL - 37400, TAG sgd Witsell to USAREUR and other Maj Comds, 9 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 220.2 (1950), Vol. I, Items 12 and 12a - 1.

²⁸Memo, G.E.R., EUCOM Office of COFS, to Lt Col Snyder, Lt Col Edwards, Col McClure, Gen Noce, Gen Handy, 15 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 220.2 (1950), Vol. I, attached to Item 12.

²⁹EUCOM CINC's Wdly Staff Conf Rept No. 31, 22 Aug 50, par.2. UNCLASSIFIED.

time in grade or time in service restrictions, subject only to major command promotion ceilings in each of the upper four grades.³⁰

f. Diversion to FECOM of Enlisted Personnel Scheduled for EUCOM. On 30 November, CINCEUR was notified that the Korean situation required shipment of a maximum number of replacements to the Far Eastern Command, and that all enlisted personnel available for assignment from the zone of the interior during December, January, February, and March would be sent to FECOM instead of to EUCOM. At the end of the year, EUCOM did not anticipate the receipt of further enlisted replacements in any appreciable numbers until after 1 April.³¹

g. Recruiting Programs. Throughout 1950 continuous recruitment programs for the Regular Army and Regular Air Force were carried on within EUCOM. Responsibility for recruitment activities within USAREUR and the 7966 EUCOM Detachment rested with the Commanding General, USAREUR. The Commanding General, USAFE, was responsible for recruitment activities within his command.³² Within USAREUR, recruitment of personnel for the Regular Army was carried out by a comprehensive program reaching all Army elements. Recruiting officers, with suitable enlisted assistants, were designated for each command, exclusive of technical and administrative services, and for each regiment or similar unit or installation subordinate to the commands. Female recruiting personnel were designated at installations where units of the Women's Army Corps were located.³³ Major emphasis in the USAREUR recruiting program was devoted to securing re-enlistments by personnel whose terms of service expired during the year, and two such concrete programs were carried out in 1950. Although these programs doubtless had a marked effect on over-all command recruitment, personal factors and the service-wide expansion during the last half of the year were other major factors in the USAREUR recruitment picture. Aiming at a total of 50 percent of personnel falling within the target category during the two six-month programs (1 January - 30 June and 1 July - 31 December), these programs came close to attaining the desired targets. Totals for two six-month periods were 39 and 40 percent respectively. A particularly gratifying and significant aspect of these programs was the large number of career re-enlistments. During the period 1 July through 30 November, for

³⁰Cable WCL - 40895, TAG sgd Witsell to USAREUR and other Maj Comds, 29 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 220.2 (1950), Vol. I, Item 18.

³¹(1) Cable W - 97675, COFSA fr GI sgd Witsell to CINCEUR, 30 Nov 50. RESTRICTED. (2) Cable SX - 4229, CINCEUR to all Maj Subor Comds, 20 Dec 50. RESTRICTED. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Maj L. P. Collins, Jr., C/Enl Sec, MPB, P&A, 14 May 51.

³²EUCOM Cir 27, 31 Aug 50, sub: Recruiting. UNCLASSIFIED.

³³USAREUR Cir 27, 21 Jan 50, sub: Recruiting, Regular Army. UNCLASSIFIED.

example, 2,484 out of 3,401 re-enlistments (73 percent) were for six-year or unspecified terms of service.³⁴

48. Military Strength of the Command at the End of the Year

By 31 December, the actual strength of the European Command had reached a total of 106,610 military personnel. Of this total, 85,146 were either assigned or attached to U.S. Army forces in Europe, 19,910 to USAFE, and 554 to USNAVFORGER. Totals of Army personnel showed an increase of 2,752 over totals reported on 1 January; the USAFE increase totaled 666; and the increase within USNAVFORGER was 154.³⁵ Within the Army component of the command, the actual officer strength of 7,926 represented an increase of 427 officers over the 1 January totals. Despite this increase, a critical shortage of medical and dental officers existed. Enlisted strength figures as of 31 December showed an increase to 75,797 personnel, 2,274 more than on 1 January.³⁶

II. Labor Service Personnel

49. Industrial Police and Labor Service Personnel Strengths on 1 January

On 1 January 1950, a total of 22,664 Germans and displaced persons employed as Industrial Police and Labor Service guard and technical personnel were under the direct staff supervision of

³⁴(1) Ltrs, CG USAREUR sgd Huebner to Comdrs of all Comds Subor to USAREUR, undated, sub: U.S. Army Europe Re-enlistment Drive. AG 340 AGP - F. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 1. (2) Ltrs, CG USAREUR sgd Huebner to Comdrs of all Comds Subor to USAREUR 22 Jun 50, sub: Re-enlistment Campaign. AG 340 AGP - F. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Items 12 - 38. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Capt R. F. Askey, EUCCOM AG Div MPB, 9 Apr 51. (4) Draft ltr, CINCEUR to Comdrs of all Army Comds Subor to EUCCOM, undated, no sub. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 55. (5) IRS, SGS to AG, 22 Dec 50, sub: Re-enlistment Campaign. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 342 (1950), Vol. I, Item 55. (6) Monthly Stat Rept, U.S. Army European Command, 31 Dec 50, p. 14.

³⁵Monthly Stat Rept, U.S. Army European Command, 31 Dec 50, p. 5. SECRET.

³⁶EUCCOM ltr, sgd Binns, Comptroller, 5 Feb 51, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report, U.S. Army European Command. SECRET.

the Labor Services Branch of the Logistics Division, Headquarters, EUCOM. Of this total, 9,022 (of whom approximately 98 percent were of German nationality) were utilized by this command as industrial police employed as static guards. The functions of this Industrial Police force were similar to those of civilian police in the United States. They were employed in forty-four districts, with 25 to 687 individuals per district. Four of these districts were under USAFE jurisdiction and accounted for 1,025 of the total 9,022 personnel so employed. In addition to the industrial police, U.S. forces employed a total of 13,642 Germans and displaced persons as mobile labor for occupation forces. This category of personnel was organized into sixty-five labor service units, thirty-three being guard companies and thirty-two technical companies. Of this total, six units (five guard companies and one technical company), composed of 907 personnel, were assigned to USAFE.³⁷

50. Administration at the Beginning of the Year

Although both categories were supervised by a single EUCOM staff division (See par. 49, above), Industrial Police and Labor Service personnel were administered separately under existing local conditions at the beginning of 1950. Commanders of military posts and exempt air installations were charged with the responsibility for screening, hiring, training, and controlling the Industrial Police, used to augment security personnel of U.S. forces by manning the equivalent of 1,749 twenty-four hour posts. Paid in accordance with local wage tariffs, industrial policemen received an average of DM 262.5 per month. Labor Service personnel, on the other hand, were administered under procedures patterned directly after those of the U.S. Army. Commanders of military posts and exempt air installations administered and controlled Labor Service units through the U.S. Army or Air Force units to which Labor Service companies were attached. The average pay of a Labor Service employee, who was paid on a zone-wide uniform scale depending upon his grade, was DM 248.83 per month, five dollars of which could be drawn in military payment certificates by displaced personnel for use in accumulating savings toward immigration and for use in purchasing certain PX items. The authority to pay these personnel five dollars of their pay in military payment certificates was withdrawn in June 1950. Responsible for the security of more important installations than those guarded by the Industrial Police, Labor Service guard personnel were initially of predominantly Baltic and Polish nationalities. The other major category of Labor Service personnel, Labor Service technical units, composed largely of Baltic personnel, were used to augment forces of the EUCOM technical services. These were mobile units with the equipment and skilled personnel required to assist technical services in accomplishing their

³⁷IRS, C/N 1 w/incl; G/PID to VCOFS, 16 Jan 50, sub: Labor Service Units and Industrial Police. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 231.4 (1950), Vol. I, Item 5.

missions. In general, the tables of distribution and allowances of these mobile units were similar to the tables of organization and equipment of the corresponding U.S. Army technical service units.³⁸ (For logistical support of Labor Service units, see par. 77, above; for discussions with HICOG on policy, see par. 120, below.)

51. Major Organizational Changes

a. Creation of the Labor Services Division. The Labor Services Division of Headquarters, EUCOM, was established and designated a special staff division on 1 August 1950.³⁹ Prior to that date, supervision of Labor Service activities had been exercised by a branch of the Logistics Division of Headquarters, EUCOM. (See par. 49, above.) Despite three internal reorganizations, the basic mission of this staff, both as a branch of the Logistics Division and as a separate staff division, was unaltered during the year. This mission consisted of providing necessary staff supervision over all Labor Service units, both technical and guard, and over all Industrial Police assigned to the various military posts and technical services, exclusive of USAFE. Specific responsibilities assigned to this division included the formulation of policy on organization, administration, and utilization of guard and technical Labor Service units and the Industrial Police, and coordination with other staff divisions on all matters pertaining to Labor Service units in the development of all directives for the administration of these organizations.⁴⁰

b. Organization of the USAREUR Labor Service Liaison Detachment. On 20 October the USAREUR Labor Services Liaison Detachment, with an initial strength of forty-five spaces, was organized and attached to the Labor Services Division for operational control. Although a detachment of non-U.S. personnel had always been on duty with the division, the creation of this organization represented an official designation of the detachment as part of the Labor Services Division. Its primary mission was to

³⁸(1) IAS, C/N 1 w/incl, C/PID to VCOFS, 16 Jan 50, sub: Labor Service Units and Industrial Police. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 231.4 (1950), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Sellers, C/Admin, Pers, Rec, and Sup Br, Lab Svc Div, 11 Apr 50.

³⁹EUCOM GO 34, 3 Aug 50, Sec I, sub: Establishment of Labor Services Division, Headquarters, European Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁰EUCOM Lab Svcs Div, Annual Narr Rept, 1950, Preface and p. 1.

furnish advisers familiar with the various nationality groups (German, Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian) assigned to Labor Service units.⁴¹

c. Organization of U.S. Navy Labor Service Units. On 3 November 1950, five hundred spaces were provided within the EUCCOM Labor Service ceiling, for the organization of Labor Service type units, to COMNAVFORGER, for utilization with U.S. Naval Forces, Germany.⁴²

52. Increased Strength Authorization for Labor Service Type Units

On 12 August the commanding generals of USAREUR and USAFE were instructed to increase Labor Service strengths by 17,000 spaces and to discontinue all but a small fraction of the Industrial Police force. The USAREUR increase totaled 15,500 personnel: 7,000 to be drawn from the discontinued Industrial Police and 8,500 to be recruited. The USAFE increase under this authorization numbered 1,500. In carrying out these instructions, USAREUR was to organize all existing Industrial Police personnel who volunteered for such service into forty Labor Service companies of approximately two hundred men each. Additional overhead personnel were to be obtained by utilizing 1,000 spaces from the increased over-all allocation. The remaining 7,500 newly-created spaces allocated to USAREUR were to be used for the creation of additional units. The Commanding General, USAFE, was instructed to assume administrative and operational responsibilities for all labor service units utilized by USAFE, and to organize those additional 1,500 spaces into mobile type units necessary to meet USAFE requirements. At the end of the year, the only remaining Industrial Police personnel totaled 1,400, of whom 400 were stationed in Berlin and the remainder, under USAFE jurisdiction, in Western Germany.⁴³

⁴¹(1) USAREUR ltr to CO, HMP, 13 Oct 50, sub: Organization of USAREUR Labor Service Liaison Detachment (Non-U.S. Personnel). AG 322 GOT - AGO. (2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Sellers, C/Admin, Pers, Rec, and Sup Br, Lbr Svc Div, 11 Apr 50.

⁴²EUCCOM ltr, Asst AG to COMNAVFORGER, 3 Nov 50, sub: Authorization for Labor Service Type Units to U.S. Naval Forces, Germany. RESTRICTED.

⁴³(1) EUCCOM ltr, 12 Aug 50, sub: Increased Personnel Strength Authorization for Labor Service Type Units. AG 322 OPOT - AGO. RESTRICTED. (2) Briefing, Col C. M. Busbee for SA and COFSA, 19 Dec 50. SECRET.

53. Status of Labor Service Personnel at the End of the Year

a. Command Responsibility. By 31 December, the Labor Services Division, a special staff division reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, European Command, exercised full staff supervision over Labor Service units responsible to the U.S. Army component of the joint command. Having no actual command functions, this division was responsible for formulation of policy and coordination with other concerned staff divisions in the development of all directives pertaining to the administration and operations of the Labor Service force. Actual command functions were exercised by Seventh Army, by military posts, and by chiefs of technical services to which Labor Service technical units were assigned.⁴⁴ Direct supervision of all Army Labor Service personnel was actually carried out through six center headquarters, labor supervision; four labor supervision staff sections; one company headquarters, labor supervision (organized in accordance with special T/D&A); and ninety-two company headquarters, labor supervision. With the exception of the four staff sections, and the T/D&A company headquarters, labor supervision, all units were U.S. table of organization and equipment units.⁴⁵

b. Organization and Strength. By December, Labor Service personnel, excluding those retained as Industrial Police, were organized into one hundred sixty-two units. Eighty-nine guard units and fifty-nine technical service units, including three guard units in France and one technical service unit in Belgium, were under the jurisdiction of U.S. Army elements of EUCOM headquarters. Eleven units were assigned to USAFE, consisting of seven guard units and four technical service units. Three technical service units were organized by COMNAVFORGER. Guard and technical units under Army jurisdiction were authorized 18,900 and 8,628 personnel spaces respectively, while USAFE and USNAVFORGER, which operated independently of the EUCOM Labor Services Division, had authorized over-all strengths of 3,142 and 500 men respectively. At the end of the year, U.S. Army Labor Service units were approximately fifteen hundred men under authorized strength. This shortage resulted from lack of suitable housing and of properly qualified technical personnel to fill existing vacancies.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ (1) Briefing, Col. C. M. Busbee for SA and COFSA, 19 Dec 50. SECRET. (2) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. W. Sellers, C/Admin, Pers, Rec, and Sup Br, Lab Svc Div, 11 Apr 51.

⁴⁵ Briefing, Col. C. M. Busbee for SA and COFSA, 19 Dec 50. SECRET.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

c. Screening and Training. Prior to employment by the U.S. Government, all potential Labor Service personnel were subjected to detailed security investigations. Employment was limited to single men between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, certain exceptions being made in the case of highly skilled technical personnel. After receiving the minimum amount of basic training necessary to enable them to perform assigned duties, personnel received six hours of additional training per week within the unit to which they were assigned. This training included classes in the English language, first aid and sanitation, communications, overnight bivouacs, and familiarization firing with the .30-caliber carbine.⁴⁷ (For details, see 1950 USAREUR Report, pars. 86 - 89.)

III. Civilian Personnel

54. Civilian Employee Strengths on 1 January

In carrying out its mission as a joint overseas command of the Department of Defense, the European Command continued in 1950 to employ large numbers of U.S., Allied, and neutral civilians, and a large number of locally-hired civilians, mostly German, in addition to the military and Labor Service personnel discussed in the previous two sections of this chapter. As of 1 January, the command employed a total of 6,681 U.S. and 1,405 Allied and neutral civilians. The non-U.S./Allied/neutral employees, mostly German, were by far the largest group, numbering 201,816, including the 22,664 Labor Services personnel. Of the total number of U.S. civilians on hand at that time, 4,597 were either Department of the Army or Department of the Air Force direct-hire employees assigned to dollar-budget or appropriated fund agencies, whereas the remaining 2,084 were employed by U.S. military-sponsored nonappropriated fund agencies. The breakdown of employment categories of Allied and neutral civilian personnel, many of whom had been employed by this or predecessor commands since World War II, revealed that 489 were either Department of the Army or Department of the Air Force continental wage scale (CWS) employees, 303 were employed by U.S. military nonappropriated fund agencies, and 613 were on duty with U.S. military forces in nonoccupied areas.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸USAREUR Monthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 49, p.1. SECRET. Also present in the command on 1 January, although not included in civilian personnel totals since they were not EUCOM employees, were approximately 40,000 civilian dependents of U.S. military and civilian personnel on duty with U.S. military forces in Europe.

55. Major Changes in Civilian Employee Policies

a. Changes in Policy Affecting Allied and Neutral Civilian Employees. There were three major changes in personnel policy affecting Allied and neutral (A/N) employees of U.S. military forces in Europe during 1950. The first change comprised a series of measures directed toward improvement of rights of such personnel when threatened with loss of employment due to reduction in force (RIF). Until 13 April 1950, it had been EUCOM policy to replace Allied or neutral civilian employees with surplus Department of the Army civilian employees possessing minimum qualifications for positions previously held by Allied or neutral personnel. After that date, Allied and neutral employees paid from appropriated funds were no longer required to compete with U.S. civilian employees for retention and were entered in a separate A/N RIF register.⁴⁹ In July, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the most important policy change affecting these categories of civilian personnel took place. Increasingly unsuccessful in recruiting U.S. civilian personnel from the zone of the interior, EUCOM at that time abolished its ban against the initial employment of additional Allied or neutral civilian employees. The final major policy change affecting Allied and neutral civilians occurred in August when it was decided that these employees could be dismissed without formal charges whenever the supervisor determined that the position could be more effectively performed by a U.S. incumbent.⁵⁰

b. Suspension of Foreign Post Differential. On 26 January, EUCOM headquarters was informed that foreign post differentials were to be abolished effective 10 March. In this command, Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force civilian employees had received differentials of 10 percent of their basic salaries for service in Europe. Although this differential was not restored to civilian personnel of the command as a whole during the remainder of the year, a post foreign differential of 10 percent was authorized Department of the Army civilian employees at the Berlin Military Post. This differential, which

⁴⁹(1) Cable SC - 16144, USAREUR to all Comds, 13 Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR ltr to all Mil Posts Comdrs Dir Subor to USAREUR (incl BPE), 29 May 50, sub: Submission of Requests for Approval of Position Changes of Allied/Neutrals and of Promotions. AG 230 GPA - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR ltr to Comdrs of all Comds Dir Subor to USAREUR, 22 Jul 50, sub: Utilization of Civilian Personnel. AG 230 GPA - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁰(1) Cable SC - 11678, USAREUR sgd Huebner to Mil Post Comdrs, 7 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR P&A Div Annual Narrative Report, Chap. IV. SECRET.

became effective in mid-May, because of restrictive conditions existing in the Berlin area, was discontinued four months later.⁵¹

c. Performance Appraisal Program. On 29 December a new plan for appraising work performance of U.S. Army civilian employees was substituted for the existing efficiency rating system. Under provisions of this new plan, single adjective ratings of "outstanding," "satisfactory," and "unsatisfactory" were to be given to all employees following performance appraisals by supervisors. "Outstanding" ratings were to be given employees only when all aspects of the individual's performance were considered sufficiently superior to merit special commendation; "satisfactory" ratings were to be given when performances in general met requirements of the job; and ratings of "unsatisfactory" were to be given only when it was determined that an employee had failed consistently to meet performance requirements of his position.⁵²

56. Civilian Employee Strengths on 31 December

At the end of the year, the European Command employed a total of 6,001 U.S. and 2,872 Allied and neutral civilian personnel. These numbers reflected a small decrease in the total of U.S. employees and a substantial increase in the number of Allied and neutral civilian personnel over the figures reported for 1 January, (See par. 54, above). Of the 6,001 U.S. civilians reported on 31 December, 4,447 were Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force direct-hire employees assigned to dollar-budget or appropriated fund agencies. The remaining 1,554 were employed by nonappropriated fund agencies. Personnel statistics through December 1950 revealed that the number of Allied and neutral civilian employees of this command increased sharply from 1,405 to 2,872 individuals. The bulk of this increase occurred within the category of non-U.S. personnel on duty with U.S. military forces in nonoccupied areas. During the twelve-month period

⁵¹(1) Cable WCL - 34900, OSA to EUCOM, 26 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable WCL - 41193, OSA to USAREUR, 31 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with M. B. Jaume, Admin Asst, P&A Div, 2 May 51.

⁵²(1) HMP Civ Pers Cir 3, 8 Feb 51. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) HMP ltr, Civ Pers Off to All Civ Employees, 20 Feb 51. HEICP 230.346. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, S. Stone, Hist Div, with M. B. Jaume, Admin Asst, P&A Div, 2 May 51.

this total jumped from 613 to 2,210. The number of Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force CWS employees decreased from the 489 personnel reported on 1 January to 315 on 31 December, and that of Allied or neutral employees of nonappropriated fund agencies increased from the 1 January total of 303 to a year-end figure of 347.⁵³

⁵³(1) Monthly Stat Rept, U.S. Army, European Command, 31 Dec 50. SECRET. (2) EUCOM ltr, Comp sgd Binns, 5 Feb 50, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report, U.S. Army, European Command, for 31 December 1950. SECRET. During the year the dependent population of approximately 40,000 expanded to more than 44,000.

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CHAPTER IV

Military Training

I. Scope of Program57. EUCOM Training Program for 1950

The Commander in Chief, EUCOM, was primarily interested in matters of training which concerned two or more of the component services of that joint command. In formulating a joint training program, therefore, the commander in chief sought to prepare all Army, Navy, and Air Force troops and units for the conduct of joint combat operations. Whereas specialized troop training was a responsibility of the service component commanders, the commander in chief's main function with regard to training was the development of a joint combat force utilizing all service component training, in addition to training as a joint or even combined force. Because of the relatively small role of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, in the defense of Western Germany, the EUCOM training program for 1950 laid major stress upon coordination between USAREUR and USAFE. Matters falling within the direct purview of the commander in chief were, therefore, those relating to air support of Army and Navy operations, air transportability training, amphibious training, reserve affairs of all services in Germany, EUCOM schools, and joint training exercises.¹

¹EUCOM Tng Dir No. 1, 1 Jan 50, sub: EUCOM Training Program for 1950. RESTRICTED.

58. Staff Responsibility for EUCOM Training

A significant feature of the 1950 training program was the continued tendency on the part of training staff officers to fill dual roles. Prior to the creation of the 7th U.S. Army on 24 November,² whereby a separate field army was established, staff personnel of Headquarters, EUCOM, formulated both the EUCOM and USAREUR training programs. These officers were regarded as EUCOM staff personnel when handling matters which required interservice coordination but functioned as the USAREUR staff when formulating the Army training program. After 24 November, broad training programs affecting the Seventh Army continued to be drawn up by the EUCOM staff with the detailed programs being prepared by the Seventh Army Staff. Detailed programs affecting Army commands other than the Seventh Army which were directly subordinate to EUCOM continued to be drawn up by the EUCOM staff. On the over-all basis coordination of joint training was accomplished by the EUCOM staff, while the detailed coordination was delegated to the Seventh Army and the 2d Air Division.³

59. Status of Training

a. Operational Readiness. One of the major difficulties encountered during the training year was that of evaluating the actual combat readiness of the European Command and the United States Army, Europe.⁴ Staff officers and major commanders agreed that the command was well-trained by peacetime standards, but it was difficult to apply a single set of standards to such evaluations. Late in the year, Army elements of the command were judged to have an operational readiness of 85 percent. On the basis of training inspections and its performance in Exercise RAINBOW, it was estimated that the command would require approximately three months of intensive training to reach maximum operational effectiveness.⁵

b. Obstacles to Training. The principal obstacles to most effective training of all EUCOM elements were: insufficient training areas and inadequate firing ranges, the exacting occupation mission requirements of certain service units, inadequate

²EUCOM GO 53, 22 Nov 50, sub: Activation of Seventh Army. RESTRICTED.

³Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col H. M. Exton, C/Tng Br, OPOT Div, Hq EUCOM, 28 Nov 50.

⁴Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col L. A. Hedges, Tng Br, OPOT Div, 12 Jan 51.

⁵Ltr, Brig Gen E. T. Williams, DCOFS for Opns, EUCOM, to C/AFF, 20 Oct 50, sub: Strength and Training Status Report. AG 353 GOT. (This report covered period to 25 Sep 50.) CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II.

classroom facilities, and insufficient training aids.⁶ High priority was assigned to the procurement of additional training and firing areas, the EUCOM Training Aids Center at Hoechst was taxed to its productive capacity, and funds were allocated for the improvement of classroom facilities.⁷

60. Intensification and Acceleration of Training

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea and the tense situation in Europe during 1950 prompted a decision by the Chief of Army Field Forces to accelerate and intensify all training activities.⁸ Within the European Command the normal training week was increased from forty to forty-four hours,⁹ and increased attention was devoted to providing the most realistic training possible. Battle indoctrination training was emphasized and the construction of infiltration courses and a mock village was initiated.¹⁰ (Details of this program are contained in 1950 USAREUR Report, Chap. III.)

II. Joint Maneuvers

61. General

Behind the decision to stress field training of all units and services within the European Command was the desire of the commander in chief that EUCOM be prepared for any tactical emergency. Maintenance of the highest level of combat readiness was the primary aim of Headquarters, European Command. In June 1950, Lt. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Commanding General, USAREUR, and Chief of Staff, EUCOM, stated: "The only reason for this headquarters or any other headquarters is the training, supply, and fighting of combat units, and the prime mission of this headquarters and all other headquarters is to service the troops...."¹¹

⁶Ibid. Also letters, same subject, dated 22 Nov. and 19 Dec 50.

⁷Ibid.

⁸(1) DA ltr, to Maj Comdrs, 14 Jul 50, sub: Accelerated and Intensified Training Programs. AGAO 353 (13 Jul 50) G3 - M. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) PID Tng Release, Office C/AFF, 7 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT Tng Br files.

⁹Memo, Lt Col H. M. Extton, C/Tng Br to Ctl Off/OPOT, 25 Aug 50, sub: Notes for Commander-in-Chief's Wkly Staff Conf. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT Tng Br files.

¹⁰Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col P. V. Tuttle, Jr., Tng Br, OPOT Div, 12 Dec 50.

¹¹EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 21, 14 Jun 50, par. I, 1, b. UNCLASSIFIED.

The program for 1950 was drawn up with a view to eliminating defects noted in previous field exercises. The further development and eventual perfection of the coordinated joint command, continued attention to the ever-present problem of command-wide communications, and the provision of periodic tests of the training and combat readiness of all troops and units became vital objectives in all joint training exercises.¹²

62. Exercise SHAMROCK (CPX - 50)

a. Objectives. With two full-scale maneuvers (Exercises SHOWERS and HARVEST) behind it, Headquarters, EUCOM, based its maneuver training program for early 1950 on correcting deficiencies in communications and staff procedures. By late 1949 it had become apparent that training of EUCOM troops and tactical units had reached a high peace-time level.¹³ On the other hand, there was an obvious need for improvement in joint staff operations and in communications at all levels higher than the organic battalion.¹⁴ The joint planning staff therefore initiated preparations in November 1949 for a joint command post exercise to be held in March 1950.¹⁵ On 4 January, the following specific objectives were established for CPX - 50 (Exercise SHAMROCK):

(1) To organize a joint maneuver staff and train officers for such duty in this command; and to insure their understanding of the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the joint force.

(2) To perfect staff procedure at all levels, stressing coordination between staffs of the different services.

(3) To test, under field conditions, the communications of the command with particular emphasis on radio communication.¹⁶

b. Organization

(1) Joint Staff. On 27 December 1949, General Handy designated Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commanding General, USAFE, as Joint Task Force commander, charged with the conduct of the

¹²Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Col L. M. Howell, Maneuver Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 8 Jan 50.


¹³EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, pp. 358 - 387. SECRET.

¹⁴Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Col Paul A. Gavan, OPOT Div, 14 Jan 50.

¹⁵Final Report, Exercise SHAMROCK, p. 11. RESTRICTED.

¹⁶EUCOM ltr, to CG, USAREUR, USAFE, and COMNAVFORGER, 4 Jan 50, sub: Joint Command Post Exercise. AG 354.2 GOT - AGO. UN-CLASSIFIED.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART CPX - 50



exercise. On 31 January 1950, General Cannon assumed command,¹⁷ and detailed planning was initiated. An experienced maneuver staff was set up well in advance of the maneuver, and by D-Day, 16 March, a staff organization had been established in Heidelberg, where Joint Task Force headquarters was to be located.¹⁸ Somewhat simpler than the organization set up for Exercises SHOEERS and HARVEST in 1949, the joint command structure adhered generally to the pattern of a commander and deputies, a chief of staff, an administrative chief of staff called executive, and the joint maneuver staff. (Chart 3.) The actual staff organization was far less important, however, than the manner in which the joint staff carried out its functions. At all stages of the exercise, the concept of cooperation with and coordination among staff divisions was stressed throughout the organization. From the outset of planning particular emphasis was placed on the necessity for accurate staff coordination on matters of communications.¹⁹ Two staffs new to maneuver operations were also incorporated into the staff structure. These were a comptroller division and a safety division.

(2) Major Subordinate Commands. At the command level immediately below joint task force, considerable latitude was given to service component commanders in organizing their forces. One major departure was made in the major subordinate command structure. Whereas all air activity had previously fallen within the scope of a single commander, two separate air commands were created for Exercise SHAMROCK. The 2d Air Division, under Brig. Gen. T. C. Darcy, served as the tactical air command, and the 61st Troop Carrier Wing, commanded by Brig. Gen. E. H. Alexander, coordinated all actions requiring the use of cargo aircraft.²⁰ U.S. Army Forces, which comprised the bulk of the U.S. Constabulary and 1st Infantry Division, was commanded by Maj. Gen. I. D. White, Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary.²¹ The fourth major command, the Rhine River Patrol, which acted as U.S. Naval Forces, CPX - 50, was a much smaller command than the others but was placed at the same level in the command chain.²²

¹⁷JTF, CPX - 50, GO No. 1, 31 Jan 50, sub: Assumption of Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸War Diary, JTF, CPX - 50, 15 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹(1) Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col R. J. McKithan, JTF Sig Officer, 23 Mar 50. (2) CPX - 50 Planning Conf, Heidelberg, 31 Jan 50.

²⁰(1) CPX - 50 Planning Conf, 9 Dec 49. (2) USAFE ltr, to CGs, 2d Air Div and 61st Trp Carr Wg, 27 Jan 50, sub: Joint Command Post Exercise, 1950. OOP 354.2.

²¹USAREUR ltr, to CGs, USCON and 1st Inf Div, 23 Jan 50, sub: Designation of the Commander of US Army Forces Participating in CPX - 50. AG 354.2 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

²²Final Report, Exercise SHAMROCK, p. 8. RESTRICTED.

c. Personnel

(1) Joint Task Force. In view of the stated objectives for CPX - 50, actual participants were limited to headquarters personnel down to and including battalion level for Army Forces (forty-seven major headquarters), group level for Air Forces (nine major headquarters), and the Rhine River Patrol. In addition to headquarters personnel, all communications personnel of the command and a few specially designated units needed for actual logistical support went into the field and simulated the activities for 48,100. The break-down by component services was as follows:²³

	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Simulated</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>11,840</u>	<u>48,100</u>
Joint Task Forces Headquarters	1,600	1,600
U.S. Army Forces	9,300	40,000
2d Air Division	730	4,250
61st Troop Carrier Wing	110	2,100
Rhine River Patrol	100	150

(2) Composition of the Joint Staff. The Joint Task force staff at maneuver headquarters in Heidelberg clearly reflected the unified aspects of the exercise. On 9 March, this staff was composed of 145 officers of whom 89 were Army, 48 Air Force, and eight Navy. During the operational phase, 16 - 22 March, the staff expanded to 180 officers with the general ratio of 11 Army to six Air Force to one Naval officer.²⁴

d. Operations

(1) Tactical and Intelligence Planning. In order to present a realistic problem situation in CPX - 50, the planning staff of Joint Task Force headquarters prepared a detailed hypothetical intelligence buildup in which Aggressor was an occupying power east of the Rhine River. U.S. forces were disposed in the northern part of the French occupation zone of Germany, French forces in France proper, and the British Army of the Rhine west of the Rhine and north of U.S. forces. For the six-month period immediately preceding CPX - 50, Aggressor had been waging a propaganda campaign of increasing intensity advocating the evacuation of all occupation troops from Germany. To show his apparent good faith, Aggressor had moved all occupation troops well out of the Rhine area. But information leaking out of the Aggressor Zone indicated that Aggressor troops were assembling inland for what appeared to be an attack against Allied forces.

²³Ibid., p. 9.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.

Additional troops were arriving daily from the Aggressor homeland and from other areas under Aggressor control.²⁵ In view of this situation, the Joint Task Force formulated plans for the defense of the adjacent Rhine valley area. These plans specified action to be taken in the event of a hostile act by Aggressor.²⁶ Early in March the political situation had deteriorated to such a point that Task Force units were ordered to assembly areas in preparation for hostilities. H-Hour for these moves, which actually opened CPX - 50, was set at 2301Z hours 15 March.²⁷ At that time it was known that three Army headquarters and two Corps headquarters were within the Aggressor zone of occupation. Reliable intelligence sources indicated that Aggressor forces numbering between 86,000 and 150,000 troops were dispersed generally through east and southern Germany and northern Italy.²⁸

(2) Movement into Position and Aggressor Hostile Act.

The initial movements of Joint Task troops in an area approximately 60 by 120 miles along the west bank of the Rhine River from the French border north to Wiesbaden²⁹ simulated a concentration of troops from areas further to the west, although the movements were actually executed from home stations. As Joint Task Force units were moving into the designated assembly areas west of the Rhine, Aggressor committed a series of overt acts which actually initiated hostilities.³⁰ These acts -- bombings of airfields in friendly countries and air attacks on shipping in nearby waters -- took place in the early morning hours of 16 March. At the same time, Rhine River bridges in the maneuver area were secured by friendly German police, and units of the Joint Task Force.

(3) Early Operations. Shortly after the commission of Aggressor's hostile acts, Joint Task Force headquarters directed major commands to execute attack plans formulated prior to 16 March in which U.S. forces were to establish a bridgehead east of the Rhine north and south along the Main and Neckar Rivers.³²

²⁵Hq JTF, CPX - 50, Intel Summ No. 1, 7 Feb 50. RESTRICTED.

²⁶Hq JTF, CPX - 50, Ltr of Instr No. 2, 11 Feb 50.
RESTRICTED.

²⁷Hq US Army Forces, CPX - 50, Per Opns Rept No. 1,
16 Mar 50.

²⁸Hq JTF, CPX - 50, Intel Summ 1, 2, and 3, 7 Feb, 27 Feb,
13 Mar 50. RESTRICTED.

²⁹See Overlay to Hq US Army Forces, Per Opns Rept No. 1,
16 Mar 50.

³⁰Hq JTF, Ltr of Instr No. 2, 11 Feb 50, became operational following these acts.

³¹Cable Hq JTF, CPX - 50, to Maj Comds (O-6-R), 16 Mar 50.
RESTRICTED.

³²Hq JTF, CPX - 50, Ltrs of Instr 1 and 2, 1 Feb and 11 Feb. RESTRICTED.

Throughout this early action, the Joint Task Force held local air superiority and vital Rhine River bridges were being held by friendly German police. By darkness of 17 March forward elements of U.S. Army Forces had relieved local police units and, at 0600 hours on 18 March, the Joint Task Force moved east against light ground and air opposition to establish a bridgehead over the Rhine. By 2000 hours that evening U.S. Army Forces were ten miles east of the Rhine with all major units across the river.³³ With the bulk of Aggressor air power still committed outside the Joint Task Force area of responsibility, U.S. Forces maintained its control of the air throughout this period.³⁴

(4) Operations, 19 - 21 March. Resuming its attack at dawn on 19 March, the Joint Task Force pushed forward steadily through the day and, by nightfall, secured positions on the high ground on the east bank of the Rhine between the Main and Neckar Rivers. Simultaneous with these successes, however, came intelligence information indicating a strong build-up of Aggressor forces in the area immediately forward of the path of the advancing Joint Task Force. At midnight on 19 March, problem time for the exercise was advanced four days and 20 March was arbitrarily designated D-Day plus six to allow for the build-up necessary for the imminent Aggressor attack. Having dulled the edge of the Joint Task Force advance, Aggressor succeeded in strengthening his forces and in consolidating positions. Early in the morning of 20 March, three Aggressor divisions launched an attack in force with a sharp thrust into the Joint Task Force bridgehead area between Hanau and Aschaffenburg. Moving swiftly during the day, the Aggressor attack penetrated nearly twenty miles and, by 2000 hours, forward elements had reached the outskirts of Darmstadt. Operating in close support of this attack, enemy air struck at U.S. rear supply depots, airfields, and bridges. Despite this strong display of Aggressor strength, the 1st Division and the 2d Constabulary Brigade held their positions in the center and southern sectors of the Joint Task Force front.³⁵

(5) Aggressor Southward Swing and Joint Task Force Withdrawal. On 21 March Aggressor continued his attack against the U.S. bridgehead. Leading elements reached the Rhine River west of Darmstadt on the 21st and swerved southward to split the Joint Task Force bridgehead. This action left the 1st Constabulary Brigade and the 18th Regimental Combat Team on the north of the breach and all other army units to the south. Although U.S. Army Forces fought a strong delaying action, the 1st Infantry Division was forced to withdraw to the Neckar River during the afternoon. Both the 1st and 2d Constabulary Brigades counterattacked to restore their lines

³³See overlay to Hq US Army Forces CPX - 50, Per Rept No. 3, 10 Mar 50. RESTRICTED.

³⁴Final Report, Exercise SHAMROCK, p. 29. RESTRICTED.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 29 - 31.

but, opposed by overwhelming Aggressor forces and heavy Aggressor air superiority, were not successful in pushing Aggressor back. During the night of 21 - 22 March Joint Task Force units began to recross the Rhine. The exercise was officially terminated at 1200 hours on 22 March.³⁶

e. Conclusions and Recommendations

(1) General. Although the play of Exercise SHAMROCK reflected a need for improvement in communications, staff operations, and joint operating procedures at all levels, the basic objectives were accomplished. General Handy commended all participating personnel and noted the "...smooth operating efficiency of the joint maneuver staff at CPX Headquarters and the high degree of coordination which existed in the field among the three services."³⁷ Brig. Gen. T. C. Darcy, Commanding General, 2d Air Division, noted progress made in joint training and cited the effective coordination between antiaircraft artillery units and the fighter defense system of the tactical air command as evidence of the increasing degree of coordination among services. He also mentioned the necessity for balance in the concept of maneuver operations and cited the inability of the 2d Air Division to utilize tactical air reconnaissance, light radar warning equipment, and "Y" service elements as illustrations of a possible lack of balance between services in Exercise SHAMROCK.³⁸ The need for tactical air reconnaissance was also noted by Brig. Gen. J. H. Collier, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, CPX - 50. General Collier also reiterated, however, that the exercise was characterized by excellent coordination among units and services. He particularly noted the excellent relationship between the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary in the field.³⁹

(2) Communications. Basically a Signal command post exercise, Exercise SHAMROCK served to bring out several defects in tactical communications in the European Command. It was observed that too many messages were sent in clear text,⁴⁰ that signal unit maintenance was faulty, that small signal teams needed more training in working together,⁴¹ that enciphering and deciphering equipment used by the 61st Troop Carrier Wing during the exercise was inadequate,⁴² and that a suitable low-grade field cipher was needed for all participating units.⁴³ On the credit side, most commanders and staff officers agreed that communications had

³⁶Ibid., pp. 31 - 35.

³⁷Minutes of Critique, Exercise SHAMROCK, Heidelberg, 5 Apr 50, Remarks of Gen T. T. Handy, CINC, EUCOM.

³⁸Ibid., Brig Gen T. C. Darcy, CG, 2d Air Div.

³⁹Ibid., Brig Gen J. H. Collier, Deputy CG, USCON.

⁴⁰Ibid., Maj Gen F. B. Milburn, C/S, USAREUR.

⁴¹Ibid., Maj Gen J. Matejka, Chief Sig Off, Hq EUCOM.

⁴²Ibid., Brig Gen E. H. Alexander, CG, 61st Troop Carrier Wing.

⁴³Ibid., Final Report, Exercise SHAMROCK, p. 45.

functioned remarkably well over long distances and that the creation of direct teletype lines between J - 3, A - 3, and G - 3 was an excellent idea.⁴⁴

(3) Staff Operations. The creation of a separate joint umpire control command as part of the J - 2 Division contributed immeasurably to the progress made during Exercise SHALROCK toward development of a single integrated command.⁴⁵ Relations between similar staffs of different commands were simplified considerably, although the tendency of some commands to take the field with incomplete staffs worked to the disadvantage of the entire joint staff.⁴⁶ Among the valuable lessons learned from Exercise SHALROCK were: the continuing need for simple organization at all levels, the desirability of placing headquarters of the tactical air command and Army forces in the same location, and the feasibility of direct teletype communications between similar staff divisions of different echelons.

(4) Tactical. Although nonheadquarters personnel did not participate in CPX - 50, situations presented by the paper play of the exercise furnished an excellent basis for planning future tactical operations and maneuvers. The difficulty of defending over an excessively wide front posed problems whose solution required an exhaustive knowledge of terrain, deployment of small defending forces, and general defensive tactics in this theater. Even in simulated situations it was found that time spent in movement of ground units was excessive,⁴⁷ that the air area of responsibility was too small to afford maximum training benefits,⁴⁸ and that the division of responsibility for air defense between antiaircraft artillery units and the 2d Air Division was impractical.⁴⁹

63. Exercise RAINBOW (FTX - 50)

a. Objectives. The annual fall training exercise for EUCOM troops of all services was designed as the logical fulfillment of lessons learned from previous exercises and stressed the development of joint operating procedures within the European Command. Not entirely satisfied with tactical communications and with air-ground liaison as demonstrated during CPX - 50, planners of Exercise RAINBOW placed special emphasis on the correction of these defects. As established on 10 May 1950, the objectives of FTX - 50 were as follows:

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 41.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 42.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 47.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 46.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 47.

- (1) To conduct the annual field training test of units of this command.
- (2) To organize and operate a joint maneuver director's headquarters and to plan and conduct a joint field training exercise.
- (3) To develop and perfect the air-ground tactical team at all levels including the transportation by air of Army units.
- (4) To develop and test logistical support procedures including the operation of a port at Bremerhaven under the control of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany.
- (5) To test under simulated conditions the communications of the command.

Although all these specific objectives had been set up for previous maneuvers held in the command, the continued inclusion of (3) and (5) indicated continuing emphasis on these matters.⁵⁰

b. Organization

(1) Command Level. The importance of Exercise RAINBOW as the annual field training test of all available units and troops in the command was indicated on 31 August when General Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, EUCOM, assumed direct personal command of the exercise and of all units and personnel of participating services.⁵¹ At the same time the level immediately below the director was created with the assignment of Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commanding General, USAFE, as Deputy Director for Air; Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, Commanding General, USAFECUR, as Deputy Director for Army; Rear Admiral John Wilkes, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, as Deputy Director for Navy; and Colonel S. G. Conley, Director, OPOT Division, Headquarters, EUCOM, as Deputy Director for Operations.⁵² On 5 September, Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, was appointed Special Assistant to the Director,⁵³ and on 9 September Brig. Gen. Charles F. Born, Chief of Staff for Operations, USAFE, was designated Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Air.⁵⁴

⁵⁰EUCOM ltr to CGs, USAFECUR, USAFE and COMNAVFORGER, 10 May 50, sub: Fall Training Exercise. AG 353 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED.

⁵¹LHQ FTX - 50, GO 1, 31 Aug 50, sub: Assumption of Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵²JHQ FTX - 50, GO 2, 31 Aug 50, sub: Announcement of Assignments. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵³JHQ FTX - 50, GO 4, 5 Sep 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁴JHQ FTX - 50, GO 6, 9 Sep 50, sub: Announcement of Assignment. UNCLASSIFIED.

(2) Joint Staff. The over-all joint staff organization which had proved effective in Exercises HARVEST and SHAMROCK was utilized with some modifications for Exercise RAINBOW. Several minor changes instituted did not directly affect staff operation. The Communications Division, which had been treated as a general staff division during CPX - 50, was placed at the joint technical staff level for FTX - 50. In practice, it was actually responsible to J - 3 and the Joint Maneuver Control Command throughout the exercise. Control of the maneuver, which had been exercised by the J - 2 Division in Exercise SHAMROCK was accomplished by a small separate command, the Joint Maneuver Control Command. This command also incorporated the functions of the Joint Aggressor Command. (Chart 4.) As in previous exercises, the staff of joint headquarters was a thoroughly unified organization. Although no predetermined ratio of Army-Air Force-Navy staff personnel was used, officers and enlisted personnel of all three services were assigned where required. From the earliest planning stages an Air Force officer headed the key J - 3 (operations) staff and other Air Force and Navy personnel participated in planning activities preceding the exercise. On D-Day, 11 September, Army officers headed twenty-three staff divisions, Air Force officers were in charge of five and, although no Navy officers actually headed joint staff division, the small USNAVFORGER staff participated to the maximum extent compatible with its size.⁵⁵ In addition, all general and most special and technical service staff divisions contained deputies from services other than that of the division chief.⁵⁶


(3) Subordinate Command Level. With two major exceptions, the main subordinate command structure for FTX - 50 was almost identical with that for CPX - 50. The first change was the creation of a Joint Maneuver Control Command under Brig. Gen. J. H. Collier, then Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Constabulary. Originally constituted to carry out the functions of an umpire command, the Joint Maneuver Control Command became the over-all control element of the exercise and, in that capacity, was responsible for general direction of all Aggressor activities.⁵⁷ The second major change was the shift of the communications zone from the joint staff level beneath the J - 4 Division to that of a major command subordinate to joint headquarters. The four service component commands which had functioned in Exercise SHAMROCK were unaltered for the fall exercise. A distinguishing feature of this command alignment was that control of air activity was divided on a functional basis between the 2d Air Division, the tactical air arm of USAFE, and the 61st Troop Carrier Wing, whose cargo- and

⁵⁵(1) JHQ FTX - 50, GO 3, 2 Sep 50, sub: Announcement of Assignments. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Figures cited above were obtained in interview, G.R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Col L.M. Howell, OPOT Div, 10 May 51.

⁵⁶Interv, G.R. KAPLAN, Hist Div, with Col L. M. Howell, C/Maneuver Br, OPOT Div, 6 Sep 50.

⁵⁷JHQ FTX - 50, Maneuver Procedure Order No. 2, Change 2 to Annex 29 - Joint Maneuver Control Command, 10 Aug 50, sub: Mission and Organization. JMMC. UNCLASSIFIED.

EXERCISE RAINBOW



Source: Final Report Joint Field Training Exercise (Exercise RAINBOW)
11 - 18 September 1950

troop-carrying functions more closely aligned it with the ground forces command. U.S. Army Forces, which consisted of the 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Constabulary (less the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 15th and 24th Constabulary Squadrons), the Rhine River Patrol, and most of the supporting logistical and service units of USAREUR, were commanded by Maj. Gen. I. D. White.⁵⁸ This command also included the 1st Battalion, 350th Infantry, U.S. Forces, Austria (USFA); the 3d Battalion, 351st Infantry, U.S. Forces, Trieste (TRUST); the 1st Royal Dragoon Regiment, British Army of the Rhine (BAOR); and the 7th Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens, French Forces in Germany (FFA). The 2d Air Division, again commanded by Brig. Gen. T. C. Darcy, comprised the 36th and 86th Fighter-Bomber Wings, their normal supporting units, and squadrons of the British and French occupation air forces.⁵⁹ The 61st Troop Carrier Wing, used for the air-lifting of certain ground units and for paradrops of equipment and supplies to ground units, was commanded by Brig. Gen. E. H. Alexander and consisted of the 60th Troop Carrier Group.⁶⁰ U.S. Naval Forces, FTX - 50, commanded by Captain C. F. M. S. Quinby, USN, consisted of the U.S. Naval Advanced Base at Bremerhaven and administrative responsibility for the Rhine River Patrol.⁶¹

c. Personnel. The composition of the joint maneuver staff reflects the "teamed for defense" aspects of EUCOM field training exercises. During the exercise the joint staff was manned by Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel in the ratio of 7 to 2 to .3.⁶² In the field, U.S. Army Forces numbered 33,018; USAFE personnel totaled 7,297; USNAVFORGER furnished 254 officers and enlisted men; the USFA contribution came to 884; and TRUST supplied 740 persons. Although less than 2,000 French and British participated in FTX - 50, the French were represented by all three services, and the British furnished both Army and Air Force personnel and units.⁶³

d. Planning. The cumulative experience of three previous exercises demonstrated conclusively that at least four months of intensive planning by a well-trained staff were required to assure the success of a full-scale joint maneuver. In order to make the fullest possible use of personnel already trained for Exercise SHAMROCK, preliminary planning for FTX - 50 was begun late in February 1950, several weeks prior to the commencement of simulated hostilities in the spring exercise. During CPX - 50, key staff personnel of Joint Task Force headquarters who were to participate in similar capacities in FTX - 50 were briefed on

⁵⁸Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁹Hq 2d Air Div, Opns Dir No. 68 - 50 for Exercise RAINBOW, 26 Aug 50. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁰61st TC Wing, FTX - 50; GO 2, 6 Sep 50, sub: Command Post Opening. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶¹Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW, p. 11. RESTRICTED.

⁶²JHQ FTX - 50, Roster of Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶³Ibid.

the over-all plan of the fall maneuver. Subsequent briefings on 21 February and 14 March oriented the proposed staff on the general scheme of maneuver, administrative procedures to be followed, personnel allocations, and the intelligence situation upon which the tactical play was to be based.⁶⁴ As in the past, the Director, OPOT Division, and personnel of the Maneuver Branch of that Division coordinated early planning.⁶⁵ Approximately two months prior to the exercise, a nuclear planning staff was in full-time operation at maneuver headquarters in Heidelberg. Initially, this staff planned an exercise centering on the Danube River area north of Munich but, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean action in late June, the site of the maneuver was moved to the Rhine River area so that U.S. Forces in Germany would be better deployed in case of an actual tactical emergency. On July a concept of operations was published detailing a three-phase maneuver to be held in the U.S. Zone of Germany between 11 - 18 September.⁶⁶ Less than two weeks later, on 1 August, this concept was followed by a warning order which contained initial missions and tactical instructions to all major commands.⁶⁷ On 12 August, nearly a month prior to the exercise, Operation Plan 2 - 50 was published. With appropriate annexes, this plan was the guide to all tactical action during the maneuver.⁶⁸

c. Operations

(1) Intelligence Picture. As in Exercise SHALROCK, a continuous intelligence build-up carried through a hypothetical situation involving U.S. forces and a mythical **Aggressor** occupying a "homeland" to the east and southeast of the U.S. Zone of Germany.⁶⁹ As the scheme of maneuver was developed, it became apparent that U.S. Forces augmented by units of TRUST, USFA, and the British and French Forces of Occupation would be expected to engage in withdrawals to the west. The exercise thus formulated called for a small actual Aggressor force, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and close control over this force by the Joint Maneuver Control Command of Joint Headquarters. As of D-Day, 11 September, an Aggressor build-up of troops, equipment, and supplies to the northeast, east, and southeast of the U.S. Zone of Germany indicated probable hostile action by Aggressor. Unable to depend

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Col Paul A. Gavan, C/Maneuver Branch, 14 Jun 50.

⁶⁶Ltr, J - 3 Div, JHQ, FTX - 50, sub: Letter of Instructions, Concept of Operations as of 20 Jul 50. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁷JHQ FTX - 50, Warning Order 2 - 50, 1 Aug 50. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁸JHQ FTX - 50, Operation Plan 2 - 50, 12 Aug 50. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁹JHQ FTX - 50, Intel Summ 1, 2, and 3, 22 Jun, 31 Jul, 31 Aug 50. RESTRICTED.

fully on "satellite" countries to assist in his operations, Aggressor shifted his Tenth Army into a strategic location facing the U.S. Zone.⁷⁰

(2) Withdrawal. In the early morning hours of 11 September, Aggressor patrols crossed the eastern border of the U.S. Zone, and Joint Headquarters went into action.⁷¹ At 0600 hours five Aggressor divisions swept across the border and drove westward. Facing an overwhelmingly large force, U.S. forces were forced to withdraw to predetermined positions along a defense line from Frankfurt along the Rhine and Neckar Rivers to Stuttgart. This was a planned withdrawal from home stations. The only unit not in its normal locations was the 1st Infantry Division, which was then at Grafenwohr near the Czech border. In the north, the 1st Constabulary Brigade withdrew according to plan towards the Frankfurt-Hanau area; the 1st Division in the central sector moved back to a north-south line through Aschaffenburg to Heilbronn; and the 2d Constabulary Brigade on the southern flank began its march to positions in the Heilbronn-Stuttgart area. By noon of 12 September all U.S. ground forces had reached the defense line and had commenced preparations of positions for a sustained defense. Throughout the period, Aggressor air superiority was marked and his control of all aspects of the operation was definite.⁷²

(3) Consolidation. Once in defensive positions, U.S. forces undertook the difficult tasks of establishing communications between widely-scattered units and of preparing for possible follow-up attacks by Aggressor. Several limited counterattacks were made by U.S. forces, and repeated Aggressor attempts to infiltrate U.S. lines were thwarted. One of these, a simulated Aggressor air drop in the sector of the 2d Constabulary Brigade was neutralized. U.S. tactical air began to contest Aggressor for air superiority on 13 September and harassed several Aggressor attempts to renew the offensive. However, Aggressor air inflicted heavy damage on the port at Bremerhaven, and the tide of battle was still strongly in his favor.⁷³

(4) Counteroffensive. At 1600 hours on 13 September, joint headquarters issued plans for a counteroffensive to drive Aggressor out of the U.S. Zone of Germany and back to his "homeland."⁷⁴ On the night of 13 - 14 September the Allied XL Corps

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹JHQ FTX - 50, Operation Plan 2 - 50, 12 Aug 50. RESTRICTED.

⁷²(1) JHQ FTX - 50, J - 3 Final Report. RESTRICTED. (2) JHQ J - 3 Per Repts 1 and 2, 11 and 12 Sep 50. RESTRICTED. (3) US Army Forces, FTX - 50, Per Opns Rept No. 1, 13 Sep 50. RESTRICTED.

⁷³(1) Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW. RESTRICTED. (2) J - 3 Per Repts 3 and 4, 13 and 14 Sep 50. RESTRICTED. (3) Hq, US Army Forces, FTX - 50, Per Opns Rept No. 2, 14 Sep 50. RESTRICTED.

⁷⁴JHQ FTX - 50, Opns Plan 3 - 50, 13 Sep 50. RESTRICTED.

(simulated) moved north into the zone of responsibility of the 2d Constabulary Brigade and the 16th Infantry, and these units moved into assembly areas immediately to the rear of the central sector of the 1st Infantry Division. As preparations were made for the counteroffensive, the 2d Air Division made a strong bid for air superiority and achieved it by nightfall of 14 December, the eve of the attack.⁷⁵ At 0900 hours 15 September the counterattack was launched by the 1st Infantry Division with the 26th on the left and the 16th Infantry on the right. With excellent artillery support and numerous air strikes, both regiments advanced approximately twelve miles to the east. On the same evening the 1st Constabulary Brigade launched its attack by a crossing of the Main River near Hanau. The following day saw the 2d Brigade committed to the offensive. By the night of 16 - 17 September the 26th Infantry had reached the Main River at Wurzburg where another crossing was made during the night. With air superiority firmly in the hands of the 2d Air Division and enemy resistance weakening, U.S. Army Forces succeeded in reaching all objectives by noon on 18 September.⁷⁶

f. Conclusions and Recommendations

(1) General. At the formal critique of Exercise RAINBOW on 20 September General Handy and the major commanders stated that the major objectives of FTX - 50 had been carried out successfully but that several aspects of the field training of U.S. Forces in Germany could be improved. General Handy commended the teamwork evidenced in joint operations but found communications inadequate for the scope of the exercise.⁷⁷ Both Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, CG, USAREUR, and Maj. Gen. I. D. White, CG, U.S. Constabulary, cited the necessity for further training and reorganization of civil affairs staffs at all levels.⁷⁸ The outstanding point brought out at this critique was the unsatisfactory condition of equipment currently in use in the theater. General White stated that too much time was required for servicing vehicles, that equipment was old and required frequent repair, and that grave consequences could result from the continued use of World War II material.⁷⁹

(2) Communications. The need for continuous training in signal communications at all levels was brought out sharply by the play of Exercise RAINBOW. Although communications functioned

⁷⁵(1) JHQ FTX - 50, J - 3 Per Rept No. 4, 14 Sep 50. (2) J - 3 Final Report.

⁷⁶Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW, p. 50.

⁷⁷Minutes of Critique, Exercise RAINBOW, Heidelberg, 20 Sep 50, Remarks of Gen T. T. Handy, CINC, EUCOM.

⁷⁸Ibid., Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG USAREUR, and Maj Gen I. D. White, CG, USCON.

⁷⁹Ibid., Maj Gen White.

at least adequately, the superimposition of a maneuver signal system on the existing signal facilities at Heidelberg proved difficult.⁸⁰ The frequency of movement of Army headquarters also contributed to unreliability of signal communications, and it was recommended that frequent signal command post exercises be held in order to iron out difficulties arising during joint maneuvers.⁸¹ Working with military personnel of other nations also pointed up the need for resolving differences in language, equipment, and general signal procedures.⁸²

(3) Movement. Although the rate of march of Army units during Exercise SHAMROCK had been regarded as too slow, it was found during FTX - 50 that even a prescribed rate of twenty miles per hour was excessive. It was recommended, therefore, that this rate be lowered to twelve - fifteen miles per hour.⁸³ March discipline was also criticized. Columns were too long both in space and time, and their vulnerability to air and ground attack was great. The need for column reconnaissance and for liaison aircraft for communications within and between columns was also cited.⁸⁴

(4) Tactical Operations. The necessity for further training in night operations was demonstrated during Exercise RAINBOW. One major regrouping operation was carried out at night, and it was found that all units needed further work in night attacks, occupation of defensive positions, and night motor marches on secondary roads.⁸⁵ During the exercise, rear area and service units also underwent attack by Aggressor forces. On the basis of the performance of rear area units in these situations, it was strongly recommended that training programs of USAREUR service units be revised to include tactical indoctrination to the extent necessary to enable such units to defend themselves when attacked by infiltrating enemy troops.⁸⁶

(5) Air-Ground Operations. The need for a single air-ground operating headquarters in the field was again demonstrated in FTX - 50. The establishment of a permanent joint operation center within the European Command was urged by several staff officers. The necessity for accurate field coordination of the fire power of both air and ground units was also shown during the maneuver. Lieutenant General Eddy commented on this subject and cited the need for coordination in matters of air support and air

⁸⁰JHQ FTX - 50, Sig Div, Final Report.

⁸¹Ibid., Brig Gen R. V. D. Corput, Chief Signal Officer, EUCOM.

⁸²Hq, 2d Air Div, Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW.

⁸³Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW, p. 68.

⁸⁴Ltr, Maj Gen John E. Dahlquist, CG, 1st Inf Div, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG, USAREUR, 9 Oct 50, sub: Exercise RAINBOW. AG 353
GOT. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸⁵(1) Ibid. (2) Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW, p. 69.

⁸⁶Ibid.

transport. He further noted the need for increased training in both passive and active antiaircraft defense measures and "... the positive requirement for a greater consciousness of antiairborne defense, both in tactical units and in static posts and installations."⁸⁷

III. Air Transportability Training

64. Background

In line with the program of eliminating defects noted in the training programs of previous years, EUCOM headquarters inaugurated an intensive, year-long program of training in air transportability for units and personnel of the 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Constabulary, and the 61st Troop Carrier Wing. Impetus was given to this program in October 1949 when General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, expressed his personal interest in air transportability in training in a letter to Lt. Gen. C. R. Huebner, then Commanding General, USAREUR, and Chief of Staff, EUCOM.⁸⁸ Following receipt of this letter, training staff personnel of Headquarters, EUCOM, and Headquarters, USAFE, initiated detailed planning for the program. In October and November of 1949, general plans were formulated at a working level and, on 1 January, a training directive was published by EUCOM in which details of the program were specified.⁸⁹

65. Objectives

The development of "air-movement-mindedness" on the part of all commanders and staffs, in key noncommissioned officers and cadre personnel, in all units, and in all components was the ultimate objective of such training.⁹⁰ In the European Command, these objectives were made more specific by provisions of EUCOM Training Directive 2, which stated the command objectives as those of training all personnel in:

⁸⁷Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy to CGs, 1st Div and USCON, 27 Sep 50, sub: Exercise RAINBOW. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸⁸Reference to this letter is contained in IRS, D/OPOT, EUCOM to DCOFS for Opns, EUCOM, 18 Dec 50, sub: Air Transportability Training. RESTRICTED. In OPOT Tng Br Files.

⁸⁹EUCOM Tng Directive 2, 1 Jan 50, sub: Air Transportability Training. RESTRICTED.

⁹⁰ODA ltr to C/AFF, 23 Mar 50, sub: Training in Movement by Air. RESTRICTED.

- a. Combat loading of troops and equipment destined for immediate entry into combat upon landing.
- b. Unit loading of troops and equipment for air transport.
- c. Bulk loading to make maximum use of transportation, with readiness for combat at destination a secondary consideration.⁹¹

In emphasizing the necessity for such training, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, stated that "The total appreciation in the Army of the military possibilities of air transport, notwithstanding training activities of the past five years, is considered below minimum desirable standards. Therefore, indoctrination education, training, and thinking in air movement must be intensified."⁹² The letter further stated that "all units will conduct detailed training in movement by air, based on training films, literature, and mockups, and will develop preliminary detailed staff plans for the air movement of all personnel and equipment susceptible to such movement."⁹³

66. Program

a. General. As developed for application within the European Command, the program for training in air transportability was divided into four general phases, the first for orientation and instruction of unit commanders and key staff officers; the second for the training of unit instructor personnel, including selected officers and noncommissioned officers; the third a phase of unit instruction and practice loading; and the fourth the phase of actual operation during a maneuver. When the program was formulated in late 1949, it was envisioned that the 61st Troop Carrier Wing would be fully equipped by 1 April with its full complement of forty-eight C-82 type aircraft, although there were but twelve of these craft in the command at that time.⁹⁴

b. Command and Staff Planning Phase. The initial phase of the air transportability training program was conducted at Furth Air Base, Nuremberg Military Post, from 30 January to 17 February and consisted of a series of six two-day (sixteen-hour) courses. A total of 371 commanders, staff officers, and

⁹¹EUCOM Tng Dir 2.

⁹²DA ltr to C/AFF, op. cit.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. S. Bowers, Tng Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 20 Dec 50.

instructors attended these courses.⁹⁵ Attendance for this series was limited to key staff personnel of the 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Constabulary, and 61st Troop Carrier Wing. These included three designated division staff officers from the 1st Division and U.S. Constabulary; regimental commanders, executive officers, S - 3's, and S - 4's; battalion commanders and their S - 3 and S - 4 officers; officers designated by the commanding general, 61st Troop Carrier Wing. Approximately half of the officers attending Phase I were from U.S. Constabulary; two fifths were from the 1st Infantry Division; and the remainder were from the 61st Troop Carrier Wing. The sixteen-hour course broke down into the following phases:

- a. Introduction 1 hour
- b. Airfields (departure and arrival). . . 1 hour
- c. Preliminary planning, higher head-
quarters 1 hour
- d. Ground-air conference. 1 hour
- e. Preparation of air movement forms. . . 3 hours
- f. Staff planning exercise. 8 hours
- g. Loading and lashing demonstration. . . 1 hour

c. Instruction of Key Personnel Phase. The second phase of the program, which lasted from 20 February to 24 March, consisted of four five-day courses for personnel designated to serve as instructors in Phase III. A total of 175 officers (120 of whom had attended orientation courses) and 153 enlisted men participated in this series.⁹⁶ Each battalion or similar unit was allotted four officers (all of whom must have attended Phase I) and eight selected noncommissioned officers. U.S. Constabulary was allowed a quota of nineteen officers and thirty-eight noncommissioned officers, and the 1st Infantry Division was allocated sixteen officers and thirty-two noncommissioned officers for each course. In addition, thirty personnel from Berlin Military Post, thirty from the 61st Troop Carrier Wing, and fifteen from TRUST attended this phase of instruction. The following subjects were included in this phase:

- (1) Introduction. 1 hour
- (2) Familiarization with aircraft 2 hours
- (3) Flight safety 1 hour
- (4) Ropes and knots 2 hours
- (5) Special tie-down devices. 1 hour
- (6) Computation of loads. 8 hours
- (7) Computation of lashings 2 hours
- (8) Aerial delivery 1 hour

⁹⁵USAREUR Qtr Narr Tng Ltr (1 Jan - 31 Mar 50), Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, CG USAREUR, to Maj Gen Clift Andrus, D/O&T, US Army.
RESTRICTED.

⁹⁶Ibid.

- (9) Loading and lashing of heavy equipment. 14 hours
- (10) Air Movement Form #4 1 hour
- (11) Training flights with equipment. . . 4 hours
- (12) Teaching methods 2 hours
- (13) Summary and critique 1 hour

d. Unit Instruction Phase. In the third phase of the air transportability training program, a phase not actually limited by the times specified in Training Directive No. 2,⁹⁷ all Army units assigned or attached to the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary, except tank units, were trained by use of mock-up devices and, in some instances, by use of actual aircraft. This phase of the program was conducted by utilizing personnel trained as instructors in Phase II. Although the bulk of training was accomplished by the use of thirty-eight mock-ups of C-82 aircraft, four battalions were actually airlifted in C-82 and C-54 aircraft. Two battalions of the 18th Infantry Regiment each received one week's training on C-82 aircraft at the Giebelstadt Air Base near Kitzingen and participated in exercises involving being air landed at Rhine Main Air Base and establishing a perimeter defense. Two battalions were airlifted in conjunction with operational readiness tests of the 61st Troop Carrier Wing.⁹⁸ The training program for this phase included the following subjects:⁹⁹

- (1) Introduction 1 hour
- (2) Familiarization with aircraft. . . 3 hours
- (3) Flight safety. 1 hour
- (4) Ropes and knots. 3 hours
- (5) Special tie-down devices 1 hour
- (6) Aerial delivery. 1 hour
- (7) Loading and lashing. 12 hours
- (8) Training flights with equipment. . . 4 hours
- (9) Summary and critique 2 hours

e. Maneuver Phase. Exercises SHAMROCK and RAINBOW afforded the additional opportunities for air transportability training. Since Exercise SHAMROCK was a command post exercise, air movement aspects were limited to planning communication and administrative activities. Headquarters actions involving coordination between ground and air transport elements were carried out throughout the exercise. Although no USAREUR units were actually airlifted during Exercise RAINBOW, several parachute supply drops were made and the 3d Battalion, 351st Infantry, TRUST, was airlifted

⁹⁷EUCOM Tng Dir 2, op. cit.

⁹⁸(1) IRS C/N 2, D/OPOT to C/Hist Div, 19 Apr 51, sub: Historical Manuscript, "Military Training (EUCOM)," Incl 2, SECRET. In Hist Div files. (2) Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Lt Col Bowers. (3) USAREUR Qtr Narr Tng Ltr, op. cit.

⁹⁹EUCOM Tng Dir 2, op. cit.

from Udine Air Base, Italy, to Rhine Main Air Base and return.¹⁰⁰

IV. Air Support of Army and Navy Operations

67. Joint Operation Center and Ground Liaison Teams

a. Joint Operation Center. During the training year close cooperation characterized all operations involving USAREUR and USAFE, although no joint operation center was established on a permanent basis. In Exercises SHAMROCK and RAINBOW ground force and tactical air headquarters were often in adjoining buildings, but no single coordinating staff was set up.¹⁰¹ On 1 September 1950 a joint operations directive for air ground operations described the establishment of such a staff or command,¹⁰² and it was anticipated that implementation by Headquarters, EUCOM, would follow in 1951.¹⁰³

b. Ground Liaison Teams. By provisions of USAREUR Training Circular No. 1, 1 January 1950, the 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Constabulary were instructed to train not less than three ground liaison teams each to be employed in joint command post exercises, maneuvers, or in case of emergency.¹⁰⁴

V. Marksmanship

68. EUCOM Marksmanship Competition

In addition to marksmanship training as prescribed by training programs and directives at all command levels, the European Command sponsored two command-wide small arms competitions

¹⁰⁰IRS C/N 2, D/OPOT to C/Hist Div, 19 Apr 51, sub: Historical Manuscript, "Military Training (EUCOM)," Incl 2. SECRET. In Hist Div files.

¹⁰¹See Final Reports, Exercises SHAMROCK and RAINBOW.

¹⁰²Office, C/AFF and Hq, Tac Air Comd, Joint Tng Dir for Air/Ground Ops, 1 Sep 50. RESTRICTED.

¹⁰³Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col P. V. Tuttle, Jr., OPOT Div, 12 Dec 50.

¹⁰⁴USAREUR Tng Cir No. 1, 1 Jan 50, sub: USAREUR Training Program for 1950. RESTRICTED.

during 1950. Carried out in accordance with provisions of AR 370 - 10, these competitions were held for the following purposes: to promote interest and to raise the standard of performance in use of individual arms; to improve techniques and equipment by assembling individuals who excel in the use of small arms, and to classify competitors according to merit under prescribed similar conditions.¹⁰⁵ The first of these competitions, the EUCOM Winter Small Bore Competition which took place in January, February, and March 1950, was a series of indoor elimination matches held by commands, units, and installations throughout the U.S. Zone of Germany, USFA, and TRUST.¹⁰⁶ Results of this "postal phase" held in January and February were communicated to Headquarters, EUCOM, by telephone, targets were mailed in, and teams were selected for the "shoulder-to-shoulder" shoot-offs in March. Weapons used for this competition were the caliber .22 pistol and caliber .22 rifle. Over six hundred officer and enlisted personnel of EUCOM, USAREUR, USAFE, USNAVFORGER, USFA, and TRUST participated.¹⁰⁷ In July 1950, the fourth annual EUCOM Small Arms Competition was held at Grafenwohr with participants from the same commands. Firing caliber .45 pistols and caliber .30 rifles, approximately six hundred personnel took part in matches which were again supervised by the European Command.¹⁰⁸

VI. Training Relationships with the British and the French

69. Nature of Relationship

As in previous years, two major aspects of the EUCOM-USAREUR training programs required extensive coordination with the British and French Forces of Occupation. The first was the continued use

¹⁰⁵AR 370 - 10, 16 Aug 48, sub: Arms - Training and Qualifications. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁶EUCOM ltr, 2 Dec 49, to CGs, Maj Comds, sub: Winter Small Bore Competition. AG 353 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁷(1) Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Lt Col L. A. Hedges, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 14 May. (2) EUCOM ltr, 18 Jan 50, to CGs, Maj Comds, sub: Winter Small Bore Competition. AG 353.2 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁸Details of planning for these matches are to be found in (1) EUCOM ltr, 5 Jan 50, to CGs, Maj Comds, sub: Advance Information - EUCOM Small Arms Competition 1950. AG 353.2 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM ltr, 14 Apr 50, to CGs, Maj Comds, sub: EUCOM Small Arms Competition 1950. AG 353.2 GOT - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

by USAREUR units of ranges and firing areas in both the British and French Zones of Germany. The lack of suitable tank and anti-aircraft ranges and training areas in the U.S. Zone of Germany made necessary the use of these facilities by USAREUR. No less important was the exchange of units of all three occupation forces in field training exercises. During the year, French ground, air, and naval units and British air and ground units participated in EUCOM maneuvers, while units of USAREUR and USAFE engaged in French and British training exercises.

70. Training Areas and Ranges

The most formidable obstacle to successful execution of the USAREUR training program was the lack of suitable anti-aircraft and tank firing ranges within the U.S. Zone of Germany.¹⁰⁹ Full use was made of training reservations at Grafenwohr and Wildflecken in the U.S. Zone,¹¹⁰ but the continued use of Putlos and Hohne in the British Zone and Baumholder and Munsingen in the French Zone presented several problems to the commanding general, USAREUR. Although the Allied occupation powers cooperated to the fullest possible extent, the distance factor involved in using British ranges was completely unrealistic. The two anti-aircraft artillery battalions within the command, the 48th and 552d, were both located near Karlsruhe, approximately five hundred miles from Putlos, the best available range for the firing of either 90 or 40-mm. anti-aircraft guns. The obvious zonal security aspects of this situation made the problem a grave one, since the only anti-aircraft artillery units in the command were forced to undergo firing training outside the zone. The lack of suitable tank firing ranges, while not constituting as serious a problem as the inadequacy of anti-aircraft firing facilities, also necessitated the use of ranges in the other western zones of Germany. Baumholder and Munsingen in the French Zone and Hohne in the British Zone were used frequently.¹¹¹

71. Exchange of Units for Maneuvers

The exchange of units for maneuvers among the three western occupation powers was accelerated during 1950. In March, the French Forces of Occupation sent an armored infantry company, a medical company, and an armored field artillery battalion to the

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ltr, Gen Thomas T. Handy, CINC, EUCOM, to Mr. John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner for Germany, 12 Oct 50. SECRET. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II.

¹¹¹Ltr, Brig Gen E. T. Williams, DCOFS for Opns, EUCOM, to C/AFF, 20 Oct 50, sub: Strength and Training Status Report (as of 25 Sep 50). AG 353 GOT. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II.

U.S. Zone of Germany to participate in Exercise DRAGOON held by the 2d Constabulary Brigade;¹¹² the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st U.S. Infantry Division, participated in BAOR Exercise BROADSIDE¹¹³ and, in September elements of both the British and French occupation forces were integrated into the U.S. joint force in Exercise RAINBOW. These included the British 1st Royal Dragoon Regiment; the 16th Fighter Attack Squadron of the British 2d Air Group; a battalion of the French 7th Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens; the French IV Escadre de Chasses and II/33d Photo Reconnaissance Squadron; and several craft of the French Rhine River Patrol.¹¹⁴

72. Other Activities

Although most coordination in training matters between EUCCM and other Allied occupation armies was concerned with training areas and exchanges of units, training methods and developments of the French and British occupation forces were also observed closely during the year. In February a British Land/Air Warfare Team toured the U.S. Zone of Germany to familiarize U.S. personnel with recent developments in their special field.¹¹⁵ On 15 June the British Air Show, at Gutersbach in the British Zone of Germany, was attended by officer and enlisted men of all EUCCM major and subordinate commands. During the year general officers from EUCCM, USAFE, and USAREUR attended a Land/Air Warfare Study Period at Old Sarum, England.¹¹⁶ Coordination with the French in training matters was also maintained during the year. Examples were the attendance of French officers at a training session in countermortar measures at Grafenwohr in May¹¹⁷ and participation by a small U.S. tank force in a French bridging exercise over the Rhine River at Rheinhausen and Germersheim on 23 - 24 September.¹¹⁸

¹¹²Cable BB - 152, Lt Col Roberson (Baden-Baden) to CINCEUR for D/OPOT, 15 Feb 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 353 (1950), Vol. II.

¹¹³Memo, Col G. Garton, OPOT Div, for Col P. A. Gavan, OPOT Div, 6 Oct 50, sub: Summary of Field Exercises and CPXs held in 1949 - 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT Maneuver Branch Files.

¹¹⁴Final Report, Exercise RAINBOW, p. 11.

¹¹⁵EUCCM ltr to CGs, USAREUR and USAFE, no date, sub: Tour of British Land/Air Warfare Team. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁶(1) Ltr, Air Chief Marshal Sir J. M. Robb, CINC, Air Forces, Western Union, to CINCEUR, 1 Feb 50. (2) Ltr, CINCEUR to Robb, 2 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁷Memo, C/Tng Br, OPOT, for Fr Liaison Off, EUCCM, 24 Apr 50, sub: Officer Observers, 1st Division Artillery. UNCLASSIFIED. In OPOT Tng Br Files.

¹¹⁸IRS, D/OPOT to SGS, Directors of Intel, Log, P&A, Engr, Ord, Sig, 5 Sep 50, sub: French Army Bridging Exercise. SECRET. In OPOT Tng Br. Files.

CHAPTER V

Major Factors Affecting Logistical Support

I. Main Developments73. International Factors

From the end of World War II to mid-1950, the national program of reduction and retrenchment dominated the EUCOM logistical picture. Although the rebuilding and re-equipment of this command as a joint tactical force had begun prior to 1950, international developments highlighted by the action in Korea further solidified the concept that U.S. forces in Germany were no longer primarily an occupation force but had become a substantial element of western defense. (For details on EUCOM supply of recipient countries under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, see pars. 101 and 102, below.) To accomplish its broad mission of preparing for defensive warfare in Europe, this command required considerable strengthening both in manpower and in materiel.¹ During the summer and autumn months of 1950, it became apparent that the same Korean action which had focussed U.S. national attention on the strategically vital European Command and was to precipitate congressional debate on "troops for Europe" in 1951 was to become a major controlling factor in the

¹Logistic Planning Forecast, Hq EUCOM, 1 Jul 50, p. 1. SECRET. In Log Div files.

logistical expansion of this command.² With the Korean action receiving the highest priority in virtually all materials, supply sources in the zone of the interior were utilized increasingly to supply the Far Eastern Command at the expense of other commands, both overseas and in the United States. Although the EUCOM supply picture was not critical in 1950, this command was forced to operate under conditions of increasingly stringent supply economy until such time as U.S. defense production was geared to supply U.S. forces adequately in all theaters. German sources were exploited increasingly during 1950, but this practice was not regarded as contributing to sound support in the event of war.³ Although procurement in Germany was economical for the Army and beneficial to the German economy, there were serious implications in depending on supply sources which might not be available in case of an emergency.⁴

74. EUCOM Priority on ZI Stocks

The need for an expanded program of local procurement by this command became more urgent in September 1950 when the EUCOM priority of receipt of supplies of all classes from the United States was lowered from "D" to "F" on the world-wide priority list.⁵ Throughout most of the post-World War II period, the Far East and European Commands had received the same priority of shipment, but Department of the Army Supply Supplements published after 1 August - at which time the Far East and European Commands were still at the same level - placed this command two notches lower.⁶ Although no immediate repercussions were felt within the European Command, there were indications of a general belt-tightening. In October, for example, Technical Equipment Survey Teams operating from Headquarters, EUCOM, visited military posts and tactical commands to determine equipment excess to needs and

²(1) Cable W - 90560, G - 4, US Army to CG's: 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th Armies (to USAREUR for info), 2 Sep 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 400.12 (1950), Vol. I, Item 78. (2) Interv., G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div with Col F. A. Henning, Deputy Dir for Opns, Log Div, 12 Apr 51.

³Ibid.

⁴Logistical Briefing for Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace Jr., and Chief of Staff, Gen J. Lawton Collins, Heidelberg, 20 Dec 50. SECRET. In Log Div files.

⁵Supply Supplement - Part II of the Troop Program and Troop List, 15 Sep 50, p. 13. SECRET. In Cen files, Log Div.

⁶(1) Ibid. (2) Op. cit., 1 Jan 51, p. 13. SECRET.

authorizations of units, and to initiate action to return excess items to depot stocks or to establish adequate authorizations. Reports from these teams indicated that there were considerable quantities of excess equipment in post stocks and in the hands of troops.⁷ At the same time, technical services and commands prepared plans for further economy, local procurement, and rebuild in case supply from the ZI became more critical. During 1950, however, the ZI supply situation did not become critical and there was no indication that this command would suffer from inconveniences except for those caused by increased shipping time.⁸

75. Support of EUCOM Augmentation

a. ZI Supply Support. Although details of the actual numbers of additional troops to be sent to this command were never finally determined during 1950, the knowledge that a sizeable augmentation was to take place during 1951 was used as a basis for broad logistical planning. Late in 1950, this headquarters received permission to requisition on the zone of interior for units scheduled to arrive or to be activated within the command. Such requisitions could be submitted 120 days prior to the scheduled activation or arrival of new units. Using an anticipated troop basis of 164,000, the European Command began in late 1950 to requisition for this augmentation. Even after this permission was granted, it was found that certain Engineer and Quartermaster items could not be supplied within the 120-day period. In some instances lack of definite information from the ZI concerning types of equipment and weapons being shipped with new units delayed requisitions for spare parts and ammunition. Such items could not be procured locally. To alleviate this difficulty, it was arranged that the 4th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions were to be shipped with 60-day maintenance supplies of items already in the command and 180-day maintenance supplies for equipment new to the European Command. As a result, it was not anticipated that there would be any serious shortages in support of the troop augmentation program except for certain items of T/O&E equipment not arriving with troops.⁹

⁷Logistics Comments for Monthly Conference with Post Commanders and Selected Commanders of Seventh Army Units, 28 Feb 51. RESTRICTED. In Office of D/Log Div, EUCOM.

⁸Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Healy, Log Div, EUCOM, 12 Apr 51.

⁹(1) EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 8, 6 Mar 51, p. 5. SECRET. (2) Interv, G. R. Kaplan, Hist Div, with Maj R. W. Healy, Log Div, 10 Apr 51.

b. Local Support of Augmentation. Basing its planning on a troop basis of approximately 164,000 by late 1951, the Logistics Division devoted a large part of its efforts in 1950 to expanding essential facilities of the command. Almost every aspect of this division's activities was affected. A large construction program was carried on; many casernes were re-requisitioned; available casernes were expanded; dependent housing facilities were increased; ordnance rebuild installations were reopened or expanded; hospitalization facilities were increased; and provisions were made for more dependent schools, commissaries, laundries, bachelor officer quarters, and subsidiary installations.¹⁰

76. Line of Communications Across France

A major logistical development in 1950 was the establishment of a line of communications (LOFC) across France from the Bordeaux - La Pallice area to the U.S. Zone of Germany. Establishing, supplying, staffing, and budgeting this project was carried on throughout the last half of the calendar year and, by 1 January 1951, the nucleus of a peacetime LOFC was ready for limited operations. At best, however, this LOFC represented only a partial solution of the paramount problem of supplying U.S. forces in Germany in case of an emergency. Since the Bordeaux - La Pallice area was approximately six hundred road miles from the U.S. Zone of Germany, a tremendous amount of development and expansion of communication facilities would be required to make it practicable as an alternative to Bremerhaven. The main advantage of the Bordeaux - La Pallice harbor area over Bremerhaven was that it was southwest instead of north of the U.S. Zone of Germany, and the extreme vulnerability of the route from Bremerhaven to the U.S. Zone made it necessary that an alternate line be established.¹¹

¹⁰Interv, G. R. Kaplan, with Col Henning, 12 Apr 51. For details see 1950 annual narrative reports of Engineer and Medical Divisions of this headquarters.

¹¹Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Col Henning, 12 Apr 51. Details of supply and procurement for the LOFC are contained in par. 73, this chapter; for other aspects of the LOFC, see pars. 12 and 42, above, and 1950 USAFEUR Report, pars. 22 and 23.

II. Logistical Support Activities

77. Logistical Support of Labor Service Units

a. General. The augmentation of the EUCOM Labor Service force to a strength of 31,000, authorized during the summer of 1950, indicated that provision of additional food, supplies and equipment, and housing would be no small problem.¹² A proposed further increase to 56,000 persons in the near future¹³ meant that logistical support of Labor Service units would be an increasing responsibility for all EUCOM and USAREUR agencies concerned. (On Labor Service units, see also pars. 28, 49 - 53, above, and 1950 USAREUR Report, pars. 86 - 89.)

b. Subsistence. Because of the low caloric content and inadequate variety of the ration issued to Labor Service units prior to their reorganization, action was initiated by Logistics Division to improve food supply of such units through local procurement of subsistence.¹⁴ This policy of local procurement of food by mandatory requisition was authorized by HICOG as an exception to its policy directive No. E - 2 of 5 June 1950.¹⁵ The existing ration of 3,014 calories per day, which was lacking in fresh meats, dairy products, fruit, and vegetables, was increased, after experimentation at Heidelberg Military Post, to a daily average of 3,400 calories.¹⁶ The new menu became effective in all Labor Service units on 11 November.¹⁷ The interim procedure by which such supplies were to be procured pending formulation of a permanent SOP was prescribed in a EUCOM letter of 30 October. Deutsche mark funds were to be used exclusively; subsistence was to be purchased only from the German economy; and staff supervision over all steps of the

¹²(1) Log Div Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, p. 17. RESTRICTED.
 (2) USAREUR ltr, 28 Jul 50, sub: Organization of Certain Labor Service Companies (Guard) (s). AG 322 GOT - AGO. RESTRICTED.
 (3) EUCOM ltr, 12 Aug 50, sub: Increased Personnel Authorization for Labor Service Type Units. AG 322 OPOT - AGO. RESTRICTED.

¹³IRS, DCOFS for Opns to D/OPOT; D/Log, 18 Aug, sub: Labor Service Units. SECRET. In OPOT files.

¹⁴Memo, D/Log for CINCEUR, 20 Nov 50, sub: Logistics Comments for the HICOG-CINCEUR Monthly Meeting with Heads of Major US Elements - 27 November 1950. RESTRICTED. In Log Div files.

¹⁵Ltr, Maj Gen G. P. Hays, Deputy US HICOG to CINCEUR, 8 Aug 50. SECRET. See also, par. 89c, below.

¹⁶Log Div, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, pp. 17 - 19.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 17. RESTRICTED.

procedure was to be exercised by the EUCOM technical service concerned. Procurement was to be made in the most economical manner practicable under local conditions.¹⁸

c. Supplies and Equipment. After the augmentation of mid-1950, Labor Service units were supplied necessary equipment from three possible sources: local procurement, excess stocks, or requisition from the zone of interior. Tables of allowance and tables of distribution were published for these units, and high priority was assigned to the procurement of materials essential for living and housekeeping.¹⁹ On 11 October, the Department of the Army approved the "Equipment for Labor Service Project" involving the procurement of 752 line items. Items listed on the proposed bill of materials for this project which were not available from excess stocks were approved by the Department of the Army for supply from the ZI under the current normal priority of shipment. The following table shows the breakdown by technical services of the procurement status of the required line items as of 23 January 1951.²⁰

<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Total Line Items in Project</u>	<u>Available Excess EUCOM Stocks</u>	<u>Local Procurement</u>	<u>On ZI Requisition</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>752</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>441</u>
Chemical	5	2	0	3
Engineers	130	9	1	120
Medical	21	5 a	5 b	12
Ordnance	83	40	43	0
Quartermaster	301	94 c	97	204
Signal	203	107	0	96
Transportation	9	3	0	6

(a) Includes one item partially available.

(b) Immediately available on an "as required" basis.

(c) All items only partially available.

¹⁸EUCOM ltr, 30 Oct 50, sub: Supply of Subsistence for Labor Service Units. AG 430.2 GLD - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁹Logistics Division Notes, D/Log, 21 Sep 50, sub: Logistics Comments for the Monthly Conference with USA REUR Commanders - 25 Sep 50. RESTRICTED. In Log Div files.

²⁰EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 43, 23 Jan 51, par. IV 6. RESTRICTED.

78. Supply and Procurement for Line of Communication (LOFC) Across France

a. Logistical Mission of 7966 EUCOM Detachment. The mission of the 7966 EUCOM Detachment, as stated on 8 June 1950, included the establishment, development, and operation of the EUCOM line of communication across France. Logistical aspects of this mission included storage, inspection, maintenance, and security of all U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force emergency supplies located in France; command, administration, and logistical support to other personnel when authorized by Headquarters, EUCOM; and logistical support to other personnel when authorized or directed by the parent headquarters.²¹

b. Intergovernmental Agreements. On 6 November 1950 an intergovernmental agreement was signed which permitted the establishment and operation of installations in France by U.S. armed forces.²² Under terms of this agreement, each service was allowed certain logistic facilities in France and, by the end of the year, the Army had already started supply and storage operations, the Air Force had begun a survey of installations suitable for wing bases, and the Navy had demonstrated its interest in port facilities.²³ On 14 December firm agreements regarding procedures for procurement in support of the LOFC and fiscal policy incidental thereto were signed by the Commanding General, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and French military representatives.²⁴ The procedure formulated for carrying out procurement in France for the LOFC divided responsibility between the French Ministry of Defense and the 7966 EUCOM Detachment. The French Liaison Mission, an agency of the Ministry of Defense, was to contract with the Commanding General, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, for the procurement of supplies, services, and facilities on a cost reimbursable basis. The mission would carry out all negotiations and actually enter into contracts with the French suppliers. However, the Commanding General, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, reserved the right to establish standards and specifications, to inspect, and to reject. The intergovernmental agreement of 6 November 1950 provided that the initial French contribution toward the cost of the first year's operation was to be two billion francs (approximately \$5,700,000).

²¹EUCOM ltr to CO, 7966 EUCOM Det, 8 Jun 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. AG 322.011 GOT - AGO. SECRET.

²²Ltr, CINCEUR to CINCAF, 18 Dec 50, sub: Logistic Operations in France. AG 400 GLD. SECRET. In SGS 092 (1950), Vol. I, Item 34a - 1.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Agreement Relating to the Procurement of Supplies, Services, and Facilities from the French Economy for Operation of the Line of Communications across France, 14 Dec 50, sgd Brig Gen Mason J. Young, CG, 7966 EUCOM Det, and M. G. Le Bigot, Controleur de la Marine, Chef de la Mission de Liaison pour L'Assistance aux Armees Allies. SECRET. In SGS 092 (1950), Vol. I, Item 34.

For Fiscal Year 1951 the Department of the Army had included \$6,733,500 for the LOFC. At the request of EUCOM, the Department of the Army later included in its FY 51 supplemental budget a request for the amount of \$51,500,000 for construction on the LOFC and \$6,382,745 for other LOFC operations. As of 31 December, Headquarters, EUCOM, had not yet received a firm funding program for this supplemental budget.²⁵

c. Supply. The basic level of supplies formulated for the line of communications for 1951 was a thirty-day level of strategic supplies in the Metz-Verdun area and a fifteen-day level of strategic supplies in the Bordeaux-La Pallice area.

79. Allocation of Quartermaster Stocks to USAFE.

The allocation of 128 common-user major items of equipment from USAREUR to USAFE, which had taken place in 1949, was the initial major step in the extension of such allocations to include all Quartermaster common-user items. The Department of the Air Force believed that such allocation would place it in a better position to determine exact total assets of the Air Force and to develop more realistic logistical plans and budget calculations. Too, the Chief, Quartermaster Division, EUCOM, felt that complete division of Quartermaster stocks would solve many QM problems arising from the necessity of issuing to USAFE out of common stockpiles for nonallocated items and of maintaining experience and consumption data for USAFE. Under authority granted by the Department of the Army in May 1950, concurred in by USAFE, complete allocation (15,821 items of QM stocks), except for Class I and III supplies, was effected as of 31 December 1950, as follows:

a. All standard and authorized substitute common-user items of QM supplies and equipment were allocated except subsistence items, petroleum, spare parts for which the Army retained depot maintenance responsibility, and stocks in certain special depot accounts. This allocation was based on relative troop strengths, equipment authorizations, and other known demands and amounted to 22 percent of all EUCOM requirements for common-user items.

b. On 1 August the submission of separate Army and Air Force requisitions to the zone of interior was initiated.

c. Allocated stocks were credited to separate accounts. Issues, receipts, and other transactions were recorded separately in appropriate accounts.²⁶

²⁵Log Div Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, p. 25. SECRET.

²⁶(1) Log Div Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, pp. 56 - 57.

(2) EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 28, 8 Aug 50, p. 2.

80. Procurement for USNAVFORGER

During 1950 the small U.S. naval force stationed at Bremerhaven and within the U.S. Zone of Germany was supplied in two ways. For supplies not in the category of specialized Navy requirements, USNAVFORGER units were considered to be lodger units on the military posts and were supplied by the posts concerned. For specialized Navy requirements, a separate NAVFORGER budget was set up starting with German Fiscal Year 1951 (1 April 1950 - 31 March 1951), and procurement of these items was carried out by the NAVFORGER purchasing and contracting officer in Bremerhaven. Beginning with the third calendar quarter of 1950, however, this procedure was changed. Because EUCOM consolidated all Army, Navy, and Air Force mandatory requirements for submission to HICOG, requirements for specialized NAVFORGER needs were submitted directly by USNAVFORGER to the Logistics Division, Headquarters, EUCOM. This naval headquarters then procured those items for which it had budgeted and received mandatory assignments. In order to receive common-user items, NAVFORGER submitted its requirements to the appropriate chief of the EUCOM technical service concerned for integration with military post requirements. Procurement of these items was carried out by USAREUR.²⁷

81. Support of SHAPE

The establishment in France in early 1951 of Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe (SHAPE), headed by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, had only minor immediate logistical repercussions on the European Command. Pending the formal establishment of this headquarters, however, CINCEUR was charged with furnishing all financial assistance required for initial operations of SHAPE. On 19 December, the Budget Division, U.S. Army, requested that CINCEUR give all financial assistance required and that he submit an estimate of funds necessary for this assistance for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1951.²⁸ A flash estimate of \$18,517,420 submitted on 21 December was rejected as premature and the suggestion was made by the Budget Division, U.S. Army, that a more realistic estimate be made after discussions between CINCEUR and SHAPE representatives who were scheduled to arrive in this command in January 1951.²⁹ On 22 December, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, also requested CINCEUR to furnish SHAPE all necessary logistical

²⁷Monthly Review, Office of D/Log, Feb 50, p. 16. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁸Cable W - 99200, 19 Dec 50, of COFSA Budget Div to CINCEUR. SECRET. In SGS 322 SHAPE.

²⁹(1) Cable S - 4269, 21 Dec 50, CINCEUR to COFSA for C/Bud Div. SECRET. (2) Cable W - 99862, COFSA Bud Div to CINCEUR, Dec 50. SECRET. In SGS 322 SHAPE.

support.³⁰ Initially and until such time as SHAPE had its own facilities and operating units, this support was to be provided through agencies existing within the 7966 EUCOM Detachment.³¹

82. Third Air Division

In December, an agreement was signed for the support by the 3d Air Division in England of U.S. Army units assigned to EUCOM and stationed in the United Kingdom. Full logistical support was to be provided, including supply, budget and funding, transportation, and such miscellaneous services as welfare activities including post exchange services, chaplain services, postal services, schools, etc. Military justice, however, was to be administered by USA REUR and claims were to be handled by EUCOM.³²

83. Logistical Support of Joint EUCOM Maneuvers

a. Logistical Scope of Field Training Exercises. Although logistical support of U.S. forces in Europe was a continuing full-time mission of the technical services, the only opportunity afforded these services to experience actual field operations came during the periods of joint EUCOM maneuvers. (See pars. 61 - 63, above.) During the course of these exercises -- two of which were held in 1950 -- combat logistical procedures were formulated, tested, and evaluated. In addition to servicing EUCOM units and troops actually engaged in simulated warfare, the joint logistics staff division and its subordinate technical services performed the following functions: serviced troops of other commands and occupying powers; set up an active paper play for communications zone operations; and tested joint logistics staff operations, interservice coordination, and the efficiency of communications among technical service units.

b. Exercise SHAMROCK (CPX-50). In March a Joint Logistics (J-4) Division was organized as part of the Joint Maneuver Staff for CPX-50. In planning the logistical play of this command post exercise, the J-4 staff divided its activities into three broad aspects: actual support, logistical activities of the combat zone, and rear area or communications zone activities.³³ Headquarters

³⁰Cable W - 99619, 22 Dec 50, G4 sgd Collins to CINCEUR. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 SHAPE.

³¹EUCOM ltr to CG, 7966 EUCOM Det, 9 Jan 51, sub: Logistical Support of SHAPE. AG 400 GLD - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 SHAPE (1951).

³²"Agreement for Support by Third Air Division of U.S. Army Units Assigned to EUCOM and Stationed in the United Kingdom." No date. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 USA FE - 8 Dec Section.

³³Final Report, Exercise SHAMROCK, pp. 17 - 19. RESTRICTED.

actually participating in the exercise departed home stations with prescribed loads of Class I and III supplies and were issued Class II and IV supplies on an emergency basis only.³⁴ In supporting the "combat zone," which was the area in which troops would have been engaged in a live operation, J - 4, G - 4, S - 4, and I - 4 sections of participating headquarters played a theoretical problem of replenishing ammunition, evacuating theoretical casualties, and transporting simulated troops. In its role as U.S. Army headquarters, U.S. Constabulary provided actual as well as simulated support for all units of all services which were in this "combat zone."³⁵ The communications zone play, carried out on paper only, provided a completely detailed theoretical communications zone based on a North Sea port and extending forward to the Army rear boundary.³⁶

c. Exercise RAINBOW (FTX-50). Immediately after the conclusion of CPX-50, the Logistics Division and subordinate technical services inaugurated detailed planning for their role in Exercise RAINBOW. Utilizing virtually the same J - 4 staff which had functioned efficiently in Exercise SHAMROCK, the maneuver J - 4 staff planned a simpler logistical operation, although approximately four times as many troops as had taken part in CPX-50 were to participate. Without having to simulate a "combat zone" play and by designating a separate communications zone staff, the J - 4 Division was left relatively free to carry out functions relating only to actual logistical support of troops in the field. In general, U.S. Army forces provided the following: complete support for U.S. Army units, including aggressor; common-user items for participating U.S. Air Force units; supplementary surface transportation for U.S. Air Force units; depot maintenance for common-user items of supply for U.S. Air Force units; all construction and installation maintenance necessary for the maneuver except for exempt air bases and Joint Headquarters; and emergency hospitalization and evacuation as required by U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy units participating in the Army area of operations. Both U.S. Air Force and Navy units provided their own administrative support except as indicated above, and both headquarters coordinated their actual anticipated administrative support requirements by 1 June, three months in advance of the exercise.³⁷ During the exercise

³⁴Ltr of Instructions No. 6, Hq JTF CPX-50, to CG's US Army Forces, CPX-50; 2d Air Division, CPX-50; 61st TC Wing, CPX-50; and COMNAVFOR, CPX-50, 2 Mar 50. RESTRICTED.

³⁵Final Report, Exercise SHAMROCK, p. 13. RESTRICTED.

³⁶Ibid., p. 19.

³⁷EUCOM ltr to CG's, USAREUR and USAFE: COMNAVFORCER, 24 May 50, sub: Administrative Support Responsibility for Joint Field Training Exercise. AG 354.2 GLD - AGO. RESTRICTED.

the following supply procedures were observed:

- (1) Class I and III Supplies. Two days' initial supplies were stockpiled by U.S. Army forces prior to the exercise.
- (2) Class II and IV Supplies. Basic loads were carried initially by participating forces and seven days' level of technical service supplies was prestocked by U.S. Army forces.
- (3) Class V Supplies. Units carried their basic loads of ammunition and resupply was played on paper only.³⁸

d. Lessons Learned. In both exercises all technical services demonstrated excellent adaptability to field operations. The problems of air and naval supply were solved with a minimum of difficulty by such means as the creation of an Air Materiel Division in Exercise RAINBOW and continued representation of Air Force and Navy personnel on the J - 4 staff in both exercises. The actual play of both exercises served, however, to demonstrate certain deficiencies in staff operations and in training of service units and personnel. Among these were the following:

- (1) The need for an efficient system of showing the logistical situation at a given time was pointed up sharply during FTX-50. It was recommended, therefore, that an all-inclusive reporting system and SOP be established and maintained on a twenty-four hour basis in future exercises.
- (2) Rear areas under the responsibility of technical service units were often inadequately protected so that infiltrating aggressor units were able to inflict heavy damage in such areas.
- (3) Air engineer activities in both exercises suffered greatly from the lack of an engineer aviation battalion; a strong recommendation was made for its inclusion in future exercises.
- (4) Although virtually all technical service units in the command received beneficial field training, certain engineer units designated to participate in FTX-50 were not assigned maneuver missions and were thus deprived of the opportunity to test their capabilities in the field.

³⁸Appendix A, Supply Procedures, to Annex 19, J - 4 Division, to Maneuver Procedure Order No. 2, Joint Headquarters, FTX-50, 2 Aug 50. RESTRICTED.

- (5) During FTX-50, liaison between staff sections of joint headquarters with corresponding sections of the communications zone was never formally established. While the play of the maneuver was not affected by the lack of any logistical support, communications zone staff sections of joint headquarters should have received periodic reports of corresponding communications zone staffs.
- (6) Quartermaster troops showed certain training deficiencies in both exercises. The need for training in night operations, proper road convoy operations, security of bivouacs and dumps, and basic field training was acute.
- (7) The failure of joint staff planners to inject major problems involving the use of chemical and ~~toxicological agents~~ prevented the Special Weapons (Chemical) Division from carrying out its mission. It was also observed that commanders did not seem fully aware of the capabilities of smoke generator companies.
- (8) The operations during FTX-50 of virtually all transportation truck companies in the command afforded an excellent opportunity to evaluate performances of these units under simulated tactical conditions. It was found that, with no other commitments, the number available during this exercise would be barely sufficient for an actual combat operation similar to Exercise RAINBO even if driver augmentation teams were assigned for twenty-four hour operation.³⁹

84. Assistance to Nonmilitary Agencies and Individuals

The presence in the U.S. Zone of Germany of many official U.S. and other agencies on legitimate business connected with the occupation was, as always, a drain on the resources available for the support of the EUCOM occupation forces but not in itself a serious matter. Logistical support of agencies of the Departments of State and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Health Service, and others was provided almost without question. On the other hand, many private agencies not directly connected with the occupation expected similar support

³⁹(1) Final Report, Exercise SHAMROCK, pp. 42 - 43. RESTRICTED. (2) Final Report, Exercise RAINBO, pp. 69 - 70. RESTRICTED. (3) Log. Div Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, pp. 14 - 17. RESTRICTED.

and were frequently forced to content themselves with limited assistance. The mere presence of such agencies in the zone was no guarantee of logistical assistance -- although many agencies in this category had been supported logistically in the early days of the occupation -- and the trend during 1950 was to place as many such agencies as possible on the German economy. The guide to the amount of logistical support to be provided sponsored business establishments, accredited noncommercial agencies and individuals, welfare organizations and the like was to be "... when [the agency]... is in furtherance of the European Command mission and when providing such assistance is not detrimental to military requirements."⁴⁰ (See also par. 109, below.)

III. Supply

85. Levels

Throughout 1950, authorized levels of supply of all classes remained constant and served as a guide to all resupply and procurement activities of the command. The following table indicates authorized levels by classes:⁴¹

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Authorized Levels</u>	
	<u>Days (a)</u>	
	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Class I	30	60 (b)
Class II	30	60
Class III	15 (c)	35 (d)
Class IV	30	60
Class V	60	60 (e)

- (a) These levels were used as a basis for determining requirements for resupply from the ZI and for programming local procurement. USAREUR technical services had authority to stock items (World War II excesses) in excess of these levels if there was a foreseeable future requirement and if the items retained did not deteriorate in storage.

⁴⁰EUCOM Cir 2, 30 Jun 50, sub: Assistance to Non-Military Agencies and Individuals. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴¹Monthly Reviews, Office of D/Log, Hq EUCOM, Jan - Oct 50 and Jan 51. RESTRICTED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

- (b) Includes five days operational rations.
- (c) Operating level.
- (d) Emergency replacement.
- (e) Plus one year training requirement.

In addition to the supplies listed above, this command maintained a strategic reserve of sixty days based on a troop strength of 100,000. This strategic reserve included only selective items for maintenance and resupply and did not include items for initial issue.⁴²

86. Status of Line Items on Zone of the Interior Requisition

A major factor affecting the logistical readiness of the European Command was the varying lengths of time between initial submission of requisitions to the ZI and receipt of the total requisitioned quantities of supplies.⁴³ As of 30 November 1950 it was found that medical supplies, which could generally be procured directly from commercial companies, reached the command within four months of requisitioning. General engineer items and spare parts were received much more slowly than all other types of supplies. In general, supplies requisitioned in June, July, and August 1950, the months immediately subsequent to the outbreak of the Korean action, were received later than supplies requisitioned prior to Korea,⁴⁴ but the over-all picture of shipment of ZI-procured supplies was not discouraging. Delays caused by the needs of U.S. forces in Korea were inevitable and anticipated. A potential delaying factor in readying the LOFC across France for full-scale operations was the necessity of training French administrative personnel to prepare requisitions. Experienced German personnel had assisted the technical services since the conclusion of World War II, and it was anticipated that the job of training new personnel in France would be a considerable one. It was deemed necessary to train all such personnel in advance in order to eliminate delays in requisitioning supplies after the LOFC became operational.⁴⁵

87. Berlin Supply

a. Levels of Supply. Because of its isolated position within the Soviet Zone of Germany, the Berlin Military Post operated under supply conditions different from those obtaining

⁴²Log Div Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, p. 43. SECRET.

⁴³Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Col Henning, 12 Apr 51.

⁴⁴(1) Ibid. (2) See par. 77.

⁴⁵Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Col Henning, 12 Apr 51.

in the U.S. Zone. In general, the Berlin Military Post was authorized by the Department of the Army to maintain a 150-day maximum level of stocks subject to the ability of EUCOM to support this level from its own resources. At the end of the year, between 120 and 150 days of supply of all items except engineer Repair and Utilities (R&U) were on hand at Berlin. The level of R&U stocks remained at 40-50 days, since 90 percent of the items required for support of such activities were procured in Berlin. In addition, a local stockpile of 70,000 metric tons of coal for military use -- approximately a year's supply -- was maintained at Berlin. As of 16 January 1951, 74,000 tons were on hand.⁴⁶

b. Special Aspects. Certain specific aspects of the defense plan for Berlin required the stockage of items in addition to those authorized by applicable T/O&E's. These consisted almost exclusively of major items such as weapons, vehicles, and radio sets. Although some of this equipment authorized by established projects was already on hand in Berlin, a project was being prepared to obtain authorization for those on hand and to provide a means for requisitioning required additional quantities from the ZI. The purposes of both the 150-day level mentioned above and this project were to establish a level which would permit continued operation of the Berlin Military Post in the event of another land blockade and to support any emergency action which might be required.⁴⁷

IV. Procurement

88. Developments in Military Procurement

With the actual troop basis relatively stable during 1950 and with the change-over from occupation to defense virtually completed, there were no substantial changes in sources of supply, procurement procedures, or types of supplies and materials procured. The increasingly tactical mission of U.S. forces in Germany did, however, accelerate a trend toward procurement by negotiation instead of by means of competitive bidding. Although fully cognizant of the risks of local procurement, the command also procured more furniture and building materials in Germany, developed plans for purchase of limited quantities of ammunition from Belgium, and depended heavily on local procurement for the Labor Service force. Nevertheless, the emphasis throughout the year was on procurement

⁴⁶Remarks of the D/Log Div, Hq EUCOM, at Briefing for Brig Gen L. C. Mathewson, USCOB, 21 Jan 51. SECRET. In Log Div files.

⁴⁷Ibid.

of vital supplies from the zone of the interior. The only significant departures from established EUCOM practice were in local procurement of foodstuffs, Berlin procurement, procurement of solid fuels in Germany, and reacquisition of surplus property from STEG (Staatliche Erfassungsgesellschaft fuer Oeffentliches Gut m.b.H.).⁴⁸

89. Procurement of Foodstuffs in Germany

a. Background. During 1950 the U.S. policy of assisting, wherever possible, in rebuilding the economy of the German Federal Republic led to investigation of the possibilities of procurement within Germany of food and agricultural products for the U.S. occupation force. In February the U.S. High Commissioner requested that the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, consider such procurement as a means of supplementing the hard currency exports of Germany.⁴⁹ (See also par. 124^a, below.) Although provisions of existing military government regulations prohibited the procurement of food from the German economy except by individuals for their personal needs,⁵⁰ initiation by HICOG of action to procure foodstuffs in Germany was in itself a strong indication that no difficulty would be encountered in the rescission or invalidation of these regulations. Even before detailed investigations of the problem were carried out, it was envisioned that the Quartermaster Division, EUCOM, all regular USAREUR installations, and nonappropriated fund messes throughout the command would be good potential purchasers of food surplus to the needs of the German economy.⁵¹ A major consideration in carrying out such procurement, however, was that of strict adherence by German vendors to U.S. standards of inspection, acceptance and rejection, soliciting bids, and making awards.⁵²

b. Initial Action. Following agreement between HICOG and EUCOM early in the year,⁵³ a preliminary survey was undertaken by the Quartermaster Division, EUCOM, and the revision of MG

⁴⁸Interv, G. R. Kaplan with Col Henning, 12 Apr 51. STEG was a semi-public German agency engaged in the purchase and sale of surplus U.S. Army stocks.

⁴⁹Monthly Review, Office of D/Log, Hq EUCOM, Mar 50, p. 20. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁰MG Regulations, Title 12, Sec. 12 - 302, 6 Sep 49, as amended. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵¹Monthly Review, Log Div, Mar 50, p. 20. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵²Memo, Maj Gen G. A. Horkan, C/QM Div, EUCOM, for CINCEUR, 7 Feb 50, sub: Procurement of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables on the German Economy. In SGS 400.12 (1950), Vol. I. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵³Ltr, Maj Gen B. Noce, VCOPS, EUCOM, to Maj Gen G. P. Hays, Deputy US High Commissioner for Germany, 9 Feb 50. In SGS 091.3 (1950), Vol. I. UNCLASSIFIED.

Regulations 12 - 302 was begun by HICOG.⁵⁴ The survey carried out by the Quartermaster Division in early February revealed that certain items of fresh fruits and vegetables were normally produced in sufficient quantities to meet the average monthly requirements of Army agencies without injury to the German economy.⁵⁵ It was also found that seasonal climatic variations would be the guiding factor in pricing these goods in 1950. At such an early date, however, no definitive statement could be made regarding the specific quantity and quality of the merchandise. Procedures would also have to be formulated for training German vendors in U.S. Army standards of hygiene, quality, packing, crating, etc.⁵⁶

c. Statement of Policy. On 5 June, HICOG issued a policy directive which legalized and, in effect, encouraged the purchase of German food and agricultural products by all Allied members of the occupation forces in the U.S. Zone of Germany and their dependents; all messes, clubs, and similar groups; and supply organizations such as EES and the Quartermaster Division.⁵⁷ The only major restriction as to type of purchases was a prohibition against the purchase of grain and grain products such as flour, bread and cereals -- which were subsidized by the German Government. The mandatory requisitioning of food except that required for the feeding of German employees of official residences was also specifically forbidden. Purchases were to be paid for only by dollar-procured deutsche marks and were to be considered as "invisible exports." Two other specific provisions of this directive related to the procurement of food of animal origin and to bulk purchases. In the first case, all food of animal origin served in special messes, troop messes, and served or sold by EES to occupation personnel had to be procured initially from German wholesale outlets which had been approved by the Veterinary Corps of USAREUR or USAFE.⁵⁸ In making bulk purchases, organizations were directed to plan in such a way as not to disturb the local economy. As a precautionary measure, HICOG reserved the right to limit procurement by area or commodity if such procurement would result in serious shortages, sharp price fluctuations, or other undesirable market disturbances.⁵⁹

⁵⁴Ltr, Mr. Omar Pancoast, Act'g C/Food and Agriculture Div, Office of Economic Affairs, HICOG, to Maj Gen D. Noce VCOFS, EUCOM, 15 Mar 50. In SGS 091.3 (1950), Vol. I. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁵(1) Memo, Maj Gen G. A. Horkan for CINCEUR, op. cit.
(2) EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 15, 18 Apr 50, par. IV, 10. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷HICOG Policy Directive No. E - 2, 5 Jun 50, sub: Purchase of Food and Agricultural Products from the German Economy. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁸Monthly Review, Log Div, May 50, p. 19. RESTRICTED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁹HICOG Policy Directive No. E - 2, op. cit.

d. EUCOM Implementation of Policy. On 16 December, EUCOM headquarters carried out joint HICOG-EUCOM policy by publication of a letter on procurement of food from the German economy. Substantially the same as Policy Directive E - 2, this letter gave specific instructions regarding the purchase of all food and agricultural products from the German economy.⁶⁰

90. Berlin Procurement

a. Objectives. The problem of maintaining a sound basis for the economy of West Berlin raised the question of utilizing the manufacturing potential of that city. (See also par. 124b, below.) Removed from the U.S. Zone by a distance of some 200 air and 275 road miles, the West Berlin land island was almost completely dependent on a working economic relationship with the three west zones. By late 1949, shortages of markets for small West Berlin manufacturers had caused widespread unemployment throughout the city, and action was initiated by HICOG and EUCOM to relieve this situation and buttress the Berlin economy.

b. Initial Findings. In January 1950, the Commanding General, USCOB, requested that EUCOM develop plans to procure certain materials in Berlin. During the week of 23 January, a procurement team composed of representatives of the EUCOM-USAREUR technical services visited Berlin and made an initial survey of manufacturing capacities and capabilities. The findings of this group were that Berlin manufacturers were potentially capable of supplying many USAREUR procurement requirements, that labor wage scales were generally similar to those then prevailing in the three zones of West Germany, and that there was no shortage of materials.⁶¹ Although an extensive program of procurement would primarily benefit small manufacturers located in Berlin, it was noted that large manufacturers such as Siemens, Halske, Osram, and Klingel also had agencies and factories in cities throughout the U.S. Zone but that money received for items manufactured by those concerns would revert to that city no matter where orders were placed.⁶² However, two of the USAREUR technical services involved in this survey, Ordnance and Engineers, considered the small manufacturers a good source of vehicle spare parts,⁶³ and the Chief Quartermaster considered Berlin manufacturers a good source for the procurement of furniture.

⁶⁰EUCOM ltr to all Mil Post Comdrs (excl Wiesbaden Mil Post), 16 Dec 50, sub: Procurement of Food from the German Economy. AG 430 GLD - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶¹EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 7, 14 Feb 50, par. IV, 6. RESTRICTED.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

c. Procurement Procedures. Shortly after completion of this survey, a procurement team of representatives of the Engineer, Ordnance, and Quartermaster Divisions was established on a permanent basis in the procurement office of the Berlin Military Post. At that time, EUCOM policy was to exert continued efforts toward this project if the prices of Berlin manufacturers were commensurate with those prevailing in the western zones and delivery dates and specifications were satisfactory. To assist Berlin suppliers in meeting West German prices -- Berlin prices were slightly higher -- bids in Berlin were submitted FOB factory. Delivery to depots or issue points was made by military freight warrant and transportation costs were absorbed as occupation costs.⁶⁴

d. Results of Program in 1950. During 1950, orders valued at DM 6,626,800 were placed in Berlin by the USAREUR technical services. The breakdown of these orders by technical services was as follows:⁶⁵

Engineer Division	DM 562,000
Medical Division	DM 5,800
Ordnance Division	DM 758,000
Quartermaster Division	DM 2,513,000
Signal Division	DM 2,788,000

Despite aggressive coordinated efforts by EUCOM and the HICOG Berlin Element to increase procurement during the year, the small total cited above showed that the city's industries did not take particular advantage of the opportunities offered by EUCOM procurement. Berlin prices remained consistently higher than those in the zone despite the advantages of FOB factory prices. It was anticipated, however, that Berlin suppliers would become increasingly familiar with U.S. requirements during 1951. The Logistics Division emphasized that prices of Berlin items would have to become truly competitive before a large volume of EUCOM business could be placed there.⁶⁶

e. Planning. On 24 August 1950, the long-range problem of Berlin procurement was taken up at a conference in Heidelberg attended by EUCOM and HICOG agencies concerned. Four major items were on the agenda: Maximum procurement, procurement organization, payment, and prices. But the primary reason for the conference was to devise ways and means of increasing USAREUR procurement in Berlin. Requirements of the technical services and budgetary limitations imposed upon them somewhat restricted the freedom of action. Within the bounds of such restrictions, however, procedures could be established to insure procurement of the allowable maximum of goods and it was agreed that the Logistics Division would coordinate such procurement. A list of yearly estimated requirements by item was to

⁶⁴EUCOM Log Div Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, pp. 76 - 77.
RESTRICTED.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid.

be submitted to the Industries Branch, Berlin Element, HICOG; advertising campaigns were to be conducted; the Industries Branch, Berlin Element, would publish a directory of manufacturers; and the Logistics Division would publish a manual of procurement instructions. No changes were envisioned in the over-all procurement mechanism within Berlin, but there was a demonstrated need for a better system of payments. Other matters discussed were the possibility of a manufacturers' exhibit and Berlin as a potential source of EES procurement.⁶⁷

91. Procurement of Solid Fuels in Germany

a. Planning. During 1949, it became apparent that a system of local procurement of solid fuel and delivery by German dealers would be more economical than the existing practice of supplying coal to military posts through central procurement and distribution. To decentralize such activities, the Chief, Engineer Division, Headquarters, EUCOM, instructed the engineer of the Stuttgart Military Post on 16 January that a program of procurement of solid fuels through local German vendors would be tested at that post during the period 1 April - 30 June 1950.⁶⁸ A similar experiment was initiated on 1 May 1950 at the Heidelberg Military Post.⁶⁹ Future implementation of this program at all military posts depended on the reliability of sources of supply and upon comparison of total costs under the two methods. If the experiment demonstrated that the additional cost of retail purchase did not exceed the savings which could be effected in personnel, equipment, and rentals under the program of central procurement, solid fuels were to be procured at the post level.⁷⁰

b. Inauguration of Command-Wide Policy. Although the new program was tested during the late spring and early summer period and German suppliers were not always given sufficient opportunity to plan their activities, the trial period was regarded as successful. Accordingly, the existing policy of central procurement was discontinued for all posts except Berlin. On 1 July all other posts began local procurement of solid fuels. Posts were provided with equipment for collecting samples to be submitted to the Hangu-

⁶⁷Summary of Conference of 1430 Hours, 24 Aug 50, Heidelberg, Germany. In SGS 400:12 (1950), B/P. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁸Memo, D/Log for CINCEUR, 20 Mar 50, sub: Logistics Comments for the HICOG - CINCEUR Monthly Meeting with Heads of Major US Elements. UNCLASSIFIED. In Log Div Control Office files.

⁶⁹EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 22, 20 Jun 50, par. IV, 9. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁰Of fn.

Chemical Depot for analysis; the maintenance of high standards was stressed. To provide against failure on the part of vendors to complete their contracts, a command reserve of 100,000 metric tons was to be maintained at the Rheinau coal point and a reserve for Berlin of 70,000 tons was maintained by direct shipments from Rheinau.⁷¹

92. Disposal and Reacquisition of Surplus Property

a. Status of Surplus Property. In 1945, when the U.S. occupation of Germany began, approximately 11,000,000 long tons of wartime stocks remained for disposal. Of this total the German economy received 1,200,000, divided between 800,000 tons transferred to the German economy as deferred charges against future German exports (mostly material to be used for the prevention of disease and unrest and for support of the displaced persons program through UNRRA and IRO) and 400,000 tons of Signal, Ordnance, Engineer and Transportation equipment which were sold to STEG.⁷² Although the exact portion of the 400,000 tons still remaining in the theater was not known, the possibility of reacquiring certain serviceable items was the subject of an investigation during 1950.

b. Negotiations for STEG Property. In August 1950, Headquarters, EUCOM, obtained permission from HICOG to reacquire desirable property then held by STEG. Title to such property, which had been declared surplus by the Army and turned over to the Foreign Liquidation Commission on a deferred payment basis to the Bizonal Economic Council, had been taken over by STEG on 23 January 1948. The legal aspects of reacquisition of such property were examined in August and a request made by the commander in chief that an exception be made to the provisions of subparagraph 6b, AR 72 - 5 which prohibited the reacquisition of surplus property without specific authorization of the assistant secretary of the Army.⁷³ This authority was granted on 26 September⁷⁴ and a recommendation made that the matter of procurement of STEG equipment be expedited.⁷⁵

⁷¹EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 39, 7 Nov 50, par. IV, 4. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷²IRS, D/Log to SGS, 29 Sep 50, sub: Status of Surplus Property. In SGS 400.74 (1950), Vol. I, Item 27. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷³(1) Cable S - 1875 CINCEUR to COFSA for G4, 21 Aug 50. In SGS 400.74 (1950), Vol. I, Item 22a. SECRET. (2) AR 72 - 5 and AF Reg. 70 - 12, 9 Nov 49, sub: Procurement; Contracting Authority Outside United States, Its Territories and Possessions; Construction Work Outside Continental United States, subpar. 6b.

⁷⁴Cable W - 92616, COFSA G4 to CINCEUR, 26 Sep 50. RESTRICTED. In SGS 400.74 (1950), Vol. I, Item 22a.

⁷⁵Cable 143, McCloy to State Dept (2750) pass to COFSA for G4, 2 Oct 50.

c. Amount of Material Available. Late in the year, an estimate was made of the amount of material which could be reacquired by this command. Although exact prices were not agreed upon during the remainder of the year, it was estimated that current prices for procurement of new items in these categories would be between seventy-five and one hundred million dollars. Items available for purchase included 4,800 vehicles, 600 trailers, and unspecified number of automotive spare parts; 10,000 line items of Signal equipment; 1,943 tons of Engineer supplies, including heavy construction equipment, hand tools, pierced steel, aluminum planking, and spare parts; 25 X-ray machines; and thousands of items of individual clothing and equipment.⁷⁶ Reacquisition of this equipment was to be completed by 30 April 1951.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Memo, D/Log for CINCEUR, 20 Nov 50, sub: Logistics Comments for the HICOG - CINCEUR Monthly Meeting with Heads of Major US Elements - 27 Nov 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In Log Div files, Control Office.


⁷⁷Loc. cit., 22 Jan 51. (For conference of 29 Jan 51.)

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RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE MATTERS



RESTRICTED

corrected to date: 31 December 1950

AGL (1) 5-51-60-18403

CHAPTER VI

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program

I. Early Planning and Organization93. MDAP Responsibilities of the European Command

By the beginning of 1950 it was evident that the commander in chief, in his capacity as United States Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe, was to be responsible for military coordination of Department of Defense activities in support of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in Europe (See Chart 5 for United States organization for Western European defense matters, as of 31 December 1950) and that the European Command would help to implement the program by providing administrative support to the advisory missions, opening its training facilities to MDAP students, and contributing in some measure to the end-item program.¹

94. Status of the Program, 1 January 1950

Under Title I of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 the United States was preparing, throughout the fall of 1949, to

¹For detailed discussion of background, organization and developments to the middle of 1950, see EUCOM Hist Div monograph, The European Command and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1 Jan 49 - 30 Jun 50, Parts I and II. The "end-item program" was a program to provide materiel and equipment ready for use by the foreign defense forces.

aid eight European countries by supplying urgently-needed defense equipment, training selected members of their armed forces in its use, and stimulating additional production in Europe of militarily important items in accordance with over-all strategic requirements. To aid and advise the various governments in developing programs along these three lines, with a special view to insuring the efficient use of United States funds, joint military missions, representing the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, were to be established in Belgium (for Belgium and Luxembourg), Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. As of 1 January 1950, except for the fact that a few officers who had been serving as military attaches were available for MDAP duty in some of these countries, the entire program was still in a planning stage. The joint military missions, or Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), could not enter their assigned countries, nor could firm supply and training programs be developed, until the President approved an over-all strategic defense plan and bilateral agreements between the United States and other participating nations were signed. These two conditions were fulfilled on 27 January, opening the way for the establishment of the MAAG's, the formulation and approval of end-item programs for the individual countries, and the definition of training needs, by country, in terms of the material to be received.

95. Orientation Conference at London, 11 - 13 January.

Outstanding problems facing the European Command in its support of the new program, and the policies to be followed, so far as they had been defined, were analyzed at an orientation meeting held by the European Coordinating Committee (ECC) in London on 11 - 13 January 1950.

a. Study of Administrative Problems. Members of the conference sought detailed solutions to problems concerning the use of local currency by the MAAG's, security, communications, and the establishment of units to administer the program. Agreement was reached on the establishment of two sections, "Military Assistance Program Advisory Group" and "Plans, North Atlantic Treaty," within the Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), and on the inclusion of JAMAG and MAAG personnel within the troop basis of EUCOM, provisions shortly confirmed by the publication of Special Regulation 1 - 470 - 5.²

b. End-Item Program. By 11 January 1950 lists of the equipment to be shipped under the FY 1950 program were nearly firm. First shipments to Title I countries awaited approval of the Army, Navy and Air Force programs by the director of MDAP, signing of the bilateral treaties, approval of the over-all defense plan, and the release of funds. The

²ECC, London, Record of Discussion on MDAP Orientation Meeting, January 11, 12 and 13, 1950. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 400.336 B/P Item 28. Also, Statement by P&A Division, EUCOM, at Briefing on MDAP, Command Building, EUCOM, 29 Jan 50. SECRET.

tentative dollar value of the program totaled \$891,500,000 including \$694,000,000 allocated to the Army, \$110,430,000 to the Navy, and \$86,490,000 to the Air Force. These amounts were intended to provide enough equipment to bring practically all existing forces in the receiving countries to operational level, with enough spare parts to assure one year's maintenance.³

c. Training of Foreign Personnel. Extensive plans for an MDAP training program had also been developed during 1949.⁴ The discussions at London named the objectives of the program and brought out the urgency of training foreign personnel in storage, maintenance, stock control and related supply functions, prior to the receipt of equipment. Personnel selected for service with the MAAG's were instructed to schedule their requisitions so that key personnel of military units should have received familiarization courses to permit their proper use of the equipment upon receipt. Funds for the training program were tentatively divided as follows: Army, \$9,500,000; Navy, \$1,333,000; Air, \$16,500,000.⁵

96. Establishment of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups

After months of preparatory work, including the designation and briefing of Army officers for the Army sections of the MAAG's and the movement of MAAG chiefs to Italy, France, and Belgium, the European Command early in February began issuing orders for the "initial increments" of MAAG personnel. Since each MAAG was to function as a section of a United States embassy, approval for the entry of MAAG personnel had to be received from the State Department, the United States ambassador concerned, and officials of the foreign government. The movement of MAAG officers to their posts of duty took place from February to April; in a few instances, because of the many factors involved, entry of the full staff was delayed for an indefinite period.⁶ (For other effects of the MDAP program upon EUCOM, see par. 42 above.)

³Record of Discussion, MDAP Orientation Meeting, January 11, 12 and 13, 1950. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 B/P Item 28.

⁴Note especially (1) MDAP Training Plan, OPOT Division, 30 Dec 49. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 (1949), Vol. II, Item 172, (2) Cable WX - 97901, COFS US Army from Dir Plans & Orgn to JAMAG, 25 Dec 49. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 (1949), Vol. II, Item 160. (3) EUCOM, Memo for DCOFS for Opns, 353 GOT, 30 Dec 49, sub: MDAP Training. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 (1949), Vol. II, Item 171.

⁵Record of Discussion, MDAP Orientation Meeting, January 11, 12 and 13, 1950. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 B/P Item 28.

⁶Interv, E: S. Lay, Hist Div, with Col William O. Blandford, Mil Pers Br, P&A Div, EUCOM, 10 Jan 51.

97. Administrative Support of the Advisory Groups

The administrative support and control of the advisory groups by the European Command was principally a matter of supervising their internal organization, providing administrative services for their military and civilian personnel, and arranging to provide, so far as possible, various other services not included in the logistical support afforded by the Department of State.

a. Personnel Administration. A standing operating procedure for personnel assigned to the Military Assistance Advisory Groups was published by EUCOM on 1 February and reissued 20 October.⁷ Establishment of the EUCOM MDAP Control Group in the Office of the Comptroller, on 15 March⁸ centralized responsibility for a variety of tasks, including recruitment and administration of United States civilians employed in the MAAG's. Of approximately eighty-seven authorized civilian spaces for the six MAAG's (not including MAAG - United Kingdom) and the control group, sixty-eight had been filled by midyear and eighty-five by the year's end.⁹ In August an efficiency rating committee for MDAP civilian personnel was established,¹⁰ and other administrative services were provided as the civilian staff increased.

b. Publication of Basic Directive. A basic directive to all MAAG's was issued by JAMAG, at the request of CINCEUR, on 13 March, setting forth guiding policies with regard to the mission, organization and operations of the MAAG's, procedures and military channels, signal communications, and such matters as decorations and publicity.¹¹

c. Administrative Survey. During May and June a team of EUCOM officers visited the MAAG's to assist in the establishment of better administrative procedures, survey personnel requirements, and make recommendations on ways of lessening the administrative burdens placed on MAAG personnel.¹² Findings of the team led to personnel

⁷(1) EUCOM, 1 Feb 50, sub: Standing Operating Procedures for Military Assistance Advisory Groups. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM, 20 Oct 50, sub: Standing Operating Procedures for Personnel Assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups. RESTRICTED.

⁸EUCOM, memo for heads of all staff divs, 14 Mar 50, sub: EUCOM MDAP Control Group. AG 334 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹EUCOM Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Rept 1950. SECRET.

¹⁰EUCOM SO 128, 18 Aug 50.

¹¹JAMAG, London, 13 Mar 50, Memo to MAAG's, No. 1. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 400.336 B/P Item 74a.

¹²IRS, EUCOM DCOFS for Opns to D/P&A; Comptroller, 26 Jun 50, sub: Survey of MAAG's. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 400.336 (1950), Vol. V, Item 234.

increases of approximately 15 percent for the MAAG's¹³ and a reduction in reporting requirements.

d. Inspections and Investigations. On 13 October, a three-member team representing the Army, Navy, and Air Force began an inspection tour of the MAAG's on behalf of the Inspector General, EUCOM. Reports had been prepared on a number of the groups and the survey was still in progress at the end of 1950. In addition, the Inspector General Division conducted a number of special investigations relating to the MAAG's and their staffs.¹⁴

98. Fiscal Operations Related to MDAP

A number of activities in support of the MDAP stemmed from the necessity for making and accounting for certain expenditures in connection with the program. EUCOM support of the program therefore included the following activities.

a. Payment of MAAG Personnel. The EUCOM MDAP Control Group administered the funds for ordinary pay, travel pay, and per diem of officers and (United States) civilians on duty with the advisory groups. After 27 April, all special station allowances and special per diem expenses of MDAP military and civilian personnel assigned to continental MAAG's were paid in local currencies.¹⁵ Eight "Class B" agents assigned to the MAAG's were given special training at the USAREUR Finance School on 10 - 13 July.¹⁶

b. Control of Expenditures for MDAP Training. The MDAP Control Group also administered the policy of not charging against occupation (deutsche mark) funds the deutsche mark expenditures for training aids and supplies, and for salaries of German civilians, incurred as a result of the training of foreign nationals at EUCOM schools.¹⁷ Special administrative instructions published 29 March 1950 covered the question of payment for various costs involved in the training of foreign nationals.¹⁸ Fiscal instructions governing

¹³Intervs, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Col W. D. Long, Chief, O&E Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 12 Jul 50 and 8 Jan 51.

¹⁴(1) EUCOM IG Div, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950. RESTRICTED.
(2) Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Major Vera F. Sievers (WAC), Control Officer, IG Div, EUCOM, 9 Feb 51.

¹⁵In accordance with DA Cable WCL - 49700, 27 Apr 50. EUCOM, Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950. SECRET.

¹⁶EUCOM, Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950. SECRET.

¹⁷See Ibid.

¹⁸EUCOM ltr, 29 Mar 50, sub: Administrative Instructions for MDAP Army Training in the European Command. AG 353 GOT - AGO. Downgraded to RESTRICTED. See also EUCOM ltr, 21 Aug 50, same subject and file.

MDAP Army training in the command were issued by EUCOM on 8 September.¹⁹

c. Reimbursement of the German Economy. The MDAP Control Group was also concerned with reimbursement of the German economy for work and materials applied to Army equipment shipped out of the occupied zone under the military assistance program. This question, with its legal and procedural difficulties, was the subject of long negotiations with HICOG and close coordination with the Judge Advocate and the Logistic Divisions. Finally, on 8 November, a Department of the Army cable directed that such expenditures would be reimbursed with funds from accelerated payments under the zone's surplus property agreement with the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.²⁰ The same policy applied to reimbursement for goods produced in Germany for the occupation forces and subsequently shipped to other countries under MDAP.

II. Training Program Under MDAP

99. Participation in the Training Program

Excellentlly equipped at both school and unit level and situated accessibly to the countries in which the MAAG's were located, the European Command shared substantially in the MDAP training program during the calendar year 1950. At the beginning of the year the command found itself moving steadily from the uncertainties of earlier planning to definite training responsibilities and commitments. This transition began in December 1949, when it became known at command headquarters that JAMAG was keenly interested in developing this aspect of the program²¹ and that \$9,467,168 had been tentatively allocated under MDAP for Army training.²² The chief events which permitted OPOT Division to begin work on a firm training program for MDAP students were as follows: Detailed discussions with a representative of JAMAG, receipt of a planning paper stating that the maximum amount of requested

¹⁹EUCOM ltr, 8 Sep 50, sub: Fiscal and Supply Instructions for MDAP Army Training in the European Command. AG 353 COM - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁰DA Cable 96101, 8 Nov 50. Cited in EUCOM, Office of the Comptroller, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950. SECRET.

²¹Cable JAMAG - 64, JAMAG to COFS, US Army for Dir Plans & Opns, 14 Dec 49. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 (1949), Vol. II, Item 141.

²²Memo, D/OPOT for DCOFS for Opns, 30 Dec 49, sub: MDAP Training. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 (1949), Vol. II, Item 171.

training would be held at installations outside the United States,²³ and the receipt from JAMAG of lists indicating types of Ordnance, Engineer, and Signal equipment to be provided.²⁴

a. Decisions with Regard to MDAP Instruction. OPOT made two important decisions with regard to training to be offered to MDAP students. In the first place, instruction would be of two general types, technical instruction and operational instruction. The former, stressing the operation and repair of equipment, would be given at the established technical schools, while operational training would be given by the 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary. In the second place, courses for MDAP students would be shortened and revised to the level of the high-class type of trainee expected under the program.²⁵

b. Steps in Organization of the Program. Between January and the first of May an initial FY 1950 training program, developed by JAMAG in coordination with EUCOM and the MAAG's was approved. Selected courses of instruction at USAREUR schools were revised and some new courses were developed by tactical units to meet MDAP requirements and a total of 1,655 spaces were approved for training in the European Command. Quotas were then allocated; courses scheduled, and the first students and interpreters were invited to report for instruction.²⁶

c. Summary of Training Accomplished During 1950. Training of MDAP students within the European Command by the Army was accomplished under the FY 1950 program, FY 1950 supplemental program, and the FY 1951 program. The total number of men trained was 1,992, comprising 1,528 given instruction under the main FY 1950 program, 99 trained in July and August under a specially-authorized FY 1950 supplemental program, and 365 trained under the FY 1951 program prior to 31 December.²⁷ This training was given at the USAREUR Engineer, Ordnance, and Signal Schools, the Kitizigen Training Center, and the Transportation Corps Training Center at Hammelburg;

²³FMACC D - 6, Rev 1, 23 Jan 50, Policy with Reference to Training of Foreign Nationals Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (MDAA). SECRET. In SGS TS files.

²⁴Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Lt Col C. F. Nelson, Chief, Sch Sec, Tng Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 25 Sep 50.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Summarized from Notes for the OPOT Portion of the MDAP Conference, 29 Jun 50, in the Command Building, prepared by OPOT Div, Hq EUCOM. SECRET. For authorization to begin training, see Cable WX - 81713, from COFS, US Army from AC/S GL to CINCEUR, 11 Apr 50. RESTRICTED.

²⁷Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Lt Col C. F. Nelson, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 9 Feb 51.

and by the 1st Division at Grafenwohr and by U.S. Constabulary units at Vilseck (Tank Training Center), Sonthofen (Field Artillery Group), Vaihingen and Fuessen.²⁸

d. Observers at Fall Training Exercise. Sixty-six MDAP students from eight countries received special training in the command as observers of the fall training exercise, FTX-50 (Exercise RAINBOW). Sent to acquire familiarity with United States methods in the field, these men were attached to units in accordance with the training needs indicated by their respective governments.²⁹

e. Army Training Authorized for 1951. At the end of 1950, 237 students remained to be trained under the initial FY 1951 training program. A supplemental program to provide 857 additional spaces had been forwarded to Washington for budgetary approval.³⁰

100. Instruction Provided by USAFE

Support of the MDAP training program by United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) was marked by direct coordination between USAFE and JAMAG with informal coordination with EUCOM on administrative regulations governing the travel and status of MDAP students within the occupied zone.³¹ On 13 March USAFE published a list of twenty courses available for MDAP students. A revised catalog, covering courses available for FY 1951, was published on 15 August.³² On the basis of the catalog issued in March, JAMAG allocated a small number of training spaces for FY 1950.

a. Training Problems. Most of the USAFE courses involved on-the-job training and required a speaking knowledge of English. Comparatively few students who met this requirement could be found by the Title I countries on the Continent, and there were many cancellations of allocated space on this account.³³

²⁸(1) Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Maj H. S. Spitzer, Training Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 12 Jul 50. (2) EUCOM publication, MDAP Training Quotas. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 B/P, Item T71b. (3) EUCOM, OPOT Div, MDAP Army Training Program European Command FY 1950. UNCLASSIFIED. Annex O to monograph, EUCOM and the MDAP, Part II.

²⁹Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Lt Col C. F. Nelson and Lt Col L. R. St. John, Tng Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 9 Feb 51.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Interv, E. S. Lay, with Lt Col C. F. Nelson, Tng Br, OPOT Div, EUCOM, 10 Jan 51.

³²See monograph, EUCOM and the MDAP, Part II, Annex P.

³³Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Major John P. Remaklus, Jr., Chief, MDAP Tng Br, Tng Div, Opns & Training Directorate, USAFE, 14 Nov 50.

b. Training Programs for 1950 and 1951. At the end of June 1950, only one student had graduated and only fifteen others were receiving instruction.³⁴ Under the FY 1951 Air Force training program, 1,382 students were to be trained in the zone of the interior and 586 by USAFE. Despite the language barrier, only partially removable by use of interpreters, training went on at all USAFE installations during the second half of 1950.³⁵

III. Supply for Recipient Countries

101. Support of the End-Item Program

As of 1 January 1950 the European Command had just resurveyed its stocks and sent the Department of the Army estimates of amounts available for MDAP.³⁶ Meanwhile the three services in Washington were developing firm lists of items to meet the specific needs of Title I countries; a pricing policy had been established; and it was becoming evident that the European Command would have a smaller part in the end-item program, operationally, than had been foreseen in earlier planning.³⁷ USAFE supplies had also been screened for availability, by direction of the Air Force, and Headquarters, 3d Air Division, was being regularly informed of the status of USAFE stocks.³⁸

a. Changes in Organization at Command Headquarters. Throughout 1950, the organization of EUCOM headquarters reflected the

³⁴Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Capt William Faulk, Chief, Pers & Orgn Div, Stat Svcs Dir, Office of the DCOFS Comptroller, USAFE, 14 Nov 50.

³⁵Interv, E. S. Lay, with Maj John P. Remaklus, USAFE, 17 Jan 51.

³⁶(1) See DA ltr to CINC, EUCOM, 28 Nov 49, sub: Supplies Available for the Military Assistance Program. AGAO - S400 (23 Nov 49), CSGLD/DS. SECRET. (2) Ltr, EUCOM to DA, 31 Dec 49, sub: Supplies Available for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. AG 400 GLD. Secret.

³⁷(1) Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Lt Col J. A. Bergmann, Log Div, EUCOM, 10 May 50. (2) ECC, Record of Discussion, MDAP Orientation Meeting, January 11, 12 and 13, 1950, MDAP Orientation Meeting Agenda Item 8a. SECRET. In SGS 400.336 B/P Item 28.

³⁸Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Maj C. J. Papik, USAF, Chief, Aircraft Div, Dir of Sup, Office of DCOFS for Materiel, USAFE (Wiesbaden), 14 Nov 50. SECRET.

responsibilities imposed by the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Special responsibility for top-level coordination of MDAP matters was carried by an Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,³⁹ and in each staff division an officer was designated for MDAP liaison. Within the Logistics Division, the MDAP Branch was inactivated on 20 January, its former chief being named Assistant Deputy Director for Foreign Military Aid.⁴⁰

b. Transfer of Vehicles During 1950. The outshipment of materiel from the European Command was delayed by the necessity for careful study of the command's own future needs. In its December estimates of availability, EUCOM had taken 1 January 1951 as a replacement date. In April the estimates were recomputed on a replacement date of 30 June 1952, allowing an interval equal to a full rebuild cycle for all Ordnance vehicles in the command.⁴¹ Authority to ship a large number of vehicles to France and thirty-seven trucks (4 to 5 tons, 4 x 4 tractor) to Greece was received on 5 May.⁴² To meet the standards of serviceability issued by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance,⁴³ EUCOM had to requisition heavily on the zone of interior for new tires and large amounts of on-vehicle materiel.⁴⁴ On 29 July an LCT picked up the thirty-seven vehicles for Greece at Bremerhaven. The remaining vehicles provided during 1950 were transferred at Illesheim Ordnance Depot, for rail shipment as directed by the recipient countries. Delivery of the 6,024 vehicles to France was completed on 7 November. The 607 vehicles for Belgium were delivered between 4 and 9 December.⁴⁵

³⁹Lt Col Charles P. Stone

⁴⁰Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Lt Col John A. Bergmann, Asst Deputy Dir for Fgn Mil Aid, Log Div, 10 May 50. Lt Col Bergmann completed his tour of duty in Germany on 31 May. His replacement, Maj M. E. Naylor, became Chief of an MDAP Section in the Supply Branch of Logistics Division.

⁴¹Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Lt Col John A. Bergmann, 12 May 50.

⁴²Cable W - 82665, from COFS, US Army from AC/S G4 to CINCEUR, 5 May 50. SECRET.

⁴³Ltr, DA, Office Chief of Ord, 3 May 50, sub: Vehicle Standards for Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Classification not ascertained. In files, MDAP Sec, Sup Br, Log Div, EUCOM.

⁴⁴Cf. Briefing by Log Div, Conf on MDAP Matters, Comd Bldg, EUCOM, 29 Jun 50. SECRET. In MDAP file, Docs Br, Hist Div, EUCOM.

⁴⁵Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Maj M. E. Naylor, Logistics Div, EUCOM, 24 Jan 51.

c. Reduction in Vehicles Available for MDAP. Under the plans originally developed for EUCOM support of the end-item program, a total of 13,853 vehicles were listed as available for MDAP. This estimate included the vehicles supplied in 1950 to Belgium, France, and Greece, and several thousand vehicles for a special project. In June, the special project, then designated "Program for Stockpiling Material for Title I Countries," was separated from the rest of the FY 1950 program. In August EUCOM arranged for the release of 2,821 vehicles found to be over the MDAP requirements for FY 1950,⁴⁶ leaving 11,032 vehicles committed. An additional 368 vehicles were withdrawn to meet revised command needs (including 260 vehicles needed for labor service units), leaving 10,664 for MDAP. Of these, 6,668 were shipped as described above, and the remaining 3,996 were retained in earmark status, along with various other technical service items, for the stockpiling project.⁴⁷

d. Transfer of Other Items by EUCOM. During the second half of 1950 small quantities of Ordnance items, including rifles and bazookas, were shipped to Turkey, Greece, and Belgium to equip United Nations troops on their way to Korea. At the end of the year the European Command, by direction of the Department of the Army, was sending varying amounts of Ordnance items to other MDAP countries.⁴⁸

102. Supplying of MDAP Materiel by USAFE

Deliveries of materiel by USAFE under the end-item program consisted partly of items shipped by the Air Force Depot at Erding, on the basis of requisitions forwarded by Burtonwood Air Depot, and partly of aircraft and spare parts shipped on instructions received directly from the Department of the Air Force.⁴⁹

a. Shipment of Special Items. Under the Air Force program USAFE shipped aircraft spares, special tools, and ground-handling equipment to Italy and France in the following amounts:

⁴⁶Cable W - 90330, 31 Aug 50. SECRET.

⁴⁷Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Maj M. E. Naylor, C/MDAP Sec, Sup Br; Log Div, EUCOM, 24 Jan 51. SECRET.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Maj C. J. Papik, C/Aircraft Div, Dir of Sup, Office of DCOFS for Materiel, USAFE (Wiesbaden), 14 Nov 50. SECRET.

	ITALY			FRANCE
	30-day level common supply from Erding AB	30-day level peculiar Neubiberg AB	180-day service	Special MAAG requisition
Shipments from USAFE Air Bases				

Line Items

Shipped, cumulative	299	944	0	0
Awaiting shipment	0	0	499	59

Tons

Shipped, cumulative	3.2	22.5	0	0
Awaiting shipment	0	0	24.9	1.4

Maintenance experts were sent to these countries to provide the training needed in connection with the items provided.⁵⁰

b. Transfer of Aircraft. In addition, ten C-47 type aircraft were delivered to Norway, and 76 F-47's in flyable condition and 30 F-47 storage aircraft were prepared for shipment to Italy. Shipment of some of the planes to Italy was delayed until early 1951 by bad weather.⁵¹

IV. Communications Network103. Responsibility for MDAP Signal Communications

By directive of the Secretary of Defense, the United States Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe was responsible to the JCS for establishing the "military channels of communication of the ECC, including the Executive Director, and country Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG (UK), etc.), with CINCEUR, CINCNELM, CG, USAFE, and CG, 3d Air Division to facilitate direct requests for support and assistance."⁵² The subject of signal communications figured prominently in the planning for MDAP carried on by EUCOM and the Department of the Army in 1949. Early in February 1950

⁵⁰ Interv. E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Maj C. J. Papik, USAFE, 16 Jan 51. SECRET.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² H Doc 613 (81st Cong 2d Sess), First Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1950, p. 68. UNCLASSIFIED.

the Department of the Army notified CINCEUR that an outline plan for Signal communications dated 28 November 1949, and dispatched to the Signal Officer, EUCOM, on 19 January, had been approved by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and concurred in by the Navy and Air Force, except with regard to establishment of a joint communications center in London.⁵³ At the same time, Major General S. B. Akin, Chief Signal Officer, notified Major General J. B. Matejka, Chief, Signal Division, EUCOM, that General Matejka had been authorized to implement the plan as funds became available.⁵⁴ Under this plan the Signal Officer, EUCOM, was given over-all responsibility for MDAP communications in Europe. The Signal Officer, EUCOM, was also made responsible for "determination of future augmentation of communication and cryptographic personnel and facilities" and for the expenditure of funds provided by the State Department for MDAP communications. The Department of State was given responsibility for "local indigenous telephone service" (use of the ordinary telephone facilities of a particular country), while responsibility for the initial augmentation of cryptographic equipment and personnel of the military attaches was placed on the intelligence divisions of the service departments. Terminal responsibility within the MDAP countries was assigned to the service providing the communications for the military attache.⁵⁵

104. Implementation of the Signal Plan

The approved signal plan called for establishment of a joint integrated communications system under "single operational control," utilizing existing circuits and installations of the participating U. S. agencies. It included circuits available to service attaches in the MDAP countries. The initial center of communications and principal relay point were to be located in Heidelberg, and existing facilities were to be expanded on the basis of need.

⁵³Cable W - 99511 (SMC IN 2152), from COFS, US Army from Dir of Plans & Opns to CINCEUR, 10 Feb 50. RESTRICTED. For early planning, see EUCOM TT - 1134 (DA TT - 2713), 6 Oct 49 to DA from CINCEUR, sub: Responsibility of EUCOM in Implementation of MAP. CONFIDENTIAL. In EUCOM SMC.

⁵⁴Ltr, DA, OCSigO, to CINC, EUCOM, 9 Feb 50, sub: MDAP Communication Plan. RESTRICTED. In files, office of Lt Col J. A. Bergmann, Log Div, EUCOM.

⁵⁵DA plan, Mutual Defense Assistance Program Communications, 16 Jan 50. RESTRICTED. Appendix G to monograph, EUCOM and the MDAP, Part II. SECRET.

a. Control of Terminal Facilities. In London, MDAP communications were to be provided by CINCPAC. In the other MAAG capitals, the military attaché responsible for communications for the air, naval and military attachés was made responsible, in addition, for MAAG communications.

b. Development of MDAP Network. To augment the existing network, EUCOM established a telex connection to Oslo, Brussels, and The Hague, leasing the wire on a time-used basis. EUCOM also sent enlisted cryptographers and teletype operators on a temporary duty to the MAAG's to handle MDAP traffic during the period prior to arrival of additional and permanent communications personnel from the United States.⁵⁶

c. Coordination at MAAG Level. Within the first months of operation by the MAAG's, EUCOM sent communications officers to the various MAAG's and to London to insure the orientation of military and State Department personnel with regard to the new communications procedures and arrangements.⁵⁷

d. Supplementary Equipment. To provide for increases in MDAP traffic, EUCOM established at the Hanau Signal Depot a pool of equipment, primarily teletypewriter equipment, from which to set up new circuits.⁵⁸

e. Publication of Basic SOP. On 29 May 1950 the Chief Signal Officer, EUCOM, published a standing operating procedure for MDAP communications, consolidating existing directives and instructions and containing diagrams of the EUCOM teletype and telephone traffic military tie-line networks.⁵⁹

f. Status at End of 1950. The principal tasks of the Chief Signal Officer, EUCOM, with regard to MDAP communications were to insure the implementation of provisions contained in the basic signal plan, arrange for the necessary increases in facilities, and establish basic operating procedures. Since most of the required

⁵⁶ Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Col M. S. Moody, Sig Div, EUCOM, 28 Jun 50.

⁵⁷ IRS, C/N 3, Sig Div to SGS EUCOM (28 Feb 50) 9 Mar 50, sub: MDAP Communications Plan. SIG 311.2 (EUCOM). RESTRICTED. In SGS 400.336 (1950), Vol. I, Item 69.

⁵⁸ Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Col M. S. Moody, Sig Div, EUCOM, 28 Jun 50.

⁵⁹ Hq, EUCOM, OCSigO, 29 May 50, sub: Standing Operating Procedure for MDAP Communications. SIG 311. RESTRICTED.

teletype network was in existence when the MAAG's were formed, the work of developing it was principally a matter of providing for proper sharing of circuits, adequate staffing, and uniform procedures. Within a few weeks after the MAAG's had begun operating, the system had been adapted to cover the needs of the new program. At the end of 1950 MDAP communications required only routine support from the Signal Division, EUCOM.⁶⁰

⁶⁰Interv, E. S. Lay, Hist Div, with Col M. S. Moody, Sig Div, EUCOM, 24 Jan 51.

The first of these is the fact that the
 system is not a simple one, but a
 complex one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
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CHAPTER VII

Relations with HICOG

I. Administration, Liaison, and Logistical Support

105. General Relationship

In 1950, the relationship between EUCOM and HICOG was again one of cooperation. The importance of close teamwork between the two agencies was emphasized by General Handy in the opening remarks at the HICOG resident officers conference on 9 October, when he said: "I am sure that we all realize that we are playing on the same team -- whether we wear civilian clothes or a khaki or blue uniform -- not a State Department team or Defense Department team -- but an American team.¹ Addressing the same conference, Mr. McCloy remarked: "Though in some cases our interests appear to conflict, we must all bear in mind that we are on a common team; that the Army is here for the same purpose we are here. If the Army appears to make demands, we must bear in mind that the Army also has great demands and requirements to fulfill; the relationship works both ways."² The commander in chief's mission in relation to the high commissioner was the same in 1950 as in the preceding year. He was to advise the high commissioner in matters having a military

¹EUCOM ltr to all staff div heads; 16 Oct 50, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Relationship. AG 350.001 SGS - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

²Rept, 2nd US Resident Off Conf, Frankfurt, 9 - 11 Oct 50, p. 2. RESTRICTED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

application; to coordinate with him in the fields of intelligence, information, and psychological warfare; and, upon his request, to take whatever action was necessary to support U.S. policy in Germany.³

General Handy explained at both the January and February HICOG-CINCEUR meetings that EUCOM's mission in Germany was "to support HICOG and particularly to carry out the U.S. policy in Germany." Accordingly, he required all senior commanders to become "thoroughly familiar" with Mr. McCloy's Stuttgart speech of 6 February, as an explanation of that policy.⁴ The term "Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces in Germany," which appeared in paragraph three of the executive order establishing the position of the United States High Commissioner for Germany,⁵ was changed in 1950 to read "Commander in Chief, European Command." The paragraph concerned itself with the relationship of the commander in chief and the high commissioner, the U.S. forces in Europe, and military matters in Germany.⁶

106. Military Personnel with HICOG

As in the preceding year, military personnel continued to serve the high commissioner in many capacities. Maj. Gen. George P. Hays continued as Deputy U.S. High Commissioner and Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor served as Mr. McCloy's personal representative in Berlin. Colonel H. A. Gerhardt was also continued as Special Assistant to the High Commissioner. Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross and Captain C. R. Jeffs, USN, were Land Commissioners for Wuerttemberg-Baden and Bremen, respectively, and Maj. Gen. James P. Hodges continued as U.S. Commissioner on the Military Security Board, along with the eight other military board members. Lt. Col. John K. Flenning was Chief of the U.S. Occupation Requirements Branch (See par. 108c, below) and Lt. Col. Walter R. DeForest headed the Public Health Branch. Major Roger Allen was newly appointed as Chief Nutritionist, and Major Roger P. Smith was the American officer in charge at the Spandau Prison for Nazi war criminals. Lt. Col. George Stump continued as Military Liaison Officer, also

³EUCOM ltr to USAREUR CG, 18 Jan 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. 322.011. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴(1) Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Mtgs, 23 Jan and 27 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, Deputy Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Items 26b and 55b. (2) Stars and Stripes, February 9, 1950.

⁵Exec Order No. 10062, 6 Jan 49, sub: Establishing the Position of United States High Commissioner for Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 HICOG (1949), Vol. I, Item 9.

⁶(1) Exec Order No. 10144, 15 Feb. Reg. 4705. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) "Executive Order on U.S. High Commissioner for Germany amended," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, No. 578 (July 31, 1950), pp. 191 - 92.

serving as Chief of the Special Train Section which operated Mr. McCloy's private train. Two captains, one each from the Army and Air Force, served as aides to Mr. McCloy,⁷ and twenty-seven military police guarded his quarters in Bad Homburg. Thirty-nine military police were assigned to guard duty at HICOG headquarters in Frankfurt,⁸ and twenty-eight served in a similar capacity with HICOG at Bonn, capital of the German Federal Republic.⁹ The Diplomatic Pouch Section and the mail room were manned by enlisted men, and a EUCOM team of one officer and sixteen enlisted men continued to screen the OMGUS records turned over, in temporary custody, to HICOG.¹⁰ (See par. 111, below.) Commenting on the guard units, Mr. McCloy wrote to General Handy as follows:

I should like to commend those in charge of selecting and training the guard personnel. These men as a group have shown themselves to be alert, conscientiously devoted to their duties, and they have displayed a degree of initiative not usually encountered in military personnel assigned to static guard duty. As a result, our physical security, in particular with respect to Headquarters Building, has undergone a marked degree of improvement and I am very encouraged.¹¹

The 7792 Office of High Commissioner (Germany) was the permanent military unit placed at the service of the High Commissioner. Its personnel strength numbered twenty-one officers and thirty-eight enlisted men. Except for the military police, who were from the 540 MP Service Company assigned to the Frankfurt Military Post, the enlisted men and most of the above officers were attached to this unit. General Hays served as its commanding general.¹²

107. Liaison Activities

The mission assigned to the commander in chief by the Joint Chiefs of Staff included that of maintaining close liaison with

⁷Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col George Stump, HICOG Mil Ln Off, 1 Feb 51.

⁸Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj Harry L. DeBusk, Exec Off, PM Sec, FMP, 31 Jan 51.

⁹Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj A. L. Bregnard, Asst S - 4, FMP, 31 Jan 51.

¹⁰Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col George Stump, 1 Feb 51.

¹¹Ltr, John J. McCloy to Gen Handy, 20 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In EUCOM SGS 322 HICOG (1950), Vol. I, Item 16a.

¹²(1) T/D No. 303-1399, 7792 Office of High Commissioner (Germany). (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col R. Talbot, OPOT Div, Trp Orgn Staff Off, 21 Nov 50. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col George Stump, 1 Feb 51.

the high commissioner on all matters of common concern.¹³ In 1950 the high commissioner and the commander in chief continued to hold monthly meetings with heads of major U.S. elements at EUCOM headquarters, Heidelberg.¹⁴ As put by General Handy, the meetings helped those who attended "to inform each other as a group what each should know about the other's activities."¹⁵ Staff division heads were encouraged to use the HICOG-CINCEUR monthly conferences as an opportunity to brief Mr. McCloy and the land commissioners, post commanders, and the EUCOM staff on matters of general interest. Controversial issues, matters in discussion at staff levels and not agreed upon, and matters of interest only to military personnel, were not brought up, except in special circumstances.¹⁶ Prior to these meetings, heads of general staff divisions and heads of special staff divisions reporting directly to the commander in chief were required to submit in advance their comments for inclusion in the conference agenda. The comments were divided into two groups, as follows: (a) suggested statements for the commander in chief, and (b) suggested statement for head of staff division. Attendance of heads of all staff divisions was required.¹⁷ At the invitation of the high commissioner, representatives from EUCOM headquarters and military posts took part in the U.S. resident officers conference at Frankfurt 9 - 11 October. In his letter of invitation, Mr. McCloy stated: "I feel that if Post Commanders of USAREUR and USAFE could participate in the seminar discussions, it would be of mutual benefit." The conference program included all phases of U.S. policy. Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, CG, USAREUR, Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, CG, USAFE, and Rear Adm. John Wilkes, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, addressed the conference.¹⁸

¹³EUCOM ltr to CG, USAREUR, 18 Jan 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. AG 322.011 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 EUCOM (1950), Vol. I, Item 4.

¹⁴EUCOM Memo to Staff Div Heads, 13 Jan 50, sub: The HICOG-CINCEUR Monthly Meeting with Heads of Major US Elements. 337 SGS-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 10.

¹⁵Minutes, HICOG - CINCEUR Mthly Mtg, 27 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 55b (1).

¹⁶Memo, Lt Col E. W. Edwards, Asst to DCOFS for Opns, to Col H. W. Johnson, DCOFS for Admin, 20 Feb 50, sub: HICOG - CINCEUR Monthly Conference. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 49.

¹⁷EUCOM Memo to Staff Div Heads, 13 Jan 50, sub: The HICOG-CINCEUR Monthly Meeting with Heads of Major US Elements. 337 SGS - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In EUCOM SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 10.

¹⁸(1) Ltr, John J. McCloy to Gen Handy, 1 Sep 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 HICOG (1950), Item 24. (2) Stars and Stripes, October 7 and 10, 1950.

The Civil Affairs Division was the EUCOM agency for coordination with HICOG excepting where staff divisions maintained their own HICOG liaison offices," e.g., the Intelligence Division, the Logistics Division (See para. 108c, below), and the Judge Advocate Division. The Civil Affairs Division also maintained liaison with the Allied High Commissioner for Germany at the tripartite level, so that EUCOM was continuously informed on tripartite matters affecting the armed forces and, therefore, in a position to protect its interests as regards tripartite legislation.¹⁹

a. Office of Political Adviser (POLAD). The mission in Germany of the Department of State (formerly Office of the United States Political Adviser for Germany and now HICOG), maintained an office at EUCOM headquarters for liaison work in connection with matters principally of a political or diplomatic nature. It was staffed in 1950 by six Foreign Service personnel; in addition EUCOM supplied two enlisted men for diplomatic pouch work, messenger service, and driving. The office furnished EUCOM with political information obtained from State Department agencies and informed General Handy and his staff on political and diplomatic questions involving the command; e.g., questions on German rearmament and political orientation, German police, situations facing U.S. interests in neighboring countries, and other such matters. The office served EUCOM in other ways as well. Through its diplomatic pouch which went out six times a week it handled several thousand pieces of EUCOM military correspondence to military attaches throughout the world. It also answered questions pertaining to protocol, and served frequently in helping to resolve EUCOM problems with American embassies and legations in Europe and with consular establishments in Germany.²⁰

b. Coordination in Berlin. In 1950, EUCOM and HICOG continued to coordinate through the U.S. Commander, Berlin. Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Commander, continued in that capacity, serving in Berlin as the personal representative of the high commissioner, as well as the deputy for the commander in chief, EUCOM. Most of the General's time, however, was consumed by HICOG matters. His mission as U.S. Commander, Berlin, required that as Mr. McCloy's personal representative he perform such functions as might be directed by HICOG and that upon the high commissioner's request, he take the necessary

¹⁹(1) IRS, D/CAD to Comp, EUCOM, 17 Oct 50, sub: Staff Study re Functions and Missions of Civil Affairs Division. SECRET. In files of CAD Opns Br. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj. S. Gitlin, CAD Tripartite In Off, 9 Nov 50.

²⁰Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with A. J. Hogden, Admin Off, POLAD, 7 Nov 50.

measures for maintaining law and order and carrying out U.S. policy in Germany.²¹ In this connection, there was considerable coordination with regard to "Deutschlandtreffen," the East Berlin Free German Youth rally held during Whitsuntide, 26 - 30 May 1950. To meet the threatened invasion of West Berlin by 500,000 Free German Youth members, the U.S. garrison in Berlin was strengthened and special training programs were conducted. The Berlin police were assured of adequate military assistance if unable to restore and maintain order. The invasion was not attempted, nor did the police require this military help.²² (See par. 5, above.)

108. Logistical Support

EUCOM continued in 1950 to furnish logistical support to HICOG without reimbursement, as it had formerly done for OMGUS. This arrangement continued through 30 June 1950, in pursuance of enabling legislation passed by the 81st Congress as Public Law 327, entitled, "Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1950." Effective 1 July, however, HICOG reimbursed EUCOM for all supplies and services furnished.²³ The general policy adopted regarding logistical support for HICOG was that HICOG would eventually assume this responsibility. This policy was aimed at making EUCOM as mobile as possible. It was also based upon prospects that HICOG would remain in Germany indefinitely and that the German economy had so improved that it was in a position to furnish HICOG with supplies and services.²⁴ Arrangements were accordingly made for EUCOM and HICOG to review conditions from time to time to determine what logistical functions could be assumed by HICOG.²⁵ A

²¹EUCOM ltr to CG, USAREUR, 18 Jan 50, sub: Letter of Instruction. AG 322.011 GOT - AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 EUCOM (1950), Vol. I, Item 4.

²²(1) IRS, Col S. G. Conley, D/OPOT to VCOFS, 21 Apr 50, sub: Rally of East German Youth in Berlin on 28 May (Deutschlandtreffen). SECRET. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 95. (2) See also, EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Security Aspects of Deutschlandtreffen; Preparations for Meeting the Threat of the Communist Rally in Berlin, Whitsuntide, 1950. SECRET.

²³Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Conf, 28 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. II, Item 171a and Tab A.

²⁴Suggested Comments for D/Log Div at Mthly HICOG-CINCEUR Conf, 28 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. II, Item 171, Tab A.

²⁵Ltr, Arthur A. Kimball, Exec Dir, Bur of Ger Affrs, Dept of State, for Maj Gen C. B. Magruder, OUSOFA, 6 Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 HICOG (1950), Vol. I, Item 5.

meeting on this subject was held in Frankfurt in the office of Glenn Wolfe, Director of Administration, HICOG, on 19 April, attended by representatives from both the State Department and the Department of the Army, as well as from EUCOM and HICOG.²⁶ There were many other such conferences later on, and considerable progress was made.²⁷

a. Support Assumed by HICOG. In keeping with the above policy, effective 1 July HICOG commenced using commercial overseas surface and air transportation. Administration of its German personnel was taken over on 1 April. HICOG dealt directly with the Deutsche (German) Post for telecommunication service after 1 July. It had assumed administration of its housing in the Frankfurt area late in 1949, and it was expected that by 1 April 1951 HICOG would have assumed control of all other real estate occupied by it. As of the date on which any piece of property was acquired, HICOG met the solid fuel requirements of the property through German contracts. HICOG owned its official passenger cars and some trucks. Arrangements for German-contracted transport were completed by 1 September. As of 1 July, motor maintenance in Frankfurt was performed by HICOG-operated maintenance facilities and by contract with German garages, and such arrangements in other military posts were expected to be completed by January 1951. Expendable supplies and nonexpendable equipment, especially those obtainable in Germany, were purchased by HICOG after 1 September, except that HICOG was permitted to use EUCOM procurement when volume requirements could be added to the current EUCOM procurement program. EUCOM watched closely this turn-over of logistical functions to HICOG, so that there would be no interruption of the support for which EUCOM was responsible during the transitional period.²⁸

b. Support Continued by EUCOM. EUCOM continued throughout 1950 to furnish HICOG with gasoline and oil, and HICOG personnel continued to use EUCOM's financial service (i.e., military scrip),

²⁶Memo for Record, Lt Col L. G. Van Waggoner, OUSOFA, for CINCEUR, 21 Apr 50, sub: Conference Administration and Logistic Support of HICOG by EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 HICOG (1950), Vol. I, atchd to Item 5a.

²⁷Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. H. Barnes, C/Civ Sup, Log Div, Proc & Civ Br, 13 Nov 50.

²⁸(1) Memo, Maj Gen R. J. Canine, D/Log Div, for CINCEUR, 28 Aug 50, sub: Logistics Comments for the HICOG-CINCEUR Monthly Meeting with Heads of Major US Elements - 28 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In EUCOM SGS 337/1 Conf of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. II, Item 171, Tab "B". (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. H. Barnes, C/Civ Sup, Log Div Proc & Civ Br, 13 Nov 50.

as well as APO, PX, commissary, and medical and dental services. EUCOM also operated for common use its transient hotels and rest centers. HICOG shared cost of rail transportation of personnel on a per capita basis but EUCOM continued to move HICOG supplies by rail without reimbursement due to impracticability of separating supplies for shipment. Registration of HICOG organization vehicles was accomplished by bulk issues of plates from EUCOM to HICOG.²⁹ A detachment of five officers and fifteen enlisted men from the Frankfurt Military Post serviced HICOG personnel at Bonn, as well as the combined steel and coal groups at Essen and Duesseldorf. Their services included a hotel, mess, movies, commissary, post exchange, and motor pool.³⁰

c. Discontinuance of EUCOM Logistics Liaison Office. Effective 1 July 1950, the functions and authorities of the U.S. high commissioner to pass upon the propriety of requisitions by the U.S. occupation forces for commodities and services from the German economy, formerly delegated to the EUCOM Logistics Liaison Office with HICOG Office of Economic Affairs, were assumed by the newly created HICOG U.S. Occupation Requirements Branch, Office of Economic Affairs.³¹ The EUCOM Logistics Liaison Office was thus discontinued, and its former head, Lt. Col. John K. Flemming, was transferred from the Logistics Division to the 7792 Office of High Commissioner (Germany) unit, to permit his appointment as chief of the new HICOG U.S. Occupation Requirements Branch. The need to pass upon the requisitions of the U.S. occupation forces stemmed from Article 52 of the Hague Regulations, Hague Convention No. IV of 18 October 1907, which provided that requisitions in kind, and services, were not to be demanded except for needs of the army of occupation, and that the requisitions had to be in proportion to the resources of the country.³² During the year 1950, such requisitions from the German economy

²⁹(1) EUCOM Cir 2, 30 Jun 50, sub: Assistance to Nonmilitary Agencies and Individuals. (2) Memo, D/Log Div to CINCEUR, 28 Aug 50, sub: Suggested Comments for the Director, Logistics Division, at the Monthly HICOG-CINCEUR Conference. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. II, Item 171, Tab "B". (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. H. Barnes, C/Civ Sup, Log Div, Proc & Civ Br, 13 Nov 50.

³⁰(1) IRS, S - 4 to Post Comp, FMP, 16 Jan 51, sub: Logistics Support to Bonn and Essen. UNCLASSIFIED. In S - 4, FMP. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj A. L. Bregnard, Asst S - 4, FMP, 31 Jan 51.

³¹Ltr, R. M. Hanes, D/OEA, HICOG, to D/Log, EUCOM, 22 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div Doc Br.

³²(1) HICOG OEA Staff Memo No. 14, 21 Sep 50, sub: Staff Appointment. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Col John K. Flemming, C/US Occup Repts Br, OEA, HICOG, 30 Jan 51.

reached the following totals:³³

a. Charged to Occupation Costs:

	<u>DM 686,783,000</u>
Commodities	386,616,000
Repairs	41,149,000
Werkleistungen (Contracting)	189,525,000
Services	87,493,000

b. Charged to Nonoccupation Costs:

	<u>DM 155,695,000</u>
Commodities	57,241,000
Repairs	409,000
Werkleistungen (Contracting)	86,629,000
Services	11,416,000

109. Intelligence Operations

The EUCOM Intelligence Division maintained continuous liaison with the HICOG Office of Intelligence throughout 1950. A division liaison officer was specially designated for this work, and approximately 80 percent of his time was spent at HICOG headquarters in Frankfurt. In their primary fields of endeavor, namely, armed forces intelligence concerning Soviet and satellite (including East German) armed forces and counterintelligence concerning the U.S. Zone of Germany and the U.S. Sector of Berlin, EUCOM military intelligence agencies collected much political, economic, and sociological information of direct concern and value to HICOG intelligence. It was the policy of EUCOM to furnish this information to HICOG on a continuous basis. In addition, HICOG received all periodic publications of the EUCOM Intelligence Division, including reports covering other than purely foreign armed forces information. HICOG, in turn, transmitted to EUCOM any intelligence at its disposal, rendered assistance when German agencies had to be contacted, and supplied information and leads pertaining to subversive activities.³⁴

³³Data furnished to Col John K. Flemming by Economics Ministry, Federal Republic of Germany, 30 Jan 51.

³⁴(1) Memo, Brig Gen R. K. Taylor, D/Intel, 17 Jan 50, sub: Dissemination of Intelligence to US High Commissioner for Germany. GID - PPT. SECRET. In Intel Div Plans, Policy & Tng Br. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col R. B. Firehock, Intel Div HICOG In Off, 7 Nov 50.

110. Schooling for HICOG Children

EUCOM and HICOG also cooperated in the matter of schooling for the children of HICOG personnel. As of 31 December 1950, there were 350 HICOG children in the dependents schools.³⁵ HICOG reimbursed EUCOM at the annual rate of approximately \$200 per pupil.³⁶ At HICOG's special request, a new school was opened in 1950 at Bonn, capital of the West German Federal Republic, in order to accommodate the dependents of HICOG and EUCOM personnel stationed there. Further cooperation during 1950 included representation accorded HICOG on both the Dependents Schools Non-Appropriated Funds Council and the Dependents Schools Advisory Board to General Handy;³⁷ coordination between the two agencies on a German-American relations project used in the dependents schools (See 1950 USAREUR Report, par. 93e); and availability of dependents schools to HICOG's Education and Cultural Relations Division for visitations by German teachers. An English-German brochure on dependents schools was especially prepared for the German teachers, so that they might derive maximum benefits from their visits. Approximately five hundred German teachers visited the dependents schools during the year.³⁸

111. Finalizing OMGUS Liquidation

The liquidation of OMGUS (Office of Military Government, U.S.), which began 15 August 1949, was continued into 1950. Most of the fiscal liquidation was completed during the year, and it was contemplated that the OMGUS Liquidation Group, set up primarily for that purpose, would be dissolved early in 1951. Remaining functions, if any, would then be absorbed within normal EUCOM operations.³⁹ All personnel property used by OMGUS and wanted by HICOG, including motor vehicles, office furniture, equipment, and supplies, was fully turned over to

³⁵DSD Mthly Sch Pop Rept, 31 Dec 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In DSD, P&A Br.

³⁶Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with G. F. Fuhrman, C/Fis Sec, DSD, 8 Nov 50.

³⁷(1) SR 350 - 950 - 1, 20 Dec 49, Sec. 8(d). (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with V. R. Walker, Deputy C/DSD, 8 Nov 50.

³⁸(1) DSD Bul No. 29 (GLS), 31 Mar 50, sub: Information for Visitors to Our American Schools in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In DSD, Sec Sch Br. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with R. H. Stutzman, DSD Hist & C/Lang Sec, 27 Nov 50 and 19 Jan 51.

³⁹(1) EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, p. 267. SECRET. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Col F. J. Kendall, C/Plans & Policy Br, Comp Div, 6 Nov 50.

HICOG by 1 July.⁴⁰ The COMUS files, loaned to HICOG until 31 December 1951, continued to be screened by a EUCOM military team for superfluous matter, permanent military records, and those items which should be turned over to HICOG. At HICOG's request, the original team of one officer and seven enlisted men was augmented in September by three civilians and nine enlisted men, making twenty in all. At the close of 1950, approximately one third of the work had been completed. It was contemplated that the major portion of the assignment would be finished by 30 September 1951.⁴¹

112. Transfer of DP Program to HICOG

On 1 May 1950, EUCOM transferred to HICOG the major responsibility for the displaced persons (DP) program, retaining only those responsibilities relating generally to the maintenance of law and order within the DP camps and the furnishing of logistical support to the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and the voluntary and resettlement agencies accredited thereto under the terms of the IRO-CINCEUR agreement.⁴² In order to effect the transfer with the maximum cooperation, six officers served on TDY with HICOG for a period of ninety days, while five civilians were permanently transferred to HICOG, together with sufficient government and relief in occupied areas (GARIOA) funds to cover their salaries through the Fiscal Year 1950.⁴³ The number of displaced persons in the U.S.

⁴⁰(1) EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, pp. 268 - 69. SECRET. (2) Monthly Review, D/Log Div, Sep 50, p. 32. UNCLASSIFIED. In Log Div Proc & Civil Br. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. H. Barnes, Log Div, C/Civ Sup, Proc & Civil Br, 13 Nov 50.

⁴¹(1) EUCOM Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, pp. 266, 270. (2) Ltr, Glenn C. Wolfe, HICOG D/Admin, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 21 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In AG Div Opns & Rec Br. (3) Ltr, Col Mark McClure, Actg DCOFS for Admin, to Glenn C. Wolfe, 1 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In AG Div Opns & Rec Br. (4) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col D. C. Turner, AG Div, C/Comm & Rec Sec, Opns & Rec Br, 7 Nov 50, and with Capt P. N. Robinson, C/EUCOM Mil Rec Scrng Team, 1 Feb 51.

⁴²(1) CAD Notes for HICOG - CINCEUR Conf, 24 Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 96, Tab E. (2) Ltr, CINC to CG USAREUR, 16 Mar 50, sub: Transfer of Displaced Persons Program to HICOG. AG 383.7 GCA - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 334 IRO (1950), Vol. I, Item 36. (3) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj S. Gitlin, CAD Tripart Ln Off, 9 Nov 50, and with Eric Hughes, C/Integration Projects Sec, DP Div, HICOG Off Pol Aff, 16 Mar 50. ⁴³EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Rept No. 16, 26 Apr 50, par. 6. UNCLASSIFIED.

Zone, Germany, at the time of this transfer totaled 183,047, as follows:⁴⁴

In centers	101,631
Living on German Economy	71,677
Labor Service Units	9,739

Their number in 1945 had totaled 3,056,231. This marked reduction in numbers was indicative of the part played by Headquarters, EUCOM, in the solution of the DP problem.⁴⁵ At the time of the transfer, General Handy received a letter from the International Refugee Organization, expressing deep appreciation for the cooperation, assistance, and support given IRO by the European Command. The communication stated, further, that "In the nearly three years since the International Refugee Organization assumed DP obligations with the occupying authorities, the splendid work of the Civil Affairs Division of EUCOM has been a vital factor in the success which has been attained in caring for these people; helping them better themselves, and aiding in their re-establishment --all with a minimum of incidents in a highly tense atmosphere."⁴⁶ After this transfer, EUCOM found it necessary to request that HICOG remove the displaced persons from the casernes they were then occupying so as to make the installations available for the contemplated transfer of additional troops to Germany. HICOG agreed, provided EUCOM found other suitable accommodations for the DPs, or constructed new buildings in which to house them. As of the close of the year, the two agencies were still engaged in conferences on the subject.⁴⁷

II. Law, Order and Security

113. Judge Advocate Conference

Early in 1950, a conference was held in Heidelberg by the EUCOM Judge Advocate, which was attended by the following persons: Chief

⁴⁴EUCOM CINC's Wkly. Staff Conf Rept No. 19, 23 May 50, par. 5. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁵(1) EUCOM Monthly DP Status Rept, CAD, 30 Apr 50, p. 1. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Mr. Morton Roth, C/Opns Br Leg Sec, DP Div, Off of Pol Aff, HICOG, 31 Jan 51.

⁴⁶Ltr, Philip E. Ryan, IRO C/Opns, to Gen T. T. Handy, EUCOM CINC, 28 Apr 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 334 IRO (1950), Vol. I, Item 72.

⁴⁷Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Mr. Morton Roth, C/Opns Br Leg Sec, DP Div, Off of Pol Aff, HICOG, 31 Jan 51.

Justice William Clark, U.S. Court of Appeals for Germany; Worth McCauley, Chief Attorney, U.S. Courts for Germany; J. Rintels, Administration of Justice Division, HICOG; U.C. Urton, Office of Political Affairs, HICOG; Maj. Gen. J. L. McKee, Provost Marshal; Brig. Gen. P. E. Gallagher, Director of Posts; Captain H. E. Duryea, USN Liaison Officer; Lt. Col. R. C. Thomas, USAFE, and Captain J. M. Hustead, Intelligence Division. Problems relating to traffic and "off limits" control and the coordination of investigating agencies were discussed. It was agreed that the occupation authorities should retain direct control of traffic until the Germans should come forward with a law meeting American standards, that emphasis should be placed upon a clean-up program in lieu of use of "off limits" controls, and that investigating agencies should work more closely with prosecuting agencies both for direction in obtaining evidence and in concluding cases.⁴⁸

114. New Legislation

EUCOM and HICOG coordinated during 1950 in drafting legislation pertaining to adoptions, prohibited transactions, a uniform highway code, hunting and fishing, and laws affecting the security of the Allied Forces.⁴⁹ HICOG ordinances applicable to military personnel, in whole or in part, were republished as military orders by quoting the ordinances, or applicable part thereof, in an appropriate EUCOM publication. To avoid confusion and misinterpretation, such ordinances were not commented upon, interpreted, or paraphrased, in the EUCOM directives.⁵⁰ As a general policy, HICOG had always consulted EUCOM in regard to proposed legislation affecting the interests of EUCOM.⁵¹

a. Jurisdiction of HICOG Courts. EUCOM and HICOG also coordinated in 1950 with respect to the promulgation of a HICOG law pertaining to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany. Under this law, these courts were vested with civil jurisdiction over all occupation personnel (military as well as civilian) in all cases, except those

⁴⁸(1) Memo, Col B. M. Gunn, JA, to COFS, 9 Jan 50, sub: Notes for the CINC's Staff Conference on 10 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In EUCOM SGS 337/2 COFS Confs (1950), Vol. I, Item 2, Tab H. (2) IRS, JA to SGS, 30 Jan 50, sub: JA Conference Re Traffic Controls, Off-Limits Controls, and Use of Army Investigative Agencies. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337 Misc Mtgs (1950), Vol. I, Item 11a.

⁴⁹Interv; Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with J. F. Kreissl, JAD Hist, 16 Nov 50.

⁵⁰EUCOM Staff Memo No. 1, Sec XLVII, 1 Jan 50, sub: Promulgation of HICOG Ordinances by Headquarters EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵¹Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with S. Pollack, JAD Mil Just Br, 16 Nov 50.

involving slander, libel, insult, false arrest or imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction, loss of right of consortium, alienation of affection, breach of promise to marry, dissolution or annulment of marriage, or proceedings to establish the paternity of, or liability for the maintenance of, illegitimate children. On the criminal side, these courts were given jurisdiction to hear and decide any case in which a defendant was charged with an offense under any applicable legislation of the occupation authorities or German law. As a matter of policy, U.S. military personnel were tried by court-martial only; other occupation personnel (employees of the U.S. occupation authorities and dependents of both military and civilian personnel) were tried by the U.S. Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany.⁵²

b. Jurisdiction of German Courts. There was also coordination between EUCOM and HICOG in 1950 on legislation defining the civil and criminal jurisdiction of German courts over occupation personnel. This legislation precluded German courts from exercising any civil or criminal jurisdiction over persons subject to the military or naval laws of the United States. German courts were empowered to exercise civil jurisdiction over other occupation personnel: (a) when such a person was a defendant and consented in writing to the jurisdiction; or (b) when such a person initiated the case; or (c) when the case was connected with or related to the subject matter of another action previously initiated by such person and was asserted as a counter action therein. As to occupation personnel not subject to the military or naval laws of the United States, land commissioners were authorized to empower German courts to exercise either criminal or civil jurisdiction in specific cases in which the exercise of such jurisdiction was otherwise prohibited. As to displaced persons and German nationals employed by the U.S. Forces, German courts were authorized to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over such persons and nationals only when the offense or act concerned had not arisen out of, or in the course of performance of, duties or services with the U.S. Forces.⁵³

⁵²(1) HICOG Law No. 10, 19 Oct 50, sub: U.S. Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany, replacing MG Ordinances Nos. 31 and 32. AHC Off Gazette, 27 Oct 50, p. 643. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Mr. A. J. Esgain, Exec & C/Clearance Sec, JAD Mil Just Br, 22 Jan 51.

⁵³(1) HICOG Law No. 6, 11 Aug 50, sub: Implementing AHC Law No. 13, Judicial Powers in the Reserved Field. AHC Off Gazette, 18 Aug 50, p. 526. (2) HICOG Law No. 10, 19 Oct 50, sub: U.S. Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany, replacing MG Ordinances Nos. 31 and 32. AHC Off Gazette, 27 Oct 50, p. 643. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Mr. A. J. Esgain, Exec & C/Clearance Sec, JAD Mil Just Br, 23 Jan 51.

115. Civilian Practice of Law

Early in 1950, EUCOM and HICOG cooperated in the preparation of a new EUCOM policy directive on the practice of law by U.S. attorneys in the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany. Under this directive, attorneys were authorized to engage in the general practice of law (previously limited to occupation personnel), provided they gave priority to cases involving occupation personnel. In return for this priority, they were given limited logistical support (billeting, car registration, postal and POL privileges, etc.). A U.S. Attorneys Supervisory Board, consisting of the EUCOM judge advocate, chairman, the HICOG general counsel, and another civilian member chosen by them from among the American attorneys in the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany, ruled upon applications for permission to engage in such practice of law, and exercised supervisory control over their practice. At the close of the year, however, HICOG issued a new policy directive that no American attorney could engage in the practice of law in the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany even though he had been accredited by Headquarters, EUCOM, unless he obtained authorization to practice under that directive. All attorneys who, as of the date of the directive, 12 December 1950, were practicing under EUCOM authorization, were authorized to continue their practice. Applications for a HICOG license were passed upon by a "Committee on Attorneys," composed of the HICOG general counsel, chairman, the EUCOM judge advocate, and a third member chosen from among the American attorneys. This directive was apparently based upon the theory that practicing law was engaging in business and the license to practice should be obtained from HICOG. An attorney authorized to practice law by HICOG had, after 12 December, to obtain an additional authorization from the EUCOM board in order to receive logistical support. During 1950, there were approximately fifteen EUCOM-licensed American attorneys practicing law in the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany.⁵⁴

116. War Crimes Activities

a. Respective Responsibilities. The executive order establishing the position of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany was amended in 1950 by addition of the following two paragraphs relative to the respective responsibilities of the U.S. high commissioner and the commander in chief, EUCOM, in connection with the matter of war criminals:

⁵⁴(1) Ltr, Gen Handy to Maj Comds; 16 Oct 50, sub: Practice of Law by U.S. Lawyers in the U.S. Area of Responsibility in Germany. AG 250.4 JAG - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) HICOG Policy Directive G - 5, 12 Dec 50, sub: Practice of Law by American Attorneys in the United States Area of Responsibility in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Interv, Harvey E. Horwich, Hist Div, with Mr. A. J. Esgain, Exec & C/Clearance Sec, JAD Mil Just Br, 23 Jan 51.

5. The High Commissioner, as representative of the United States, shall share the four-power responsibility for the custody, care, and execution of sentences and disposition (including pardon, clemency, parole, or release) of war criminals confined in Germany as a result of conviction by the International Military Tribunal, Nurnberg, and shall be responsible for the custody, care, and execution of sentences and disposition (including pardon, clemency, parole, or release) of war criminals confined in Germany as a result of conviction by military tribunals established by the United States Military Governor pursuant to Control Council No. 10.

6. The Commander in Chief, European Command, shall be responsible for the custody, care, and execution of sentences and disposition (including pardon, clemency, parole, or release) of war criminals confined in Germany under sentences adjudged by military tribunals established by United States Military Commanders in Germany and elsewhere, other than those referred to in paragraph 5 hereof. On the request of the High Commissioner, the Commander in Chief, European Command, shall take necessary measures for carrying into execution any sentences adjudged against war criminals as to whom the High Commissioner has responsibility and control, namely: war criminals convicted and sentenced by military tribunals established pursuant to Control Council No. 10.⁵⁵

This amendment to the presidential executive order merely codified the division of responsibility which had already existed between the two agencies.⁵⁶

b. Re-review of Sentences. A major project in 1950 in connection with war crimes matters was the re-review of war crimes cases by both EUCOM and HICOG. The two agencies agreed on a general policy to be followed in which only the sentences were to be re-reviewed. The trial of the case and the verdict reached therein were not subjects for this review. Its purpose was to eliminate any wide disparities that might be found to exist among sentences for comparable crimes and to insure that the punishment was reasonable for the offense committed. The EUCOM War Crimes Modification Board consisted of the EUCOM director of Personnel and Administration, chairman, the judge advocate, inspector general, provost marshal, director of intelligence, and adjutant general (recorder without vote). The board re-reviewed some 120 of its 480 cases and as a result of its recommendations, a number of sentences were either remitted or substantially modified. As of 31 December,

⁵⁵Exec Order No. 10062, 6 Jun 49, sub: Establishing the Position of United States High Commissioner for Germany. UN-CLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 HICOG (1949), Vol. I, Item 9a.

⁵⁶Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj J. L. Haefele, War Crimes Sec, JAD Mil Aff Br, 7 Dec 50.

forty-eight sentences had been remitted, thirty-five modified, eleven reaffirmed, and twenty-six were awaiting the commander in chief's approval of the board's recommendations.⁵⁷ The high commissioner appointed a special board of three members which re-reviewed the more than one hundred HICOG cases and made recommendations which resulted in the modification of a number of sentences. At the close of the year, its recommendations were still under consideration by the high commissioner. The board comprised the following members: Presiding Judge David M. Peck, of the Appellate Division, First Department of the New York Supreme Court; Frederick A. Moran, of Albany, chairman of the New York State Board of Parole; and Conrad E. Snow, member of the staff of the legal adviser to the State Department.⁵⁸

c. Increase in Good Conduct Time. Another matter in which EUCOM and HICOG coordinated during the year was the increase from five to ten days per month of good conduct time allowed war crimes prisoners. Only prisoners for a term of years, not life termers, were eligible for this privilege.⁵⁹ The number of prisoners released during 1950 through the aid of good conduct time totaled seventy.⁶⁰

117. Venereal Disease Control

HICOG resident officers were asked by EUCOM to assist with its program of venereal disease (VD) control among the occupation forces by emphasizing to the German police the necessity for picking up infected women and segregating them in accordance with German law.⁶¹ U.S. policy was that German police were solely responsible for the arrest and detention of VD suspects and their

⁵⁷(1) EUCOM GO 106, 28 Nov 49, sub: War Crimes Modification Board, as amended by EUCOM GO 19, 21 Apr 50, RESTRICTED. (2) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col T. L. Borom, and Maj J. L. Haefele, War Crimes Sec, JAD Mil Aff Br, 24 Nov 50, and 18 Jan 51.

⁵⁸(1) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with J. A. Bross, Asst Gen Counsel, HICOG, 31 Jan 51. (2) HICOG Press Release No. 274, 31 Mar 50, sub: US Clemency Group Established. In Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁹(1) Memo, Col S. W. Jones, Deputy JA, to DCOFS for Admin, 17 Mar 50, sub: Comments for HICOG-CINCEUR Monthly Meeting with Heads of US Elements. UNCLASSIFIED. In EUCOM SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 80d. (2) EUCOM ltr, sub: Establishment of System of Good Conduct Time Credit for War Criminals under European Command Jurisdiction. AG 383 JAG - AGO. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁰Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj J. L. Haefele, War Crimes Sec, JAD Mil Aff Br, 18 Jan 51.

⁶¹Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Mtgs, 27 Feb and 28 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Items 55b (4) and 91.

subsequent physical examination and for raids on houses of prostitution. Military Police and Air Police assisted only when specifically requested by the German police through the local resident officer. Failure by German police to discharge their responsibilities in VD control was reported by the local provost marshal to the local resident officer, who contacted the German police concerning their function in the matter.⁶² The German VD law was effective but required rigid enforcement for desired results.⁶³

118. Tear Gas for German Police

In answer to an inquiry from the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, EUCOM advised HICOG that it had no objection to the use of tear gas and tear gas apparatus by the German police for the purpose of controlling mobs and civil disorders, but that the manufacture and storage of such supplies and equipment should continue to be prohibited. HICOG was informed likewise that EUCOM was unable to furnish initial tear gas supplies, but that if a major disturbance occurred, the German police would be able to obtain these items from post and subpost commanders upon request of the U.S. resident officer. In such cases, arrangements would have to be made for dollar reimbursement. By the end of 1950, no further exchanges on the subject occurred between EUCOM and HICOG. However, the matter was discussed further on a tripartite level, and the Allied High Commission Council agreed in principle with its Public Safety Subcommittee proposal that the German police be permitted to possess, use, and store tear gas. The U.S. high commissioner also felt that the manufacture of such tear gas should be permitted, considering it normal police equipment rather than military equipment. The tripartite committee took note of the fact that the basic chemical components of police tear gas equipment were already available to German manufacturers, and the high commissioners agreed to seek instructions from their respective governments. The United States gave immediate approval for the German manufacture, possession, use, and storage of tear gas. The British also approved but the French initially disapproved its manufacture, agreeing only to its possession and use by the German police. At the request of the British and U.S. Governments, the French still had the matter under consideration at the close of the year.⁶⁴

⁶²EUCOM ltr to CG's USAREUR and USAFE, 13 Jan 50, sub: Policy - Governing Procedure Pertaining to Control of VD Carriers. AG 726.1 PMG - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶³Minutes, HICOG - CINCEUR Mtg, 28 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In EUCOM SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov & Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 91.

⁶⁴(1) EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Rept No. 28, 8 Aug 50, par. 10. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj. J. R. Bestor, CAD Plans Staff Off, 7 Nov 50; with Col W. H. Dawson, D/C Log Div Sup Br, 13 Nov 50; and with James L. McCraw, C/Pub Sfty Br, HICOG Off of Pol Aff, 1 Feb 51.

119. Sale of Dangerous Weapons

On 3 March 1950 EUCOM requested HICOG to effect passage of a law prohibiting the sale of dangerous weapons then being sold on the open German market. The weapons included rubber truncheons, telescopic blackjacks, brass knuckles, switch-blade knives, air rifles, sulphur pistols, and pistols of high muzzle velocity. HICOG presented the matter to the Military Security Board and the board ruled that the weapons did not constitute a threat to security. HICOG took no further action, German authorities being of a similar opinion.⁶⁵ However, in the fall of the year, EUCOM again pressed HICOG for such a law, pointing to a new weapon on the German market, the "Self-Protection Pistol." This pistol was supplied with self-filling cartridges which could be loaded with ammonia, or hydrochloric, sulphuric, nitric, or acetic acids. It was a vicious weapon designed to produce as minimum results either blindness or permanent disfiguration. HICOG replied that the matter had been presented to the Public Safety Subcommittee of the Allied High Commission through the Military Security Board. The committee was of the opinion that although the weapon might constitute a danger to the maintenance of law and order, it was no more dangerous than many other items serving utilitarian purposes and that there was no justification for the action requested. German officialdom maintained that the weapon was dangerous only if misused or possessed by the wrong person, and anyone likely to misuse it would readily find an adequate substitute if its sale was prohibited. No further action was taken by the close of 1950.⁶⁶

120. Labor Service Units

On 7 August, Mr. McCloy gave concurrence to a proposal by General Handy that Labor Service units be augmented by an additional 10,000 personnel to raise the total strength from 21,000 to 31,000.⁶⁷ The cost of this augmentation (DM 87,000,000) for the

⁶⁵(1) IRS, PM to VCOFS, 24 Feb 50, sub: Commander in Chief Conference. UNCLASSIFIED. In PMD Hist File. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with M. J. Patten, PMD Hist, 22 Nov 50.

⁶⁶(1) IRS, PMD to COFS, 10 Oct 50, sub: Illegal Weapons being sold in German Stores. UNCLASSIFIED. In PMD Hist File. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen George P. Hays, D/HICOG, 17 Oct and 7 Nov 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In PMD Hist Div files. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col C. E. Grimsley, PMD, C/CI Br, 29 Nov 50.

⁶⁷(1) Ltr, John J. McCloy to Gen Thomas T. Handy, 7 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I, Item 9. (2) Cable SX - 1681, CINCEUR to COFSA, 10 Aug 50. SECRET. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I, Item 16.

remainder of the fiscal year 1951 was presented to the high commissioner at a conference on 28 August in General Handy's office. Besides Mr. McCloy and General Handy, the others present included Maj. Gen. George Hays, Deputy High Commissioner; Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commanding General, U.S. Air Forces in Europe; Brig. Gen. E. T. Williams, Deputy Chief of Staff, EUCOM; Brig. Gen. J. J. Binns, EUCOM Comptroller; and Col. H. A. Gerhart, special assistant to Mr. McCloy. It was explained that EUCOM fourth quarter funds could be employed to defray this cost provided a supplemental budget appropriation could be secured on or about 15 December. The high commissioner agreed that this method could be used and that the additional funds would be approved.⁶⁸ As of the close of the year, labor services personnel were distributed as follows: Army - 27,330, Air Force - 3,170, and Navy - 500.⁶⁹ It was anticipated, however, that this strength would again be increased, from 31,000 to 58,000. Both Logistics and OPOT Divisions were directed to develop plans accordingly.⁷⁰ A sampling taken from four German, two Polish, and two Baltic labor service companies, all selected from different localities, revealed that the average age of German Labor Service employees was twenty-nine years, that of the Polish thirty, and the Baltic thirty-three.⁷¹ The principles and policies agreed upon by the high commissioner and General Handy with regard to Labor Service units were outlined in a letter from CINCEUR to Mr. McCloy on 28 November. Among these were the following:

(1) The personnel of the Labor Service units were employed as civilians to perform two missions only -- first, to guard important installations and establishments in order to relieve U.S. military personnel for combat training; and secondly, to furnish logistical support to the technical services of the U.S. forces in Europe.

(2) The policy of the United States and its allies was unalterably opposed to the creation of a German national army, and to the re-creation of the German general staff. As regarded possible

⁶⁸Memo for the Record, Col John J. Binns, 28 Aug 50, sub: Augmentation of Labor Service Units. RESTRICTED. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I, Item 33.

⁶⁹IRS, C/Lbr Svc Div to COFS, 26 Dec 50, sub: Request for Increase in Labor Service Personnel by COMNAVFORGER. SECRET. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I, Item 125a.

⁷⁰IRS, DCOFS for Opns to D/OPOT and D/Log, 18 Aug 50, sub: Labor Service Units. SECRET. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I, Item 22.

⁷¹(1) IRS, C/Lbr Svc Div to COFS, 22 Dec 50, sub: Average Age Labor Service Personnel. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I, Item 125. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Col C. M. Busbee, C/Lbr Svc Div, 14 Feb 51.

future incorporation of German military elements in a Western European defense force, the Labor Service units were not a step in that direction and had no connection therewith. Statements to this effect were to be suppressed as mischievous.

(3) Labor Service units were not to participate in activities that could reasonably give members, or the German public, any impression that such units were in fact an American-sponsored cadre of a future German national army. Such activities included singing of former Nazi songs, irresponsible political activities of German officers of Labor Service units, or any activity that accentuated a chauvinistic or militaristic spirit.

(4) In recruiting personnel for the Labor Service units, great care should be exercised to prevent selection of former SS officers, former Wehrmacht officers whose past record or known current attitude or activities reasonably indicated that their services would not be in our best interests, known communists, or known political extremists.⁷² (On Labor Service units, see also pars. 49 - 53, above.)

121. Emergency Planning

A HICOG-EUCOM Emergency Planning Committee engaged in a series of conferences during the year, in an effort to work out plans for a consonance of action on the part of HICOG and EUCOM in the event of an emergency, and also for the period preceding such an emergency. The committee totaled twelve persons, seven from EUCOM and five from HICOG. Col. F. J. Brown, OPOT Division, served as chairman of the EUCOM group and Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross acted in a similar capacity for the HICOG members. Complete accord was reached by the committee, and an agreement was drafted coordinating the respective activities of the two agencies. Thereafter, the committee continued to function as a working committee in order to coordinate any planning or action in an emergency involving both EUCOM and HICOG. As of the close of the year, the agreement had been approved by General Handy, but Mr. McCloy's approval was still being awaited.⁷³ (See 1950 USAREUR Report; par. 24.)

⁷²Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy to John J. McCloy, 28 Nov 50.
RESTRICTED. In SGS 231.4, Case 1 (1950), Vol. I, Item 103.

⁷³(1) Ltr, Brig Gen E. T. Williams, DCOFS for Opns, to Glenn G. Wolfe, HICOG D/Admin, 15 Sep 50. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 84. (2) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col B. F. Taylor, C/Sp Plans & Policy Br, OPOT Div, 26 Jan 51, and with J. B. Minor, C/Scty Off, HICOG Off of Admin, 30 Jan 51.

III. Matters Affecting the German People

122. German-American Relations

Numerous conferences were held between General Handy and Mr. McCloy concerning German-American relations. These conferences were not held because these relations were considered bad: actually, the EUCOM rate of serious incidents involving the Germans was less than one per 2,000 per month. The meetings resulted from the High Commissioner's desire to enlist the cooperation of the armed forces and their dependents as a missionary force to assist him in his major objective of democratizing the German people. There was considerable coordination in this regard.⁷⁴ On 23 June, a EUCOM board of officers was appointed to study the matter and submit recommendations on possible EUCOM action to advance the High Commissioner's objective. The board was admonished, however, that its recommendations were not to jeopardize the security of EUCOM or its position as an occupation force.⁷⁵ Membership of the board comprised Maj. Gen. John L. McKee, Provost Marshal; Col. J. R. Lloyd, Commanding Officer, Heidelberg Military Post; and Col. J. B. Murphy, Director, Personnel and Administration Division. Its recommendations were submitted 26 July in a brief entitled: "Co-ordination of Reorientation of Army and HICOG Personnel."⁷⁶ This report led to a directive from General Handy to the Commanding General, USAREUR, dated 4 August, in which he announced that the high commissioner had indicated a pressing need for a considerable change in the occupation attitude and policy in regard to relationships between the German people and the occupation forces. The directive set forth a complete program for the reorientation of occupation personnel and called for the joint use of recreational facilities as well as an increased commingling of Germans and Americans wherever possible.⁷⁷ Four days later, 8 August, all USAREUR commanders were enjoined to institute the program without delay and to insure that

⁷⁴(1) Ltr, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen Floyd L. Parks, CINFO, 18 Aug 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Vol. I, Item 22a. (2) EUCOM ltr to Staff Div Heads, 16 Oct 50, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Relationship. AG 350.001 SGS - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁵IRS, VCOFS to Maj Gen J. L. McKee, PM, 23 Jun 50, sub: German-American Relationships. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Vol. I, Item 3a-1.

⁷⁶IRS, PM to COFS, 26 Jul 50, sub: Co-ordination of Reorientation of Army and HICOG Personnel. SECRET. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Vol. I, Item 8.

⁷⁷EUCOM ltr to CG USAREUR, 4 Aug 50, sub: German-American Relationships. AG 000.7 GPA. RESTRICTED.

all facilities under their control were used in this connection.⁷⁸ Mr. McCloy wrote to General Handy on 17 August expressing appreciation for the steps taken, and advised that HICOG was working on a program to complement the EUCOM directive.⁷⁹ At the HICOG-CINCEUR monthly meeting on 28 August, General Handy reviewed the positive action thus far taken by EUCOM, and concluded his remarks with an appeal for more action by everyone, as follows:

Now, a lot of talking by me or anyone else is not going to get the results we want unless there is some corresponding action all down the line. In the units, its got to go all the way to the last soldier, and in the case of the married men, it must reflect in his wife and children. I am firmly convinced that if we act properly and show the Germans by concrete example what we intend to do, the effect is bound to be felt. Each of you must interest yourself personally in seeing that the policies are carried out in your command in the spirit as well as the letter.⁸⁰

(For further details on the program for improving relations with Germans, see the 1950 USAREUR Report, par. 93.)

123. German Youth Activities

EUCOM continued its German Youth Activities (GYA) program in 1950 with active support from HICOG. Mr. McCloy early indicated his interest in the GYA program.⁸¹ In a letter to General Handy, the high commissioner remarked: "The Army, through these efforts, has brought credit to the occupation, and has served far beyond the call of duty the mission of the United States Government."⁸² Effective 1 July 1950, HICOG reimbursed EUCOM for salary payments to Department of the Army civilians engaged in GYA activities.⁸³

⁷⁸USAREUR ltr, to all comdrs under USAREUR, 8 Aug 50, sub: German-American Relationships. AG 000.7 GPA - AGO. RESTRICTED.

⁷⁹Ltr, John J. McCloy to Gen T. T. Handy, 17 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 322 Germany (1950), Vol. I, Item 22a-1.

⁸⁰Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Conf, 28 Aug 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 171, Tab A.

⁸¹Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Conf, 23 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 26b.

⁸²Ltr, John J. McCloy to Gen T. T. Handy, 20 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Item 10.

⁸³Cable - 383 (SMC IN 3450), HICOG to CINCEUR, 21 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Item 77.

A marked change, however, was suggested by the high commissioner. Mr. McCloy was of the opinion that it was time to increase German control of German Youth Activities at the operational level. He proposed that centers be transferred on an individual basis, the time for their respective transfers to be determined by the apparent readiness of the particular community to assume such responsibility. However, he expressed a desire that armed forces support of these centers be continued at all levels, even after such a transition. General Handy replied that EUCOM was willing to comply with the wishes of the high commissioner, but that any such transfer of responsibility for the GYA program and its facilities would have to be in its entirety and not piecemeal. He further expressed the opinion that the transfer should be made from EUCOM to HICOG to German control rather than directly from EUCOM to German control. After any such transition, General Handy added, EUCOM support would have to be limited to that of individual volunteers plus such official logistical support as was then given to HICOG installations.⁸⁴ Later, however, in response to a subsequent verbal request by the high commissioner, General Handy agreed to participate in an experiment at piecemeal transfers as well as to continued logistical support of centers after their respective transfers to German control.⁸⁵ Accordingly, it was agreed that it was desirable to start by transferring responsibility for centers which were beyond reasonable supporting distance from troop concentrations. A list of forty-nine such centers was prepared, each located at a distance of more than fifteen miles from an armed forces troop unit.⁸⁶ At year's end, EUCOM had already drafted a plan to be used when turning over the centers, which would serve as a basis for further HICOG-EUCOM discussions in the matter.⁸⁷

⁸⁴(1) Memo for Record, 5 Apr 50, sub: Transfer of Responsibility for certain GYA Centers. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Item 41. (2) IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS for Admin, 27 Jul 50, sub: German Youth Activities. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Item 88.

⁸⁵(1) Memo, Lt Col L. B. Cole, C/OPOT GYA Br to D/OPOT, 31 Jul 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353.81 GYA (1950), Vol. I, Item 96, Tab B. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Col Lydon B. Cole, C/OPOT GYA Br, 23 Nov 50.

⁸⁶(1) Ibid. (2) IRS, D/OPOT to VCOFS, 11 Aug 50, sub: German Youth Activities. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Item 96.

⁸⁷(1) IRS, D/OPOT to VCOFS, 11 Aug 50, sub: German Youth Activities. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353.8 (1950), Vol. I, Item 96. (2) IRS, DCOFS for Opns to D/OPOT, 30 Aug 50, sub: Plan for Turnover of GYA Center, CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Item 107.

124. Economic Aid to Germany

a. Procuring Food from German Economy. EUCOM also coordinated with HICOG in helping to supplement the hard currency exports of Germany. Mr. McCloy asked General Handy to consider procuring food from Germany as well as from other European countries. Both the Quartermaster Division and the nonappropriated fund messes were potential sources of dollar procurement of food which was surplus to the needs of the German economy. A survey of German availabilities by the Quartermaster Division revealed that certain items of fresh fruit and vegetables were produced in sufficient quantities to meet average monthly requirements of Army agencies without injury to the German economy. As U.S. dollars were involved, German vendors were subject to the same rules and regulations governing bids, awards, inspection, and acceptance of produce as other European vendors. Also revision was required of the HICOG prohibition against procuring food from the German economy except by individuals for their personal needs.⁸⁸ During the year 1950 a total amount of \$131,813.11 was expended, a considerable assistance to the HICOG program for improving the German economy.⁸⁹ (For details, see par. 89, above.)

b. Relieving Berlin Unemployment. To help relieve unemployment in Berlin, HICOG requested EUCOM to investigate the possibility of making procurements from local manufacturers. Accordingly, the Logistics Division sent a survey team to Berlin. Its findings indicated that Berlin manufacturers were capable of supplying many EUCOM requirements at a competitive level. Subsequently a EUCOM procurement office was established in Berlin; in the course of 1950 the total purchases by EUCOM agencies there amounted to DM 8,381,090.⁹⁰ (For details, see par. 90, above.)

⁸⁸EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Rept No. 15, 18 Apr 50, par. 10. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁸⁹Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with W. D. Bartlett, Proc. Off, QM Div Sup Br, 16 Nov 50 and 18 Jan 51.

⁹⁰(1) Minutes, COFS Wkly Conf, 10 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL. In SGS 337/2, COFS Confs (1950), Vol. I, Item 2a. (2) Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Mtg, 27 Feb 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 321/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 55b(6). (3) Cable - 366 (SLC IN 1386), HICOG to London for Spoffard, 9 Jan 51. SECRET. In Log Div Proc Br files. (4) Memo, Col M. D. Harris, C/Proc Br, Log Div for Lt Col J. L. Fincher, Log Div Ctl Off, 12 Jan 51. UNCLASSIFIED. In Log Div Proc Br files. (5) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj J. H. Willard, Staff Off, Log Div Proc Br, 18 Jan 51.

c. Bringing Dollars into Recreation Areas. To take advantage of the 1950 Passion Play in Oberammergau as a means of bringing additional dollars into Germany, the high commissioner requested that EUCOM do everything possible to make properties available to the Germans for tourist trade in nearby Garmisch, which was handling overflow crowds from Oberammergau.⁹¹ Likewise, HICOG asked EUCOM to make available for the Germans all facilities in Berchtesgaden not fully utilized, so that more tourist trade could be attracted there. Commenting on these requests at a HICOG-CINCEUR meeting, Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, Commanding General, USAREUR, remarked that "every effort... should be made to keep our facilities 100% filled throughout the week. If we do that, I'm sure that the High Commissioner will not look on us with jaundiced eyes."⁹² Both Garmisch and Berchtesgaden were popular recreational centers maintained by EUCOM for all members of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Forces, as well as their U.S. civilian and Allied personnel serving in the European Command. The centers were well patronized on weekends and holidays, but there was a decline in attendance from Monday through Thursday. To stimulate the midweek attendance, authority was granted down to and including commanding officers of separate battalions and units of comparable size to issue detached service orders to their personnel for the purpose of visiting Garmisch and Berchtesgaden during these periods. Also, free rail transportation within Germany was provided to such personnel. The properties thus remained with EUCOM, as their overall occupancy during the week averaged 85 percent, and 100 percent over weekends and holidays.⁹³

125. Turn-Back of German Property

HICOG constantly urged EUCOM to return confiscated and requisitioned properties to the Germans. All such properties in excess of needs were returned. Confiscated and requisitioned properties

⁹¹Memo for Record, sgd Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, 17 Jan 50, sub: Meeting of Mr. McCloy, Gen Handy and Gen Huebner. UNCLASSIFIED. In EUCOM SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 22a.

⁹²Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Conf, 23 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 26b.

⁹³(1) AR 210 - 10, 12 Jan 50, par. 11. (2) Ltr, Asst AG to CG USAREUR and USAFE, COMNAVFORGER and CO 7966 EUCOM Det, 18 Apr 50, sub: Measures to Increase Midweek Utilization of EUCOM Leave Centers at Berchtesgaden and Garmisch. AG 353.8 SSP - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In Hist Div Doc Br. (3) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Maj John R. Sheffey, Pers Staff Off, P&A Div Pers Serv Br, 13 Nov 50.

were subject to a continuous survey.⁹⁴ In this connection, however, General Handy insisted that the "morale, health, and efficiency of the occupation forces and their dependents was of paramount importance and was not to be prejudiced."⁹⁵ He remarked: "We cannot or will not lower the standards of our soldiers. Those must go up and not down. This is a guiding principle."⁹⁶ Yet, during 1950, 1,711 requisitioned properties and 113 confiscated properties were returned to the German economy, and as of the close of the year there remained only 19,566 properties under requisition and 1,448 properties under confiscation. This compared very favorably with the largest number of properties held during the period of occupation, namely, 114,087 requisitioned and 4,232 confiscated properties.⁹⁷ Despite this continuing program, EUCOM received countless letters from Germans, urging the return of specific properties. General Handy asked the HICOG resident officers to help foster better relations and understanding between the Germans and the armed forces in this regard, by explaining to the Germans EUCOM's needs and policies in such matters. He further asked their help in obtaining from the Germans quick and positive action on the requests to be made by EUCOM for additional housing, training areas, and other facilities to accommodate the contemplated increase in EUCOM troop strength. He pointed out that it should be made clear to the Germans that the presence of U.S. military forces in Germany was the major deterrent against war and that should war come, these troops would form the major bulwark for the physical defense of the German people.⁹⁸ Mr. McCloy urged the resident officers to cooperate to the greatest extent possible in order to make the impact of the increased number of troops felt as little as possible.⁹⁹ As of 31 December, no significant requisitioning of additional properties in this connection had been made. By that time, the only requirement was additional training areas. Numerous conferences were held between HICOG and EUCOM representatives on the subject of specific areas desired for training purposes, except for a few small training

⁹⁴EUCOM ltr to Staff Div Heads, 16 Oct 50, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Relationships. AG 350.001 SGS - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹⁵USAREUR ltr to all Comdrs under USAREUR, 8 Aug 50, sub: German-American Relationships. AG 000.7 GPA - AGO. RESTRICTED.

⁹⁶COFS Wkly Staff Conf Notes, 10 Jan 50. CONFIDENTIAL.
In SGS 337/2 COFS Conf (1950), Vol. I, Item 2a.

⁹⁷(1) Engr Div Mthly Status of Real Estate Rpts, 1947-1950. UNCLASSIFIED. In RI Est Sec, Engr Div Opns Br. (2) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with J. D. Kelly, Deputy Chief Real Estate Sec, Engr Div Opns Br. and K. D. Martin, C/Stat Accts, Real Estate Sec, Engr Div Opns Br, 24 Nov 50 and 25 Jan 51.

⁹⁸EUCOM ltr to Staff Div Heads, 16 Oct 50, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Relationships. AG 350.001 SGS - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹⁹Rept; 2d US Resident Offs Conf, Fkft, 9 - 11 Oct, p. 2.
In Hist Div Doc Br.

areas which were acquired, the entire matter was still under discussion at the close of the year.¹⁰⁰ (See 1950 USAREUR Report, par. 62.)

126. Highway Maintenance Costs

EUCOM, HICOG and the West German Government engaged in a number of discussions in 1950 concerning the responsibility for maintenance and construction costs in connection with the military highway net. This was a system of roads outside the limits of U.S. requisitioned or confiscated property designated by the commander in chief, EUCOM, to guarantee the adequacy of vital supply and communications routes used by the U.S. occupation forces during occupational and emergency operations. The roads remained public highways, and normal use by Germans, as well as by occupation forces, was unrestricted. The German Government was responsible for the maintenance and construction of all the roads in this net (approximately 5,000 miles of roads and 1,200 bridges), and no labor, materials, or equipment, were furnished by U.S. occupation forces. The average annual cost of this work was estimated at DM 40,000,000. Seeking a change in policy, the German Government contended that its responsibility ended when the roads were brought up to standards that existed in Germany in 1939. Construction involving widening or upgrading the classification of bridges above 1939 standards should be funded by the occupation forces. HICOG took the middle position that requirements above 1939 standards which were of benefit only to occupation forces must be budgeted from occupation costs funds. EUCOM's position was that the occupation forces could not, and should not, spend appropriated funds for improvements on properties not requisitioned or confiscated; that any improvement to a public highway was of eventual value to the German economy and costs should not be charged to occupation funds; that no funds had been budgeted in the past or for FY 51 for construction of, or repairs to, public highways; and that if, in the future, such funds were to be budgeted by EUCOM, they should be in the mandatory cost budget.¹⁰¹ The decision finally reached provided that all future improvements would be paid from occupation or mandatory costs funds, respectively, as determined by EUCOM and concurred in by HICOG and the German authorities.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰(1) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col. R. M. Bacher, Deputy Chief, Svcs Br, Log Div, 13 Nov 50. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Col L. F. Gordon, C/Svcs Br, Log Div, 16 Feb 51.

¹⁰¹EUCOM CINC's Wkly Staff Conf Rept No. 17, 9 May 50, par. 5. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰²(1) HICOG Tech Instr No. 4 (OE), 29 Aug 50, sub: Military Highway Net. UNCLASSIFIED. In Log Div Proc & Civ Br. (2) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Lt Col W. H. Barnes, C/Civ Sup, Log Div Proc & Civ Br, 13 Nov 50.

127. Working with the German Press

At the beginning of the year, the German press carried many articles complaining of the excessiveness of occupation costs to the German people. Much space was also given to incidents involving occupation personnel and German nationals. Some of the stories were true; others contained false accusations and exaggerations of the incidents. Although these incidents were widely reported, no corresponding publicity was given in the German press to the punishments received by occupation personnel found guilty of such charges. EUCOM asked for and received cooperation from HICOG in working with the German press on publishing releases about occupation costs, de-requisitioning, disciplinary action taken in cases involving attacks on German nationals by Americans, and other data necessary to correct exaggerated and false accusations about occupation personnel. This helped considerably in improving local situations. The practice of attempting to discredit occupation personnel in the German press was reduced appreciably through local cooperation between post provost marshals and public information officers, the Kreis resident officers of HICOG, and the representatives of the local German press.¹⁰³

128. Making Germans Traffic Conscious

A serious problem that confronted EUCOM early in 1950 was the up-trend of military motor vehicle accidents resulting from unsafe practices of German motorists, cyclists, and pedestrians. For example, in May 37 percent of the accidents were attributable to such causes, as compared with 30.3 percent in April, 28.1 percent in March, and 25.2 percent in February.¹⁰⁴ EUCOM repeatedly

¹⁰³(1) Memo for Record, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, 17 Jan 50, sub: Meeting of Mr. McCloy, Gen Handy and Gen Huebner. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 22a. (2) Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Mtg, 23 Jan 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Item 26b, and 26b, Tab C. (3) Memo, Comp to COFS, 3 Jul 50, sub: Notes for CINC's Wkly Conf. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/2 COFS Confs (1950), Vol. I, Item 34, Tab E. (4) EUCOM ltr to Staff Div Heads, 16 Oct 50, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Relationships. AG 350.001 SGS - AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (5) Interv, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with Capt W. M. Minton, PID, 13 Nov 50.

¹⁰⁴Suggested Comments by Gen Handy at Mthly HICOG-CINCEUR Conf, 28 Jun 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. II, Item 148, Tab A.

recommended to HICOG that action be taken with the appropriate German officials to establish and implement an adequate public safety program emphasizing traffic safety. The HICOG chief of public safety replied that his branch was responsible for law, order, and security only and that a traffic safety program rested solely with the German Government. Since no action was taken in 1950, the above condition continued.¹⁰⁵ (Other matters involving EUCOM relations with HICOG are dealt with elsewhere in this report, and in the accompanying 1950 USAREUR Report.)

¹⁰⁵(1) Hist Rept, P&A Div Sfty Sec, 13 Sep 50, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED. In P&A Div Sfty Sec. (2) Minutes, HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Mtgs, 27 Feb and 28 Mar 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 337/1 Confs of CINC, D/Mil Gov and Maj Comdrs (1950), Vol. I, Items 55b and 91. (3) Ltr, Col John B. Murphy, D/P&A Div, to Glenn B. Wolfe, D/HICOG Off of Admin, 19 Jul 50. UNCLASSIFIED. In P&A Div Sfty Sec. (4) Intervs, Harvey L. Horwich, Hist Div, with T. H. Ayers, P&A Div Sfty Sec, 9 Nov 50, and with E. J. Krotzer, EUCOM Sfty Dir, 16 Nov 50.

CHRONOLOGY TOPICS

EUCOM

	Page
I. Air Force	181
II. Civilian Personnel	181
III. Germany	182
IV. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG)	182
V. Labor Services	183
VI. Line of Communications (LOFC)	184
VII. Logistics	185
VIII. Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP)	185
IX. Navy	187
X. Organization	187
XI. Seventh Army	188
XII. Supreme Headquarters Atlantic Powers in Europe (SHAPE)	189
XIII. Soviet Union and Satellites	190
XIV. Training	191
XV. Troops	192

• CHRONOLOGY

Note: This chronology is based on information contained in the foregoing chapters, references to which are made following each item. For example, (I, 3) denotes Chapter I, paragraph 3. The items are listed chronologically under topics arranged in alphabetical order.

I. Air Force

- 26 April EUCOM conference held in Heidelberg to discuss processing of aircraft and personnel involved in unauthorized landings in U.S. areas of responsibility, Germany. (I, 9b).
- 21 July Urgent request received by EUCOM from Department of the Army for a carrier group to assist with immediate airlift operations to the Far East. (I, 2).
- 21-25 61st Troop Carrier Group moved from Rhein/Main, Germany, to McChord AFB, Washington, for TDY assignment with MATS. (I, 2).
- 28 USAF declared that henceforth it would neither announce nor confirm unit movements, and directed its major commands and subordinate units to follow same policy. (I, 2).
- 6 December MATS directed to move 61st Troop Carrier Group to Asheja Air Base, Kyushu, Japan, for attachment to Far East Command for administration, operational control, and logistical support. (I, 2).
- 16 USAFE notified by USAF that effective 1 January 1951 the 61st Troop Carrier Units would be permanently assigned to MATS. (I, 2).

II. Civilian Personnel

- 10 March Foreign post differential abolished. (III, 55b).
- 29 December New plan for appraising work performance of U.S. Army civilian employees substituted for the existing efficiency rating system. (III, 55c).

III. Germany

- 26-30 May Whitsuntide meeting of East German Youth (Deutschlandtreffen) held in Soviet Sector of Berlin. (I, 5; VII, 107b).

- 8 August USAREUR commanders directed to institute German-American relations program. (VII, 122).

- 17 Mr. McCloy communicated appreciation to General Handy for EUCOM German-American relations program. (VII, 122).

- 19 September Declaration made by Council of Foreign Ministers that the Allied Governments would treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Western Sector of Berlin, from any quarter, as an attack against themselves. (I, 10).

- Declaration made by Council of Foreign Ministers that Allied Governments would increase and reinforce their forces in Germany. (I, 10).

- 2 October Effective date of Internal Security Act, prohibiting entry into United States of former members of Nazi party or affiliated organizations. (I, 13).

IV. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG)

- 6 February Speech by Mr. McCloy in Stuttgart defined U.S. policy in Germany. (VII, 105).

- 3 March EUCOM requested HICOG to effect passage of law prohibiting sale of dangerous weapons. (VII, 119).

- 1 April Administration of HICOG German personnel taken over by HICOG from EUCOM. (VII, 108a).

- 19 Representatives from State Department, Department of the Army, HICOG, and EUCOM discussed logistical functions to be assumed by HICOG at Frankfurt meeting. (VII, 108).

- 1 May Major responsibility for displaced persons program transferred from EUCOM to HICOG. (VII, 112).

- 1 July Turn-over of OMGUS personal property from EUCOM to HICOG completed. (VII, 111).
- EUCOM ceased furnishing HICOG logistic support on a nonreimbursable basis. (VII, 108).
- EUCOM Logistic Liaison Office with HICOG Office of Economic Affairs discontinued. (VII, 108c).
- HICOG U.S. Occupation Requirements Branch, Office of Economic Affairs, created to pass upon propriety of requisitions by U.S. occupation forces for commodities and services from the German economy. (VII, 108c).
- Use of commercial overseas surface and air transportation begun by HICOG. (VII, 108a).
- EUCOM ceased furnishing HICOG with motor maintenance in Frankfurt. (VII, 108a).
- 1 September Purchase of expendable supplies and nonexpendable equipment begun by HICOG. (VII, 108a).
- 1 October Logistic functions connected with HICOG housing and offices in Frankfurt area turned over to HICOG by EUCOM. (VII, 108a).
- 9-11 U.S. resident officers conference held in Frankfurt. (VII, 107).
- 12 December HICOG license required of U.S. attorneys to practice law in the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany. (VII, 115).

V. Labor Services

- 1 August Labor Services Division established and designated a special staff division of Headquarters, EUCOM. (II, 33f; III, 51a).
- 7 EUCOM proposal to increase strength of Labor Service units from 21,000 to 31,000 approved by Mr. McCloy. (VII, 120).

- 12 August Commanding generals of USAREUR and USAFE instructed to increase Labor Service strengths by 17,000 spaces and to discontinue all but a small fraction of the Industrial Police. (III, 52).
- 11 October ZI procurement of 752 line items for Labor Service units approved by DA. (V, 77c).
- 20 USAREUR Labor Services Liaison Detachment organized and attached to Labor Services Division for operational control. (III, 51b).
- 11 November Labor Service rations improved in caloric content after experiments in U.S. Zone of Germany. (V, 77b).

VI. Line of Communications. (LOFC)

- January EUCOM and French general staff representatives met to discuss establishment of line of communications between a French port and the German frontier. (I, 12).
- March Negotiations with French Foreign Office to effect LOFC agreement between United States and France initiated by American Embassy, Paris. (I, 12).
- 6 November Agreement establishing line of communications from La Pallice-Bordeaux areas to the German frontier signed by France and United States. (I, 12).
- 28 Resolution requesting that a supply base be established at Brest adopted by Brest Municipal Council. (I, 12).
- 14 December Agreements for procurement for LOFC, and fiscal policy incidental thereto, signed by CG, 7966 EUCOM Detachment, and French military representatives. (I, 12; V, 78b).
- French American Fiscal Liaison Office (FAFLO) established to effect settlement of LOFC expenditures. (I, 12).

VII. Logistics

- 1 July Command-wide policy of local coal procurement put into effect. (V, 91b).
- 6 EUCOM Logistic Planning Board established. (II, 26).
- 1 August Policy of submitting separate requisition forms for ZI equipment inaugurated by USAREUR and USAFE. (V, 79).
- 15 September EUCOM priority in receipt of supplies from ZI dropped two places on DA world-wide priority list. (V, 74).
- 26 DA authorizes EUCOM to reacquire equipment sold to STEG. (V, 92b).
- 6 November Intergovernmental agreement signed by United States and France permitting U.S. armed forces to establish and operate installations in France. (V, 78b).
- 27 December EUCOM Logistic Planning Board reconstituted. (II, 26).
- 31 15,821 items of QM stocks allocated from EUCOM to USAFE. (V, 79).

VIII. Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP)

- 11-13 January Orientation conference of European Coordinating Committee held in London. (VI, 95).
 - 27 Over-all defense plan approved by the President, and bilateral agreements signed by U.S. and participating countries. (VI, 94).
 - 1 February Six Army Components of the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG) established, with stations in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Italy, and Denmark. (II, 41a).
- EUCOM SOP for Military Assistance Advisory Groups published. (VI, 97a).

- 14 February 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG) organized, with JAMAG Headquarters Director, the Military Assistance Program Advisory Group (MAPAG), and Plans North Atlantic Treaty (PLANAT) in London, and PLANAT Paris Group in Paris. (II, 41b).
- Army Members, Joint American Military Advisory Group, Europe, discontinued. (II, 41b).
- 13 March List of 20 courses available for MDAP students published by USAFE. (VI, 100).
- 15 EUCOM Mutual Defense Assistance Program Control Group established and attached to the office of the Comptroller, EUCOM. (II, 41c; VI, 97a).
- 29 Administrative Instructions for MDAP Army Training in the European Command published. (VI, 98b).
- 27 April Payment in local currencies of all special station allowances, and special per diem expenses, of MDAP military civilian personnel in continental MAAG's authorized by DA. (VI, 98a).
- 29 May EUCOM standing operating procedure for MDAP communications published. (VI, 104e).
- 10-13 July Eight "Class B" agents given special training in USAREUR Finance School for service in Military Assistance Advisory Groups. (VI, 98a).
- 1 August JAMAG United Kingdom Section organized, with station in London. (II, 41b).
- 21 Administrative instructions for MDAP Army training in European Command published. (VI, 98b).
- 8 September Fiscal and supply instructions for MDAP Army training in European Command published. (VI, 98b).
- 13 October Inspection tour of Military Assistance Advisory Groups begun by Army, Navy, and Air Force. (VI, 97d).

20 October EUCOM SOP for Military Assistance Advisory Groups reissued. (VI, 97a).

IX. Navy

-- January Study prepared on inclusion of Naval officers on the EUCOM staff. (II, 38).

31 Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, at Berlin closed. (II, 39).

1 February Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, re-opened at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg. (II, 21a, 39).

17 Administration of agencies of a joint character discussed by Generals Cannon and Huebner and Admiral Wilkes. (II, 40).

-- March Agreement concluded between General Handy and Admiral Sherman providing that four Naval officers be assigned to the EUCOM staff. (II, 38).

12 April EUCOM requested USNAVFORGER to assign one captain or commander to OPOT, one captain or commander for the Training Branch of OPOT, one commander for Logistics, and one commander for the Intelligence Division. (II, 38).

1 July USNAVFORGER commenced to submit directly to the Logistics Division, EUCOM, its requirements for specialized needs. (V, 80).

X. Organization

10 March Army-Air Force Troop Information and Education Division, EUCOM, redesignated as Armed Forces Information and Education Division, EUCOM. (II, 33b).

28 April EUCOM Budget Advisory Committee established to review dollar budget estimates. (II, 30).

25 May Secretary, General Staff, EUCOM, redesignated Secretary of the General Staff, EUCOM. (II, 33c).

- 1 June EUCOM Signal Messenger Service discontinued, effective 0001 hours. (II, 33d).
- 8 Mission of 7966 EUCOM Detachment published. (V, 78a).
- 31 July Special Services Division, EUCOM, redesignated EUCOM Special Activities Division. (II, 33e).
- 11 August CINCEUR directed that Office of the Comptroller make management survey of each EUCOM staff. (II, 31).
- 18 7964 and 7965 Area Commands activated, with stations in Paris, and assigned to 7966 EUCOM Detachment. (II, 42a).
- 17 September DA authority to create a field army requested by CINCEUR. (II, 24a).
- 2 October New EUCOM Budget Advisory Committee established to review all deutsche mark budget estimates. (II, 30).
- 15 November 7721 Claims Office Team discontinued with personnel and troop spaces transferred to USFA. (II, 33g).
- 2 December All military posts, including all assigned units, reassigned from USAREUR to EUCOM. (II, 25).
- 14 Provost Marshal Division, EUCOM, established as a command. (II, 33i).
- 21 Adjutant General Division, EUCOM, established as a command. (II, 33i).

XI. Seventh Army

- 20 November DA cable authority received by CINCEUR to activate Headquarters; Headquarters Company, Headquarters, Special Troops; and Medical Detachment of U.S. Seventh Army, and to inactivate Headquarters; Headquarters Company, and Headquarters, Special Troops, USCON. (II, 24e).

24 November Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and Headquarters, Special Troops, Seventh Army, activated at APO 46, effective 0001 hours. (II, 24f).

Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy announced as Commanding General, Seventh Army. (II, 24f).

1st Infantry Division relieved from assignment to USAREUR and reassigned to Seventh Army. (II, 24f).

All units previously assigned to USCON reassigned to Seventh Army. (II, 24f).

XII. Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe (SHAPE)

- 19 December Budget Division, U.S. Army, requested that CINCEUR give SHAPE all financial assistance required, and that he submit an estimate of funds necessary for this assistance for the remainder of the Fiscal Year 1951. (II, 19, 27b; V, 81).
- 21 CINCEUR's estimate of funds needed for required financial assistance to SHAPE rejected by Budget Division, U.S. Army, as premature. (V, 81).
- 22 DA general orders issued organizing, effective 20 December, the U.S. Army Element, SHAPE, 8478 AAU (Secretary of the Defense Area), APO 55, with station in Paris. (II, 27, 27a).
- CINCEUR requested by COFSA to furnish SHAPE all necessary logistical support. (II, 27b; V, 81).
- 24 All EUCOM forces placed by CINCEUR under operational command of SCAPE. (II, 27c).
- 28 Receipt of CINCEUR's report of all EUCOM forces under his operational control acknowledged by SCAPE. (II, 27c).

XIII. Soviet Union and Satellites

- 3 February EUCOM-Soviet conference held on reestablishment of Soviet Repatriation Mission in U.S. Zone, Germany. (I, 8b).
- 9 U.S. Graves Registration Unit granted permission by Soviet authorities to disinter bodies of U.S. officers and soldiers in Soviet Zone of Germany, and to take them back to the U.S. Zone (I, 8b).
- 7 March Protest made by Soviet Military Liaison Mission against new EUCOM regulation requiring seven days advance notice for issuance of travel orders. (I, 8a).
- 24 Three Czech aircraft landed at Erding Air Base, U.S. Zone, Germany, illegally and without prior warning. (I, 9a).
- 28 Passengers of Czech planes which landed illegally at Erding Air Base departed by bus for Czechoslovakia. (I, 9a).
- 3 May Czech planes which landed illegally at Erding Air Base departed for Czechoslovakia. (I, 9a).
- 12 Travel passes of U.S. Military Liaison Mission withdrawn by Soviet authorities. (I, 8a).
- 19 Travel passes of Soviet Military Liaison Mission revoked by EUCOM. (I, 8a).
- 10 July Alleged unlawful crossings over Czechoslovakia by American military aircraft protested by Czechoslovakia. (I, 9d).
- 14 Travel passes returned to members of the U.S. and Soviet Military Liaison Missions. (I, 8a).
- 2 August EUCOM published directive on travel of Soviet Military Liaison Mission, and of Soviets transiting U.S. Zone, Germany. (I, 8a).
- 12 Unlawful landing at Pottmes, Germany, made by Czech aircraft. (I, 9c).

- 17 August Meeting of Allied High Commission Council and Chancellor Adenauer discussed control of shipments of war potential products to the Soviet Union and its satellites. (I, 7).
- 25 Czech plane which made unlawful landing at Pottmes, Germany, departed for Czechoslovakia. (I, 9c).
- 20 December Accredited status of Soviet Reparations Mission withdrawn. (I, 8c).
- 30 Soviet authorities issued new passes for travel in the Soviet Zone by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission. (I, 8a).

XIV. Training

- 1 January EUCOM training program for 1950 prescribed by EUCOM Training Directive Number 1. (IV, 57).
- 30 January-17 February Phase I, Air Transportability Training Program. (IV, 66b).
- 31 January Command of Exercise SHAMROCK assumed by Lt. Gen. J. K. Cannon, CG, USAFE. (IV, 62b (1)).
- 20 February-24 March Phase II, Air Transportability Training Program. (IV, 66c).
- 1 March EUCOM schools and training centers redesignated as USAREUR schools and training centers. (II, 33a).
- 16-22 Exercise SHAMROCK held. (IV, 62).
- 1 April-31 July Phase III, Air Transportability Training Program. (IV, 66d).
- 14 July Army-wide intensification of training initiated. (IV, 60).
- 31 August Command of Exercise RAINBOW assumed by General T. T. Handy, CINCEUR. (IV, 63b (1)).
- 1 September Army Field Forces and Tactical Air Command Joint Training Directive for Air/Ground Operations published. (IV, 67).

11-18
September

Exercise RAINBOW held. (IV, 63).

XV. Troops

25 July

All normal foreign service tours and all voluntary extended tours extended for six months effective 31 August. (III, 47c).

28

All enlistments scheduled to expire prior to 9 July 1951 extended one year beyond normal date of expiration of service unless voluntary extension or re-enlistment accomplished. (III, 47d).

9 August

Enlisted career promotional procedures outlined in Department of the Army Circular 202, 1948, suspended and controlled local position vacancy promotions instituted; switch made from permanent to temporary enlisted promotions. (III, 47e).

2 October

Exploratory meeting in Heidelberg on question of stationing troops without regard to zonal boundaries held by Allied Government representatives. (I, 11).

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

Note: The following glossary of abbreviations used in the text and footnotes of this report does not include abbreviations contained in SR 320-50-1, 28 October 1949, and its Cl of 22 August 1950.

AB	Air Base
AHC	Allied High Commission
A/N	Allied and neutral
Asst	Assistant
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
B/P	Bulky package
C/	Chief
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CCFFA	Commander in Chief, Forces Francaises en Allemagne (French Forces in Germany)
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
Ch	Chapter
CINCAFE	Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
C/N	Carrier note
COMNAVFORGER	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany
CONAC	Continental Air Command
CTB	Combined Travel Board
CWS	Continental wage scale
D/	Director

DAF	Department of the Air Force
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)
DM	Deutsche marks
DF	Displaced person
DSD	Dependents School Division
ECC	European Coordinating Committee
EES	EUCOM Exchange Service
EUCOM	European Command
FAFLO	French American Fiscal Liaison Office
FDJ	Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth)
FECOM	Far Eastern Command
FFA	Forces Francaises en Allemagne (French Forces in Germany)
FMP	Frankfurt Military Post
FTX	Fall training exercise
GAO	General alert order
GARIOA	Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
GLS	German Language Section
Gp	Group
GYA	German Youth Activities
HICOG	High Commissioner, Germany
HCOMDCS	High Command Chief of Staff
Hist Div	Historical Division
IARA	Inter-Allied Reparation Agency

Interv	Interview
IRO	International Refugee Organization
IRS	Internal route slip
JAAFAR	Joint Army and Air Force Adjustment Regulation
JAMAG	Joint American Military Advisory Group
JCS/RE	Joint Chiefs of Staff Representatives Europe
JTF	Joint Task Force
Lbr	Labor
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAPAG	Military Assistance Program Advisory Group
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
Med	Medical
MG	Military Government
Mil Rec Scrng	Military record screening
MPB	Military Personnel Branch
Mthly Sch Pop Rept	Monthly School Population Report
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	Noncombatant evacuation order
OA&D	Organization, Activation, and Discontinuance of Units
Occup Reqts Br	Occupation Requirements Branch
OEA	Office of Economic Affairs
OMGUS	Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
OPOT	Operations, Plans, Organization and Training
ORA	Order for reinforced alert

OSA	Order for simple alert
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
P&A	Personnel and Administration
PLANAT	Plans North Atlantic Treaty
POLAD	Political Adviser
Prop Div Rep & Rest Br	Property Division, Reparations & Restitution Branch
PTA	Parent-Teachers Association
RIF	Reduction in force
R&U	Repair and Utilities
SCAPE	Supreme Commander, Atlantic Powers in Europe
Sec Sch Br	Secondary School Branch
Sgd	Signed
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers in Europe
SMC	Staff Message Control
SS	Schutzstaffel (Protective Guard)
STEG	Staatliche Erfassungsgesellschaft fuer Oeffentliches Gut m.b.h. (State Corporation for Control of Public Property)
Sub	Subject
Sup Docs	Supporting documents
TRUST	U.S. Forces, Trieste
UN	United Nations
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USCON	United States Constabulary

USFA	United States Forces, Austria
USNAVFORGER	United States Naval Forces, Germany
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCOFS	Vice Chief of Staff
VD	Venereal Disease
Vol.	Volume
Wkly Staff Conf	Weekly Staff Conference

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Accompanying EUCOM Report*

<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Description of Contents</u>
1	EUCOM General Orders 1-61, 1950.
2	EUCOM Staff Memorandums 1-26, 1950.
3	EUCOM Circulars, 1950.
4	EUCOM Circulars, 1950.
5	Commander in Chief's Weekly Staff Conferences, January-March 1950.
6	Commander in Chief's Weekly Staff Conferences, April-June 1950.
7	Commander in Chief's Weekly Staff Conferences, July-September 1950.
8	Commander in Chief's Weekly Staff Conferences, October-December 1950.
9	EUCOM Troop Assignments 1-9, 1950.
10	Selected EUCOM Directives:
	<u>1950</u>
	1 January EUCOM Training Program for 1950. Restricted. Tng Dir No. 1.
	Air Transportability Training. Restricted. Tng Dir No. 2.
13	Policy-Governing Procedure Per- taining to Control of VD Carriers. Unclassified. AG 726.1 PMG-AGO.
18	Letter of Instruction. Confidential. AG 322.011 GOT-AGO.
16 March	Transfer of Displaced Persons Pro- gram to HICOG. Unclassified. AG 383.7 GCA-AGO.
10 May	Letter of Instruction. Confidential. AG 322.011 GOT-AGO.
2 August	Travel of Members of the Soviet Mili- tary Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, and for Soviets Transiting the U.S. Zone of Germany. Restricted. AG 014.331 CAD-AGO.

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4 August

German-American Relationships.
Restricted. AG 000.7 GPA-AGO.

8

German-American Relationships.
Restricted. AG 000.7 GPA-AGO.
Reports of Foreign Aircraft -
Unauthorized Landings, Crashes,
Unusual Concentrations, and Over-
flights.

11

Confidential. AG 360 GOT-AGO.
Accelerated and Intensified Training
Program.

15

Restricted. AG 353 GOT-AGO.
Establishment of System of Good Con-
duct Time Credit for War Criminals
under European Command Jurisdiction.
Restricted. AG 383 JAG-AGO.

24

Letter of Instruction.

16 October

Confidential. AG 322.011 GOT-AGO.
HICOG-EUCOM Relationship.
Unclassified. AG 350.001 SGS-AGO.
Practice of Law by U.S. Lawyers in
the U.S. Areas of Responsibility in
Germany.

20

Unclassified. AG 250.4 JAG-AGO.
SOP for Personnel Assigned to Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Groups.

24

Restricted. AG 210.3 GLD-AGO.
Priority of Occupation Requirements.
Unclassified. AG 400 GLD-AGO.

30

Supply of Subsistence for Labor
Service Units.

15 November

Unclassified. AG 430.2 GLD-AGO.
Marriage.

21

Unclassified. AG 291.1 GPA-AGO.
Procurement in the European Command.

24

Unclassified. AG 400.12 GLD-AGO.
Expediting Procurement in the European
Command.

12 December

Unclassified. AG 400.12 GLD-AGO.
Practice of Law by U.S. Lawyers in
the U.S. Areas of Responsibility in
Germany.

16

Unclassified. AG 250.4 JAG-AGO.
Procurement of Food from the German
Economy.

Unclassified. AG 430 GLD-AGO.

Folder NumberDescription of Contents

11

Miscellaneous Selected Documents:

1950

17 January

Dissemination of Intelligence to
U.S. High Commissioner for
Germany.

Secret. Intel Div Policy Memo.

31 March

Information for Visitors to our
American Schools in Germany.

Unclassified. DSD Bul No. 29.

30 April

Status Report, Displaced Persons
U.S. Area of Control in Germany
as of 30 April 1950.

Unclassified. CAD Rept.

20 September

Communique on Germany by Foreign
Ministers.

Unclassified. AG 000.7 SGS-AGO.

12 December

Practice of Law by American
Attorneys in the United States
Area of Responsibility in Germany.

Unclassified. HICOG Policy

Dir No. G-5.

13 December

Chronology of LOFC Negotiations.

Secret. 7966 EUCOM Det Memo.

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